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“I like to think that if I hadn’t been a poet, I might have become an Anglican bishop—
politically liberal, I hope; theologically and liturgically conservative, I know.” 
—W. H.  Auden1  
 
Scholars have for the most part kept quiet about the intersection of queerness and 
Christianity in the poetry of W. H. Auden, a gay British modernist poet who immigrated 
to America just before the outbreak of World War II and converted to Christianity shortly 
thereafter.  A few have made the case for reading Auden as a queer poet.2  And a few 
have explored the Christian underpinnings of Auden’s later poetry.3  Rarely, though, do 
scholars examine Auden’s sexuality alongside his Christianity.  Instead, they tend to split 
his oeuvre into two Audens:  the early “firebrand” and the later “conservative.”4 
Queering the City of God explodes the scholarly myth of the two Audens, 
bringing to light the queer commitments of Auden’s Christian poetry.  His post-
                                                
1 Quoted in Ursula Niebuhr, “Memories of the 1940s,” in W. H. Auden: A Tribute, ed. Stephen 
Spender (New York: Macmillan, 1975), 116.  
2 Most notably, Robert L. Caserio, “Auden’s New Citizenship,” Raritan 17. 2 (Fall 1997): 90-103; 
Richard Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge:  Poetry and the Meanings of Homosexuality (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 2001); and Aidan Wasley, The Age of Auden:  Postwar Poetry and the 
American Scene (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2011).  In Regions of Sorrow:  Anxiety and 
Messianism in Hannah Arendt and W. H. Auden (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), Susannah 
Gottlieb also touches on some of the queer themes in Auden’s long poem The Age of Anxiety (1947). 
3 Alan Jacobs, What Became of Wystan:  Change and Continuity in Auden’s Poetry (Fayetteville:  
University of Arkansas Press, 1998); Edward Mendelson, Later Auden (New York:  Farrar, Strauss, and 
Giroux, 1999); Arthur Kirsch, Auden and Christianity (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2005). 
4 Wasley, 164. 
 
 2 
conversion oeuvre, which spans the early 1940s to the early 1970s, unfolded in the midst 
of two international crises:  World War II and the Cold War.  Fittingly, questions like, 
“What would a just society really look like?” and, “What role should art play in resisting 
a destructive political regime?” dominate his later work.  He gives decidedly queer theo-
ethical answers, reading his own participation in queer networks through the lens of the 
Christian faith to construct gay subjectivity as an anti-imperialist prophetic vocation. 
The queer networks that Auden participated in after he left England include (1) a 
group of gay artists—among them Benjamin Britten, with whom Auden collaborated on 
films, song cycles, poetic dramas, and the operetta Paul Bunyan (1941)—who met in the 
Long Island home of Elizabeth Mayer, a German refugee, from 1939-1941; (2) the 
riotous “February House” in Brooklyn Heights that Auden shared with several other 
artists (Benjamin Britten, Peter Pears, Jane and Paul Bowles, Carson McCullers, Golo 
Mann, Oliver Smith, and Gypsy Rose Lee) from October 1940-September 1941;5 (3) the 
Ann Arbor home in Burns Park that Auden and Kallman shared in 1942, a center of gay 
life at the University of Michigan;6 (4) Fire Island—a barrier island that runs parallel to 
Long Island and that features a lively gay scene in the summer—where Auden owned a 
cabin in the mid-1940s;7 (5) the village of Forio on the island of Ischia—like Fire Island, 
a favorite vacation spot for gay men—where Auden summered from 1947-1958 (and 
                                                
5 So nicknamed after the common birth-month of its residents.  For an entertaining biography of 
the salon, see Sherill Tippins, February House: The Story of W. H. Auden, Carson McCullers, Jane and 
Paul Bowles, Benjamin Britten, and Gypsy Rose Lee, Under One Roof in Brooklyn (New York: Mariner 
Books, 2006). 
6 Much to the chagrin of their neighbors as well as the campus authorities, Auden and Kallman 
hosted regular “At Homes.”  Unfortunately, Auden’s only literary record of the group, a masque that Auden 
wrote for his guests to perform at one of the “At Homes,” no longer exists:  “The Queen’s Masque, by Bojo 
the Homo, played by Kallman’s Klever Kompanions.”  Auden described it as “really obscene,” and reacted 
to the disappearance of the manuscript by saying, “I do hope the F.B.I hasn’t been prying up here.”  See 
Humphrey Carpenter, W.H. Auden:  A Biography (London:  George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 321-322.  
7 For a wonderful reading of “Pleasure Island” (1948), Auden’s poetic account of Fire Island, a 
culture of “naked power relations and humiliation” quite different from the queer networks that make the 
subject of the main part of my study, see Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 239-243.  
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where he met the gay German composer Hans Werner Henze, who collaborated on two 
operas with Auden and Chester Kallman, Auden’s sometime lover and lifelong 
companion); (6) the farmhouse in Kirschstetten that, from 1958 on, Auden shared with 
Kallman; and (7) the transhistorical spiritual communion that Auden self-consciously 
created in his poetry with deceased literary predecessors like Henry James. 
In addition to making an intervention in Auden studies, my rereading of the later 
Auden makes an intervention in queer studies.  As we will see in the following chapters, 
looking at how gay desire inflects the theological ethics of Auden’s post-conversion 
poetry gives us purchase on several current issues in queer theory.  (1) The pre-Stonewall 
perspective of Auden’s oeuvre provides a resource for thinking politically and ethically 
outside the strictures of gay pride.  (2) Since Auden’s relationship with psychoanalysis 
cooled after he converted, his later poetry provides a resource for talking about gay 
subjectivity without using the pathologizing concepts of psychology.8  (3) And Auden’s 
later poetry, the labor of a gay Christian polymath, has much to offer current debates in 
academic theology about nature, grace, religious epistemology, and how to do ethics.   
By rereading Auden to address contemporary controversies in queer theory and 
theology, Queering the City of God explodes two other myths about Auden, polar 
opposites of each other.  On the one hand, Auden has been criticized as a topical poet 
who writes so often off of the headlines that he has nothing enduring to say.9  But on the 
other hand, Auden has been touted as a poet of universal human values who omits 
                                                
8 For a brief account of Auden’s move away from psychoanalysis, see Mendelson, Later Auden, 
130-31. 
9 See Francis Scarfe, Auden and After: The Liberation of Poetry, 1930-1941 (Edinburgh: T. and A. 
Constable, 1942), 11; Charles Miller, Auden: An American Friendship (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1983), 24; and Edward Mendelson, “The European Auden,” in The Cambridge Companion to W. H. 
Auden, ed. Stan Smith (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 65. 
 
 4 
anything of particularly gay or queer concern.10  Neither of these truisms does justice to 
the value of Auden’s post-emigration, post-conversion oeuvre.  Rather, his Christian 
poetry debunks the idea of universal human values, treating ethics not as a set of abstract, 
rational rules but instead as a concrete, communal way of life that carries on a story about 
the world, a story that began at a particular moment in history in confrontation with 
competing stories, and that creatively evolves through ongoing confrontation with 
competing stories.  In other words, as we will see, precisely Auden’s appreciation of the 
concrete, particular, historically contingent characteristics of his thinking (as a gay man, a 




I.  PASSING FOR ONE OF THE BOYS 
Not long after England’s beloved poet caused an outcry in his native country by 
remaining in America after the start of World War II—and not long after he upset his 
leftist friends by joining the Episcopal Church—he wrote the valedictory “Atlantis” 
(1941) for his lover, Chester Kallman.  The poem connects the familiar themes of 
Auden’s post-emigration, post-conversion oeuvre (the quest for social justice, the value 
of dialectical thinking)12 to a less familiar burden of his later work.  A story about 
                                                
10 See Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 7. 
11 According to Mendelson, Auden claimed that he took an interest in reading anthropology “in 
order to confirm his suspicion of the provincial narrowness of all universal claims to authority,” Later 
Auden, 130. 
12 For a seminal early study that reads Auden’s dialecticism as partly a pursuit of social justice, see 
Herbert Greenberg, Quest for the Necessary:  W. H. Auden and the Dilemma of Divided Consciousness 
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1968). 
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passage and passing, a mash-up of the New Testament and Cavafy,13 “Atlantis” 
crystallizes the central argument of Queering the City of God:  that Auden’s Christian 
poetry constructs gay subjectivity as a spiritual faculty, a theo-ethical guide, a prophetic 
call.14 
Auden encountered C. P. Cavafy’s poem “Ithaca” (1911) in a French prose 
translation by Marguerite Yourcenar.15  Like “Ithaca,” “Atlantis” praises spiritual seeking 
as its own reward:  what “Ithaca” calls “le chemin,” “le beau voyage” [“the way,” “the 
beautiful journey”].  But Auden adds a note of queer vulnerability to the journey.  Cavafy 
reassures his traveler not to fear “ni les Lestrygons, ni les Cyclopes, ni la colère de 
Neptune” [“neither the Laestregonians, nor the Cyclopses, nor Neptune’s anger”].  None 
of these bogeys will cross the traveler’s path “si tu ne les portes pas en toi-même” [“if 
you don’t carry them in yourself”].  Auden’s lover, on the other hand, has much to fear 
from the outer world:  he will have to learn “[t]o pass for one of The Boys, / At least 
appearing to love / Hard liquor, horseplay and noise” (SP 125).16  In addition to queering 
                                                
13 Auden championed the Greek poet C. P. Cavafy.  Auden’s introduction to Rae Dalven’s 
translation of The Complete Poems of Cavafy (1961) praises his “exceptionally honest” gay love poetry 
(Prose iv 292). 
14 Auden has received less scholarly attention than other major Anglo-American modernist poets.  
As Nadia Herman Colburn puts it, “Auden sometimes falls through the cracks—neither fully English nor 
American, modernist nor postmodernist,” “Bibliographic Essay and Review of Auden Studies,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to W.H. Auden, 241.  But the past decade has seen a veritable flowering in Auden 
scholarship, particularly regarding questions that touch the edges of the present study.  Richard Bozorth 
wrote the first book-length account of Auden as a gay poet, Auden’s Games of Knowledge.  Piotr Gwiazda 
offered the first treatment of Auden’s influence on a later gay poet, James Merrill and W. H. Auden:  
Homosexuality and Poetic Influence (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).  Aidan Wasley extended 
Gwiazda’s inquiry with accounts of Auden’s influence on Allen Ginsberg, Frank O’Hara, John Ashbery, 
and Adrienne Rich in The Age of Auden.  Arthur Kirsch wrote the first monograph on the religious 
underpinnings of Auden’s later work, Auden and Christianity.  I offer the first book-length account of the 
intersection of queerness and Christianity in Auden’s later work. 
15 Yourcenar’s translation is printed in Présentation Critique de Constantin Cavafy (Paris:  
Gallimard, 1958), 103-104.  Auden also translated “Expecting the Barbarians” from a French translation by 
Yourcenar.  His translation appears in Heart of Europe:  An Anthology of Creative Writing in Europe 1920-
1940, ed. Klaus Mann and Hermann Kesten (New York:  L.B. Fischer, 1943), 285-286.  Auden met 
Yourcenar while living in New York.  See Edward Mendelson, Later Auden, 166. 
16 Kallman was leaving New York to join Auden at the University of Michigan. 
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the journey, Auden Christianizes the destination.  If his lover so much as glimpses 
Atlantis “[i]n a poetic vision,” he should “lie down in peace, / Having seen your 
salvation” (SP 127), an allusion to Simeon’s song in the Gospel of Luke.17 
The exigencies of queer survival produce a spiritual gift in “Atlantis.”  Through 
the perilous discipline of passing, the seeker acquires the ability to inhabit different 
subject positions:  Ionia’s rationalists, Thrace’s mystics, and Carthage’s prostitutes.  
Inhabiting these subject positions enables him to evaluate “each refuge that tries to / 
Counterfeit Atlantis” (SP 126).  In order to discover “the true,” the poem argues, a person 
has to become “[d]ialectic and bizarre”—a Double Man (1941), as the title of Auden’s 
contemporaneous book puts it.  Whereas Cavafy encourages his traveler not to think 
about his enemies, The Double Man urges the opposite:  a responsible citizen will 
incorporate other people’s “half-truths” into her own limited perspective (DM 42); 
healthy democracy depends on such self-critical dialogism.  Finding Atlantis likewise 
requires the queer seeker to understand other people’s ersatz utopias and to compare them 
to his own.  Passing, then, functions as a charism—a spiritual grace that enables the queer 




                                                
17 Holding the baby Jesus, Simeon says, “Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, 
according to thy word: / For mine eyes have seen thy salvation” (Luke 2:29-30).  Just a month before 
suggesting a vision of the incarnation to his “dear” in “Atlantis,” Auden wrote in “Leap Before You Look” 
(1940) that “A solitude ten thousand fathoms deep / Sustains the bed on which we lie, my dear: / Although 
I love you, you will have to leap” (SP 124).  As Humphrey Carpenter has also noted, the poem—with its 
description of the solitude that divides the lovers, and with its invocation of the Kierkegaardian faith 
paradigm—seems to implore Kallman to follow Auden in converting.  See Humphrey Carpenter, 300. 
18 For another paradigmatic reading of “Atlantis” that focuses on Auden as a post-national poet, 
see Wasley, 6-8. 
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II.  ODD BEDFELLOWS 
Queering the City of God takes its inspiration from Leo Bersani’s inquiry into the 
connections between sexuality and sociality.  In his short essay “Gay Betrayals” (1997), 
Bersani investigates “the continuities between desire and community, between our 
sexuality and the way we imagine sociality.”19  He suggests that, because of an 
“exemplary confusion” about the value of community, “queers” have the ability to 
redefine sociality in ways that ought to “command the attention of straights.”20  The 
confusion boils down to the tension between gay identity politics, on the one hand, and 
anti-identitarian queer critiques, on the other.  Queer thinkers at once take pride in a gay 
community and “de-gay” it (rejecting self-identification in terms of “an erotically 
determined essence” as an “inherently disciplinary project”).21  Bersani cautions against 
“the aversion to homosexuality as an identity.”22  When queer rhetoric erases the sexual 
specificity of gayness, it unwittingly constructs queer community along homophobic 
lines.23  Bersani wants to recover the notion of a homosexual subject to ask how same-sex 
desire shapes a person’s (and a community’s) political imagination.  The essay concludes 
with a possible answer:  homosexuality disarms ethnic, national, and racial differences.  It 
models “correspondences of being” and offers “an apprenticeship for a relationality 
founded on sameness.”24   
                                                
19 Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? and Other Essays (Chicago:  The University of Chicago 
Press, 2010), 40. 
20 Bersani, 38. 
21 Bersani, 39. 
22 Bersani, 41. 
23 But see David M. Halperin’s review of Bersani’s Homos (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 1995), where he argues that Bersani himself “de-gays” gayness.  “More or Less Gay-Specific,” 
London Review of Books 18.10 (23 May 1996):  24-27.  
24 Bersani, 43, 44. 
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Where Bersani wants “to trace the political productivity” of gay desire,25 though, I 
trace its theo-ethical productivity, extending his project in a direction that would probably 
disconcert him.  Religious practice lies outside his conception of homosexuality’s 
transgressive potential; it looks more like liberal assimilation than “an outlaw 
existence.”26  “It seems,” Bersani laments repeatedly, “as if we can no longer imagine 
anything more politically stimulating than to struggle for acceptance as good soldiers, 
good priests, and good parents.”27  Yet Auden’s writing from the 1940s on imagines a 
gay “outlaw existence” that takes a distinctly ecclesial form.  
Although I lean on Bersani for the central question of Queering the City of God, I 
depart from his psychoanalytic account of gay subjectivity.  Instead, my work responds to 
David Halperin’s call for an alternative (aesthetic, philosophical, sociological, or 
spiritual) approach to studying and describing gay subjectivity.28  The problem with 
psychology is that it “judges subjective life according to a normative standard of healthy 
functioning.”29  Reacting against its disciplinary, pathologizing language, and wanting 
“to distract straight people from everything about gay culture that might make them feel 
uncomfortable with it,” gay and lesbian politics has replaced “the discreditable details of 
gay subjectivity” with “the politically acceptable category of gay identity.”30  
Consequently, queer studies has largely bracketed questions of human motivation and 
                                                
25 Bersani, 42. 
26 Bersani, 43. 
27 Bersani, 40; see also 86. 
28 David M. Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want? An Essay on Sex, Risk, and Subjectivity (Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2007).  HIV/AIDS prevention provides the particular 
occasion for Halperin’s rethinking models of gay male subjectivity.  Halperin argues that HIV/AIDS 
prevention requires an “imaginative, resourceful, non-psychological, and non-moralistic strategy” that 
understands gay male subjectivity as “a subjectivity which is not a subjectivity of risk, an object of social 
hygiene, or a target of therapeutic intervention,” 109. 
29 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 9. 
30 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 5. 
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desire, placing a gag order on questions like, “What do gay men want?”31  To break the 
silence, Halperin notes a “persistent impulse” among gay male writers (including Walter 
Pater, Oscar Wilde, André Gide, Marcel Proust, Jean Genet, and Roland Barthes) who 
turn to aestheticism in order “to imagine and to represent human subjectivity without 
recourse to psychology.”32  My readings of Auden’s spiritual construction of gay 
subjectivity particularize Halperin’s broad claim. 
In fact, psychoanalysis began to lose favor with Auden himself once he 
discovered Kierkegaard (a shift that I will look at in more detail in the conclusion).  From 
Kierkegaard, Auden learned that, as “In Sickness and In Health” (1940) quotes, “we are 
always in the wrong,” even the analyst with his overweening claims to special knowledge 
and authority (SP 121).  Many critics read “In Sickness and in Health” as a coded 
epithalamium for Chester Kallman.33  With a gentle sideswipe at Freud, the poem 
implores God 
That reason may not force us to commit 
That sin of the high-minded, sublimation,  
     Which damns the soul by praising it, 
Force our desire, O Essence of creation, 
To seek Thee always in Thy substances, 
Till the performance of these offices 
Our bodies, Thine opaque enigmas, do, 
Configure Thy transparent justice too.  (SP 122) 
 
The prayer gives gay sex a place in Christian worship.34  Wystan and Chester “seek” God 
in each other, performing the divine “offices” with their “bodies.”  And the prayer raises 
one of the driving questions of Auden’s Christian poetry:  how might gay love 
                                                
31 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 1-4.  
32 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 5-6, 113. 
33 Most notably Alan Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 76-81; Richard Bozorth, Auden’s Games of 
Knowledge, 200-205; and John Fuller, who notes that Auden added the poem’s public dedication—to a 
couple he knew when he taught at Swarthmore, and at the wife’s request—two years after he wrote it.  See 
W. H. Auden:  A Commentary (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1998), 391-392. 
34 See Fuller, 393. 
 
 10 
“[c]onfigure” God’s justice?  (Although Auden leaned heavily on Kierkegaard as he 
made his way back to the Christian faith, here the poet positions himself against the 
theologian by imagining that an exclusive love might have ethical value.  We will learn 
more about Auden’s rescuing the exclusive love of friendship from Christianity’s 
suspicion of it in chapter one.)35 
 Toward the end of his life Auden gave a concrete answer to the question of how 
gay love might “[c]onfigure” God’s justice.  “The Garrison” (1969), a poem about 
Auden’s life with Chester Kallman in Kirchstetten, Austria, affirms that “[w]e, Chester, 
and the choir we sort with” have “a duty” to challenge the false values of “the City” and 
thereby “to serve as a paradigm / now of what a plausible Future might be” (CP 846).  
Readers who call the vision of “The Garrison” “a gay utopia” miss the point of the 
poem’s ethical imperative.36  The phrase “gay utopia” implies seclusion and unattainable 
perfection.  Far from simply withdrawing from “the City” in “The Garrison,” though, 
Auden wants to change it as he lives in “loyal opposition” to it, counter to its norms of 
“greening for the big money” and “neighing after a public image.”  And “the choir” he 
and Chester “sort with” aims for plausible, not utopian, changes.   
The metaphor of the choir indicates three salient features of the queer Christian 
social vision of Auden’s later poetry, features that will emerge as major themes in the 
chapters to follow.  One, a small harmonious community of artists on the periphery (what 
I call “the coterie,” a choice of term that I explain below) models a more just way of 
living to the center (“the City”).  Two, the outsider community takes an ecclesial shape 
(choirs typically serve a liturgical function).  And three, the community elevates fun 
                                                
35 And I here position myself against other readers of “In Sickness and in Health.”  See, for 
example, Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 81. 
36 For example, Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 249. 
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(“[m]artini-time” [CP 845]) to a serious ethic (“loyal opposition” [CP 846]).  The 
metaphor conveys these features through the shock of catachresis:  the ecclesial and 
aesthetic analogy (“We, Chester, / and the choir we sort with”) is disrupted by a martial 
analogy (“have been assigned to / garrison stations”).  The verb “to sort” means “to 
sortie” or “to come out of a defensive position (e.g., a fortress) and make an attack.”  
Because the noun “sortie” can also mean “a short, fun outing,” the martial analogy has 
camp undertones.   
“The Garrison” was first published in The Third Hour, the annual proceedings of 
an ecumenical theological discussion group of the same name that met in New York after 
World War II.37  The inclusion of “The Garrison” in a journal of Christian theology adds 
an important layer of meaning to the ethic of the poem:  it constructs gay subjectivity as a 
prophetic calling, not in the Romantic sense of poet-prophets as seers with “privileged 
access to truth”38—a self-important notion that Auden would balk at39—but in the 
biblical sense of prophets as people who rebuke the systemic oppressions of their society 
and live in solidarity with the marginalized.40  Queering the City of God examines key 
moments in Auden’s conceptualization of a calling that aligns the charism of same-sex 
eros with anti-imperialist prophetic critique—from the prayerful question of “In Sickness 
and in Health” to the playful answer of “The Garrison.” 
 
 
                                                
37 Along with Auden, regular attendees of The Third Hour included Jacques Maritain, Dorothy 
Day, and Reinhold and Ursula Niebuhr.  See Niebuhr, 91, 116.  “The Garrison” appeared in the 1970 issue 
of The Third Hour. 
38 Alan Jacobs, Shaming the Devil:  Essays in Truthtelling (Grand Rapids:  Eerdmans, 2004), 33. 
39 Auden called Shelley’s famous dictum—that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the 
world”—“the silliest remark ever made about poets” (Prose ii 348). 
40 Susannah Gottlieb offers a useful definition of “prophecy in the tradition of Isaiah” as distinct 
from “fortune telling”:  it “combines exhortation and contingency,”133. 
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III.  EITHER-ORS 
On the face of it, Auden seems like a strange candidate for such an inquiry; and 
my claim about his later work, an absurd move.  As I mentioned briefly above, scholars 
and critics tend to split his oeuvre into two Audens:  the early Brit and the later Yankee;41 
the early activist and the later quietist;42 the early queer and the later Christian.43  Randall 
Jarrell’s famous attack on the stylistic changes that Auden adopted in the late 1930s, 
“Changes of Attitude and Rhetoric in Auden’s Poetry” (1941), opens with a biting riff on 
Heraclitus:  “We never step twice into the same Auden.”44  Edward Mendelson, Auden’s 
editor and literary executor, has encouraged a less insistent but no less problematic 
bifurcation of Auden’s oeuvre.  In his introduction to Selected Poems (2007), Mendelson 
claims that “Auden’s continuing subjects were […] the special tasks and problems of the 
present moment of his own life and the world around him—problems that took erotic or 
political form in his early poems, ethical or religious form in his later ones” (SP xv), as if 
Auden never occupied himself with problems that took erotic and ethical form, erotic and 
religious form. 
The early queer / later Christian narrative of Auden’s corpus began with his most 
supportive readers:  American gay male poets of the mid to late twentieth-century.  James 
Merrill’s epic poem The Changing Light at Sandover (which features Merrill’s and his 
                                                
41 Or, more precisely, the early Brit (until 1939), the American (from 1940-1948), and the later 
internationalist (1948-1973).  After 1948, Auden spent his summers outside the United States.   He moved 
back to England in 1972. 
42 Aidan Wasley writes that “Auden begins as a firebrand […] and ends his career as a devoutly 
apolitical aesthetic and cultural conservative,” 164. 
43 As Alan Jacobs puts it, “[s]ome of Auden’s commentators have written extensively and 
sympathetically about the Christian elements in his later work, while maintaining a discreet silence about 
the embarrassing matter of his homosexuality.  Other, more recent critics have written extensively and 
sympathetically about his homosexuality, while maintaining a discreet silence about the embarrassing 
matter of his Christian faith,” Alan Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 73. 
44 Randall Jarrell, The Third Book of Criticism (New York:  Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1969), 115. 
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partner David Jackson’s Ouija board communications with Auden’s ghost) addressed 
Auden’s sexuality before any biography or monograph did.45  At the same time, it 
recreated Auden as regretful of his conversion.  Praising Merrill’s and Jackson’s occult 
practice, Auden recants his Christian beliefs:  
                                                                             GREEN 
MY DEARS WITH ENVY     I COULD CURSE MY HIGH 
ANGLICAN PRINCIPLES     IN OXFORD DAYS 
THE TABLES TAPPED OUT MANY A SMART OR EERIE 
RHYTHM UNTIL OUR POLITICS TOOK OVER 
THEN THE ABSORBING LOVES & THEN THE DREARY 
WASH     CONFESSION DON’T U SEE     THE CHURCH 
MY DEARS THE DREARY DREARY DEAD BANG WRONG 
CHURCH     & ALL THOSE YEARS I COULD HAVE HELD 
HANDS ON TEACUPS46 
   
Merrill’s Auden opposes the “dreary wash” of Anglicanism to the “absorbing loves” that 
preceded his return to the church.  Likewise James Schuyler, one of Auden’s New York 
School votaries, lamented Auden’s conversion (as he saw it) from psychoanalysis to 
Anglicanism.47  One might conclude from Merrill’s and Schuyler’s accounts that after his 
conversion Auden discarded his sexuality like an outmoded jacket:  the later poems offer 
nothing in the way of queer inspiration. 
Auden’s own offhand comments to friends about the sinfulness of queer eros 
make it tempting to accept the critics’ and poets’ bifurcation of his oeuvre.48  But (as I 
show in chapter two) a closer look at such comments reveals that appealing to norms of 
shame and sin actually allows Auden to assume a posture of shamelessness in his work.  
The sin of queerness, like the sin of converting to America, becomes a platform for 
                                                
45 Gwiazda, 29. 
46 Quoted in Gwiazda, 88.  Jackson and Merrill used a teacup to spell out words on the Oujia 
board. 
47 Andrew Epstein, “Auden and the New York School Poets,” W. H. Auden Society Newsletter 22 
(November 2001):  26. 
48 In October 1947, Auden told Alan Ansen that he had “come to the conclusion that it’s wrong to 
be queer,” quoted in Mendelson, Later Auden, 268. 
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critiquing the stagnant ideas and stultifying relational forms of the “Establishment.”49  In 
other words, shame gives a defiant edge to Auden’s theological ethics. 
Auden’s comments about Christian poetry, on the one hand, and his comments 
about love poetry, on the other, might also explain why some critics have been shy about 
reading his post-conversion work as (at least in part) a queer Christian project.  In a later 
essay on the relationship between Christianity and art, Auden confessed that devotional 
poetry made him “uneasy” (DH 485).  Devotion to a person in a love poem “is quite in 
order” because a reader knows that if the poet had fallen in love with someone else “his 
feelings would be exactly the same.”  Devotion to a god in a religious poem fails to make 
its point, though, because “the Proper Name proves nothing” about a poet’s love for one 
god rather than another.  Auden employed similar logic with respect to his love poems.  
He left the gender of their beloved “you” ambiguous; he refused to reprint them in gay 
anthologies.50  But we can ignore these worries without compunction.  Many of Auden’s 
later poems both imply homoerotic longing and presuppose a Christian viewpoint, a fact 
that Queering the City of God will make clear.51 
                                                
49 In 1963, Auden wrote to Christopher Isherwood that “[t]hough I believe it sinful to be queer, it 
has at least saved me from becoming a pillar of the Establishment,” quoted in Mendelson, Later Auden, 
455-456. Auden’s comment to Isherwood involves a bit of self-delusion.  As Lytle Shaw notes, the New 
York School poets recognized Auden as a member of the literary establishment.  In 1964 Frank O’Hara 
worried that anything he might say in a letter to Mike Goldberg would end up in “Auden’s definitive 
edition” of Goldberg’s correspondence, quoted in Shaw, Frank O’Hara:  The Poetics of Coterie (Iowa 
City, IA:  University of Iowa Press, 2006), 60.  Auden had already produced several such “definitive 
editions”:  Kierkegaard, Goethe, Baudelaire, Van Gogh, Henry James, Ernst Toller, and Frederick Rolfe, as 
well as anthologies of light verse, Norse verse, and Elizabethan verse.  But whether or not Auden 
overstated his outsider status, my point holds:  Auden’s rhetoric of shame creates a performance of 
shamelessness. 
50 See Gregory Woods, Articulate Flesh:  Male Homoeroticism and Modern Poetry (New Haven:  
Yale University Press, 1987), 168-169. 
51 In particular, Auden’s paeans to the limestone moors where he grew up amount to gay 
devotional poetry.  “Amor Loci” (1965), for example, praises God by elegizing Rookhope, an old mining 
town in County Durham, England.  The speaker’s love for the deserted, disintegrating mines “offers” him 
“a vision” of “Love” that “does not abandon” (CP 779-780).  “Industry” and “Mr. Pleasure” have given up 
on the utterly useless land—it has no “Cheap Power,” no startling vistas for “romantic” backpackers, no 
opportunities for buying “sex” or a Bordeaux wine (CP 779).  Using the commodification of sexual 
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Yet another reason why scholars neglect the queer concerns of Auden’s later work 
has to do with the poet’s penchant for revision.  Auden rewrote his politically charged 
poetry of the ’30s to line up, first, with his suspicion of writerly involvement in direct 
political action and, second, his rejection of Marxism and liberal humanism.  Sometimes 
he opted to axe rather than rewrite.  As Auden explains in the foreword to Collected 
Shorter Poems 1927-1957, “[s]ome poems which I wrote and, unfortunately, published, I 
have thrown out because they were dishonest, or bad-mannered, or boring” (CSP 15).  
Hence poems like the pro-Republican anthem “Spain” (1937), which Auden came to 
regard as “wicked” (CSP 15), did not appear in any of Auden’s collections during his 
lifetime.   
Edward Mendelson has addressed the difficulties that Auden’s penchant for 
revision presents by offering two editions of his poetry based on contrasting editorial 
principles.  Selected Poems (2007) returns to earlier versions of poems that Auden 
rewrote and recovers poems that Auden disowned.  Collected Poems (2007) “honors his 
final intentions” (CP xxi).  In the introduction to Selected Poems, Mendelson suggests 
that “[f]or most readers this book will be a First Auden, and the edition of his Collected 
Poems that was published posthumously according to his final intentions may be 
recommended as a Second” (SP xxvi).  (Mendelson’s volume The English Auden [1977], 
a collection of poetry and prose [including previously unpublished work] that predates 
Auden’s arrival in America, offers yet a Third.) 
                                                                                                                                            
pleasure to indicate Rookhope’s uselessness, the persona triangulates nostos, eros, and agape—
homecoming, sexual love, and divinity.  It is hard not to see lovelorn Auden in the description of God’s 
“Love” as “smeared, shrugged at, abandoned / by a frivolous worldling” (CP 780).  He continued to love 
Chester Kallman after the latter confessed to infidelity and ended their relationship.  So the final stanza 
adds another layer to the analogy:  an unfaithful lover, like a ghost town, can help a person understand God. 
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But there are problems with Mendelson’s claims about what Collected Poems 
actually collects; likewise, with his claims about what Selected Poems actually selects.  
Collected Poems does not always honor Auden’s final intentions.  On the difficulties of 
editing Auden, Mendelson has written that 
[a]nyone who edits 30,000 lines of poetry finds he must resolve hundreds 
of minor problems, and must do so in the knowledge that, no matter how 
diligent he is, he is certain to commit blunders.  In a textual tradition as 
complex as Auden’s, there are inevitably cases where diligence is not 
enough and an editor cannot avoid using his own judgment.  Most such 
problems arose in New Year Letter, where Auden made different revisions 
to his original typescript when preparing the British and American 
editions, and later forgot about the British revisions when he reprinted the 
American text.52 
 
Auden actually preferred the American text to the British, and Collected Poems mutes the 
queer design of “New Year Letter” by following the British text in one crucial instance 
(as we will see in chapter two).  Nor does Selected Poems quite “mak[e] available the 
preferred original versions of some thirty poems that Auden revised later in life,” as the 
back of the book declares.  It returns to the first book publications.   And when it thus 
eclipses earlier journal publications of “At the Grave of Henry James,” for example, it 
eclipses the queer concerns of the poem (as we will see in chapter four).  Bringing order 
to the messy textual histories of many of Auden’s poems, and bringing the queer 
commitments of Auden’s later work to light in the process, is a chief concern of Queering 
the City of God.53 
 
 
                                                
52 Edward Mendelson, “Editing Auden,” New Statesman (17 September 1976): 377. 
53 The Complete Works of W. H. Auden, of which Mendelson is the series editor, promises to 
present “[a]ll of Auden’s poems, with variant readings” (CP xxi).  Thus readers should eventually have 




IV.  GOSSIP & GOSPEL 
A handful of readers have looked at the relationship between Christianity and gay 
desire in Auden’s love poems,54 and they, too, subscribe to the facile “two Audens” 
myth:  they posit an early philanderer and a later husband.55  Their readings focus on 
Auden’s construction of romantic love (eros) as a preparation for spiritual love (agape), a 
human image of the divine.  But almost no one looks beyond poems that explicitly 
address romantic love to ask how gay desire inflects the ethical questions at the heart of 
Auden’s later work:  What does “building the Just City” involve (DM 65)?  How might 
artists offer a non-coercive account of the task?56  From the 1940s on, Auden saw these 
questions as inescapably theo-ethical, which is to say that their very formulation needed 
to be grounded in a religious story.57  Auden found such narrative-based presuppositions 
                                                
54 See especially Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 73-95. 
55 Edward Mendelson writes that Auden’s “early poems are for intense love affairs that end 
quickly; the later poems are for marriage,” Early Auden (New York:  The Viking Press, 1981), 22.  But 
Auden’s posthumously printed poems “Glad,” “Aubade,” and “Minnelied” belie Mendelson’s claim.  The 
persona of “Aubade” (1964) “takes a street-car, happy / after a night of love” (CP 746).  The speaker of 
“Minnelied” (1967) notes to his “Dearest” that “[w]hen one is lonely […] even a call-boy can help” (CP 
747).  And “Glad” (1964) celebrates a relationship that is neither a marriage nor a transitory love affair.  
While he lived in Kirchstetten, Auden slept with a young Viennese auto-mechanic in exchange for money.  
They slept together for over a decade, even after the boy married.  The relationship that started out “Strich 
and Freier” (hustler and client) became one of mutual affection:  “A romance / In full fig it ain’t, / Nor a 
naked letch either” (CP 746). 
56 I say “almost” because Richard Bozorth comes close.  Auden’s Games of Knowledge argues that 
homosexuality figures in Auden’s religious poetry in a couple of key ways.  First, Auden develops a “queer 
theodicy” in which “divine love mirrors the unspeakability of homosexual love.”  Hence “Friday’s Child” 
(1958) emphasizes the humiliation of Jesus and the silence after Jesus’s death, 222.  Second, “crookedness” 
or “sexual deviance” symbolizes “the contingency that necessarily conditions the human search for divine 
truth,” 223.  Consider, for example, the self-interested “anglers” who bait “with the wrong request” in “The 
Waters” (1940), 228.  Likewise in “In Praise of Limestone” (1948), “homoerotic fantasy” constrains the 
speaker’s imagination of the love of God and the life of the world to come, 224.  Thus Bozorth explores the 
theological uses that Auden makes of gay subjectivity:  how does his poetry picture God?  I am more 
interested in the theo-ethical uses:  how does his poetry picture the church, the city, and the responsibilities 
of the poet to both? 
57 Auden came to this position through reading the philosopher R. G. Collingwood.  See, for 
example, “Romantic or Free?” (1940), a commencement address that Auden gave at Smith College:  “no 
thinking or voluntary behavior is possible without making some absolute presuppositions, or acts of faith.  
The intellectual will regard it his social responsibility to state what these presuppositions are, and to revise 
or restate them should fresh knowledge render them no longer absolute in their old form” (Prose ii 67).  
The “Preface” to The Sea and the Mirror (1944) asserts that neither “[s]cience” nor “[a]rt” (SM 3) but 
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in the Christian creeds and the life of the church—first Anglicanism and much later, 
when his Episcopal parish adopted a modernized liturgy that he found repellent, Russian 
Orthodoxy.58  And as I have already begun to suggest, his later poetry answers these 
theo-ethical questions through the trope of the coterie. 
 My choosing the term “coterie” as a way to talk about the queer anti-imperialist 
theological ethics of Auden’s later poetry may come as a surprise for at least a couple of 
reasons.  First, readers more readily attach the label to Auden’s early work.  For example, 
Auden’s Poems (1928) implies a coterie readership:  the poet Stephen Spender (Auden’s 
friend) printed the manuscript privately; moreover, the text covertly thematizes 
homosexuality by using the language of Mortmere, a fantasy world that the novelist 
Christopher Isherwood (a friend of both Auden and Spender) created as an undergraduate 
at Cambridge and later depicted in Lions and Shadows (1938).59  Similarly, scholarship 
about Auden tends to describe the poet’s association in the 1930s with Stephen Spender, 
Louis MacNeice, and C. Day Lewis as a coterie (called variously “the Auden Group,” 
“MacSpaunday,” and “the Pylon Poets”).60   
And a second reason why my choice of “coterie” may come as a surprise is that 
Auden’s later essays offer a rich vocabulary of community, one that might look like a 
                                                                                                                                            
religion, the “ripeness” of the “silence / On the other side of the wall” (SM 4), helps people bridge the 
awful distance “[b]etween Shall-I and I-Will.”  See also my discussion of Auden’s conversion in chapter 
two as well as my further discussion of Collingwood’s influence on Auden in chapter five. 
58 Mendelson, Later Auden, 518-519. 
59 Christopher Isherwood, Lions and Shadows: An Education in the Twenties (New York: New 
Directions, 1977).  See Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 18-53.  Lytle Shaw singles out The Orators 
(1932) as a key influence on Frank O’Hara’s coterie poetics.  The text uses the coterie mythology of 
Mortmere, thematizes “cells and collectives,” and imagines “alternative kinship structures,” Shaw, 59, 61.  
But Shaw leaves out the fact that The Orators implies that same-sex eros leads to disordered forms of 
community—either fascistic or isolating.  For a brief account of homosexuality as an evasion of real 
community, see Mendelson, Early Auden, 110-111.  For an account of the link between same-sex eros and 
fascism in The Orators, see Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 112-115. 
60 For an account of Auden’s association with Spender, MacNeice, and Day Lewis during the 
1930s, see Beret E. Strong, The Poetic Avant-Garde:  The Groups of Borges, Auden, and Breton (Evanston, 
IL:  Northwestern University Press, 1997), 123-210. 
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more apposite way of talking about queer anti-imperialist sociality than the seemingly 
anti-democratic concept of “coterie.”  In “The Rewards of Patience” (1942), Auden 
distinguishes between “a community,” which he defines as “a society of rational beings 
united by a common tie in virtue of the things that they all love”; and a “public,” which 
he defines as “a disintegrated community […] a crowd of lost beings united only 
negatively in virtue of the things that they severally fear” (Prose ii 154).  “Nature, 
History and Poetry” (1950) refines the earlier taxonomy.  Auden adds the word “crowd,” 
which refers to an aggregation of people who share no more than the basic fact of 
“togetherness.”61  A “society,” now distinct from a “community,” refers to “a system 
which loves itself”; it requires the presence of “all its component members” in order to 
function (Auden gives the example of a string quartet).  A “community,” on the other 
hand, remains the same regardless of an increase or decrease in members; it refers to 
“rational beings united by a common love for something other than themselves” (Prose 
iii 227). 
 But my use of the term “coterie” accounts for both potential queries.  First, much 
of Auden’s later work bears the traditional hallmarks of coterie writing (e.g., the address 
to a close friend that provides the organizing principle of “New Year Letter” [1940]; the 
personal dedications affixed to so many of his later poems, like the poems that make up 
the sequence “Thanksgiving for a Habitat” [1965]; the reference to “Chester” in “The 
Garrison” [1969]; or the textual variants that Auden inscribed into the copies of his books 
that he gave to friends).62  Through such hallmarks of coterie writing, Auden self-
                                                
61 Hence in “Sext” (1954), the third section of the sequence “Horae Canonicae,” the speaker 
declares that “the crowd rejects no one, joining the crowd / is the only thing all men can do” (SP 230). 
62 I discuss two instances of such personal inscriptions below in chapters one and two, 
respectively:  The Age of Anxiety (1947) and The Double Man (1941). 
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consciously creates a quasi-institution that unites the intimacy of communities (or in his 
later parlance, societies) with the political praxis of publics, a linkage that requires a word 
that falls outside Auden’s taxonomy of sociality.  Auden had an extraordinary fondness 
for taxonomies,63 and his later poetry does afford us other terminological options in 
addition to “coterie” (a point to which I will return after I give an overview of the 
chapters that make up this study).  As I will argue, though, these other terms can clarify 
Auden’s theological ethics of friendship only if we organize them under the conceptual 
rubric of “coterie.” 
Which brings us to the second reason why I have chosen the term “coterie” as the 
conceptual rubric.  Auden’s later work thematizes a more specifically queer close-knit 
circle than that named by his own relatively vague taxonomy of sociality (“public,” 
“crowd,” “society,” “community”).  Lytle Shaw has shown that, for Frank O’Hara, a New 
York School disciple of Auden, “coterie” afforded a way “to recode kinship structures.”64  
The “appropriated, superimposed, chosen, and contingent principles” of “coterie” as a 
form of cultural transmission subvert the hereditary and heteronormative principles of 
“the organic family.”65  It follows, then, that “[c]oterie […] is as much an idea about the 
social possibilities of affinity as it is a concrete sociological fact.”66  The “coterie” 
provided a similar oppositional tool for Auden, as I argue in each of the five chapters of 
Queering the City of God.67  Taking Shaw’s lead, I mean “coterie” in a simultaneously 
                                                
63 The annotations to “New Year Letter” (1941), for example, are full of them.  And for a seminar 
on Shakespeare that he taught at Swarthmore in 1943, Auden created a chart categorizing the various 
dualisms / oppositions that plague the postlapsarian world and that only “The City of God” can reconcile 
(Sea xvi). 
64 Shaw, 29. 
65 Shaw, 37. 
66 Shaw, 6. 
67 In terms of Auden’s own taxonomy of sociality, a family would constitute a “society,” a group 
that loves itself and that requires the presence of all members to preserve its designation.  A coterie would 
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more expansive yet more nuanced sense than the mere pejorative charge of anti-
democratic in-group rhetorical practices. 
Chapter one examines a shift in Auden’s coterie poetry.  Whereas in fact his early 
work (e.g., “A Summer Night” [1933]) worries that the contented complacency of private 
coteries restricts social change, Auden’s post-conversion poetry (e.g., “We, too, had 
known golden hours” [1950]) imagines a public oppositional role for marginal coteries.  
The poetry constructs coteries as quasi-institutional queer churches where civic renewal 
and re-imagination begins.  Auden’s theo-ethical account of queer friendship as an 
instrument of social justice, I argue, subversively rewrites mainstream attacks on gay 
networks (like the perpetually circulating conspiracy theories of “gay freemasonry” and 
“gay espionage”) as affirmations.  Auden thus positions himself against Christian 
theological as well as secular political attacks on the ethics of friendship. 
After chapter one establishes the broad narrative of (a) Auden’s take on the 
equivocal ethics of friendship and (b) his post-conversion change of heart regarding 
coteries, chapter two zeroes in on Auden’s first American book, the little-known volume 
The Double Man (1941), arguing that Auden’s conversion to America—as much as his 
conversion to Christianity—made possible his rehabilitation of the coterie.  The 
emigration created a platform for the shameless pariah-prophet.  “New Year Letter,” the 
book’s central poem, uses the syncretic ecclesiology of the lay Anglican poet and novelist 
Charles Williams to depict a small Long Island group of European exiles and sexual 
outlaws as exemplars of democracy.  Finding community in difference, the queer émigrés 
                                                                                                                                            
constitute an amalgamation of “society” and “community”:  it mimics kinship even as it replaces the 
naturalized bond of family with the queer bond of affect; it organizes itself around love for something 
outside itself (art, politics).  
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embody a prophetic critique of the various fascisms and nationalisms taking hold of 
Europe. 
After I make a case for reading Auden’s post-conversion oeuvre as a queer, 
theologically-driven dismantling of the Christian, Kantian, and Cold War suspicions of 
friendship (chapter one), and after I argue that Auden’s emphasis on his shameful status 
as an expatriate and a gay man give a shamelessly defiant edge to his theo-ethical 
apologies for friendship (chapter two), I turn my attention to what I call “the erotics of 
coterie” in chapter three.  Reading The Age of Anxiety (1947) alongside (a) the late essays 
and interviews of Michel Foucault and (b) Ravelstein (2000), Saul Bellow’s roman à clef 
about the philosopher Allan Bloom, I argue that Auden constructs the coterie as a 
reformulated erotic practice.  In this way, Auden’s later poetry anticipates a tradition of 
older gay male writers who mine the history of friendship as a resource for inventing 
subversive forms of relationality that make life less lonely for aging queers.   
The first three chapters thus show that Auden’s post-conversion poetry portrays a 
reformulated erotic practice of friendship created by gay citizens, émigrés, and exiles as 
key to the task of “building the Just City” (DM 65).  Focusing on the influence of Henry 
James on Auden, chapter four is an interlude between the literary concerns of the first 
three chapters and the theological concerns of the fifth chapter.  It turns from the coterie 
to the communion of saints, briefly exploring friendship between the living and the dead.  
The erotic wartime pilgrimage “At the Grave of Henry James” (1941) canonizes the 
titular sexual and national outsider in both the spiritual and literary senses of the word, 
naming James’s work an influence on Auden’s ecclesial coterie.  At once a supplicant 
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and a suitor, the poet invites James into a spiritual collaboration that mimics the queer 
Christic friendships in James’s short fiction. 
Looking at how gay desire inflects the theo-ethical questions at the heart of 
Auden’s later work, then, turns out to complicate the received view of the Christian 
Auden as decidedly unqueer and “devoutly apolitical.”68  In fact, recuperating the link 
between same-sex eros and democratic renewal in Auden’s later work entails 
reconstructing the history of what Robert Caserio calls the “citizen queer” in literary 
modernism.69  Turn-of-the-century Anglo-American writers established a tradition of 
treating “homosexuals as ideal members of any republic.”70  Take, for example, Edward 
Carpenter and Ronald Firbank, to name just a couple of queer British writers who 
inspired Auden’s later work.  Edward Carpenter’s The Intermediate Sex (1896)—which 
(as I argue briefly in chapter two) influences the construction of homosexuality in The 
Double Man (1941)—regards gay desire as the secret to “true Democracy” because it 
builds cross-class alliances.71  Moreover, the “double nature” of gay men and women 
gives them the ability to reconcile straight men and women by explaining “the two sexes” 
to each other.72  And Firbank’s The Flower Beneath the Foot (1924)—which (as I discuss 
in chapter three) provides the epigraph to one of the sections of Auden’s long poem The 
Age of Anxiety (1947)—portrays homosexuality and art as anti-imperialist.  Gay florists 
in the imaginary kingdom of Pisuerga evince “a liberty that is superior to the economic 
                                                
68 Wasley, 164. 
69 Robert L. Caserio, “Queer Modernism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2010), 206. 
70 Caserio, “Queer Modernism,” 207.  The figures Caserio cites as part of the tradition of queer 
modernism’s “alliance of same-sex love with egalitarian possibility” include Walt Whitman, John 
Addington Symonds, Frederick Rolfe, Edward Carpenter, Oscar Wilde, Ronald Firbank, Lytton Strachey, 
T. E. Lawrence, and Christopher Isherwood. 
71 Edward Carpenter, The Intermediate Sex:  A Study of Some Transitional Types of Men and 
Women (New York:  Mitchell and Kennerley, 1921), 107. 
72 Edward Carpenter, 36. 
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and state structure they adorn.”73  Auden never appears in literary critical genealogies of 
“citizen queer.”  But to read his later work as I do means to recognize it as a Christian 
contribution to an otherwise non-Christian literary tradition—an otherwise secular 
literary tradition, save for the influence of Eastern spirituality on Edward Carpenter’s 
Towards Democracy (1883)—that sees gay citizens as the key to healthy democracy.74 
Not only does rereading Auden to recover the queer commitments of his Christian 
poetry have implications for how we view modernist literary history.  I hinted at the 
beginning of this introductory chapter that it also has implications for current 
controversies in queer theory and theology, like what role abjection should play in gay 
                                                
73 Caserio, “Queer Modernism,” 208.  See also Robert L. Caserio’s reading of The Flower Beneath 
the Foot in “Artifice and Empire in Ronald Firbank’s Novels,” Western Humanities Review 51 (1997): 227-
235. 
74 Robert L. Caserio reads Letters From Iceland (1937), Auden’s poetic collaboration with his 
friend Louis MacNeice, as “Auden’s inward conversations, collaborations, and conflicts with two, indeed 
with three, preceding generations of gay elders,” namely, Edward Carpenter, Frederick Rolfe, W. Somerset 
Maugham, and T. E. Lawrence.  See “Letters and Iceland:  W. H. Auden and Generational Differences 
among Gay Modernists,” in W. H. Auden:  A Legacy, ed. David Garrett Izzo (West Cornwall, CT:  Locust 
Hill Press, 2002), 198.  For Caserio, “Auden’s absorbed relation to his gay fathers […] makes clear that 
[…] he attempts to reduce their claims for homosexuality’s heroism to [a] more modest scale,” 217.  A 
verse paragraph near the end of “Letter to Lord Byron” could serve as an example of Auden’s tempering 
the queer heroism of his gay predecessors: 
 
The Great Utopia, free of all complexes, 
       The Withered State is, at the moment, such 
A dream as that of being both the sexes. 
       I like Wolf’s Goethe-Lieder very much, 
       But doubt if Ganymede’s appeal will touch 
—That marvellous cry with its ascending phrases— 
Capitalism in its later phases.  (EA 109) 
 
Citing Hugo Wolf’s art song about Ganymede, and alluding to Edward Carpenter’s theory of gay men and 
women as forming an intermediate sex, Auden expresses skepticism about homosexuality’s ability to 
undermine social and economic injustice.  To try to vindicate Auden’s apparent underwriting of state 
power, Caserio reminds the reader that the poem layers intergenerational as well as intragenerational 
perspectives:  Byron’s, Auden’s, and MacNeice’s.  But I submit that we should take seriously the 
skepticism of the passage; it lines up with Auden’s general pre-conversion, pre-emigration position on 
utopian projects:  he saw them as “fantasies that evade the task of the present moment,” Mendelson, Early 
Auden, 172.  Only after Auden’s conversion to Christianity does his poetry begin to invoke the oppositional 
power of gay love and queer alliances unreservedly.  (Even The Orators links homosexuality to fascism.)  
Ecclesiology offered him a narrative of egalitarian possibility.  As Auden’s targum on Galatians 3:28 puts 
it, “in [the church] there is neither Jew nor German, East nor West, boy nor girl, smart nor dumb, boss nor 
worker, Bohemian nor bourgeois, no elite of any kind” (Prose ii 250).  In a very real sense Auden’s work 
gets queerer, more radical, after he converts. 
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politics and whether theological ethics requires the descriptive and moral category of 
“nature.”  Hence chapter five puts Auden in conversation with contemporary Christian 
moral and political philosophy to construct a theo-ethical alternative to the antisocial turn 
in queer theory.  Through close readings of For the Time Being (1944)—Auden’s 
modern-day retelling of the infancy narratives from the Gospels of Matthew and Luke—
and “Thanksgiving for a Habitat” (1965)—a paean to the farmhouse in Kirchstetten 
where Auden summered for fifteen years with his lifelong companion and erstwhile 
lover, Chester Kallman—I argue that the need for such a corrective arises from (a) the 
heterosexism of Christian moral philosophy and (b) the unimaginative limits that queer 
theory’s antisocial turn places on abjection as a creative practice of spiritual, ethical, and 
political resistance. 
In the conclusion I will argue for the urgency of gesturing toward a queer 
theological ethics, indicating why queer theory and literary studies ought to reflect 
seriously on current discussions in academic theology.  In addition to the obvious fact 
that such reflection facilitates more sophisticated engagement with deeply theological 
writers like Auden, I am interested in how theology—particularly Auden’s own Anglican 
tradition—might answer David Halperin’s call to find alternatives to the pathologizing, 
disciplinary language of psychology and psychoanalysis for thinking about and 
describing gay subjectivity.75  As evidenced by the camp spiritual style that Auden 
cultivates in poems like his Christmas Day letter to Chester Kallman (to which I will 
                                                
75 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 38. 
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briefly turn in a moment), Christianity can serve as the basis for a non-psychological 
queer language of love.76 
 
 
V.  COMING TO TERMS:  GAY LOVE, QUEER ETHICS 
Biographically speaking, Auden’s tumultuous relationship with Chester Kallman 
provided the terms in which he understood the Christian story.  Auden met Kallman, a 
Brooklyn student 14 years his junior, at a poetry reading in April 1939.  That summer the 
couple took a long trip across the United States that Auden called their honeymoon.  
They wore rings; Auden considered their relationship a marriage.  Two years later, 
Kallman informed Auden that he had cheated on him and that he would never have sex 
with him again.  (They maintained a close albeit sexless partnership for the rest of 
Auden’s life.)  Grief reinforced Auden’s new religious convictions.77 
An epistolary prose poem that Auden gave Kallman on Christmas day in 1941 
(five months after their marriage ended) attests to Kallman’s role in Auden’s faith.78  
                                                
76 I here take inspiration from Halperin’s remarks on Catholic kitsch (What Do Gay Men Want?, 
104).  As we will see in the conclusion, though, my turn to Auden’s camp spirituality—which is grounded 
as in a serious commitment to Anglo-Catholic theology—and my turn to contemporary Anglican academic 
theology for a non-psychological queer language of love proceeds along different lines than Halperin’s 
observation of the Catholic-kitsch-inflected tradition of abjection as creative resistance in writers like 
Genet. 
77 Auden officially reaffirmed his Anglican faith a little over a year after his honeymoon with 
Chester, in Octobor 1940, fully nine months before Kallman ended his sexual relationship with Auden in 
July 1941.  Yet Auden’s spiritual autobiography—a short contribution to the anthology Modern Canterbury 
Pilgrims and Why They Chose the Episcopal Church, ed. James A. Pike (New York:  Morehouse Goreham, 
1956)—makes oblique reference to Kallman’s infidelity as one reason for the poet’s Christian belief.  
Auden was driven to a murderous rage, “forced to know in person what it is like to feel oneself the prey of 
demoniac powers, in both the Greek and the Christian sense, stripped of self-control and self-respect, 
behaving like a ham actor in a Strindberg play” (Prose iii 579).  Mendelson reports that after revealing his 
affair to Auden, Kallman fell asleep and “half-woke to feel Auden’s hands on his neck.  He pushed them 
aside and went back to sleep,” Later Auden, 175.  Auden’s lyric “Nocturne II” (1953) concludes with the 
supplication, “Shine lest tonight any / In the dark suddenly, / Wake alone in a bed / To hear his own fury / 
Wishing his love were dead” (SP 210). 
78 For the full text of Auden’s Christmas Day, 1941 letter, see Mendelson, Later Auden, 182-183. 
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Richard Bozorth has observed that Auden’s letter “reads every figure of the nativity story 
in terms of his relationship with Kallman.”79  More precisely, the text reads not just the 
characters of the nativity but also the central Christian doctrines (the trinity, the 
incarnation, and the resurrection) in terms of Auden’s experiences with Kallman.  Arthur 
Kirsch has repeatedly stressed the fact that the letter “is an elegy, not an epithalamium.”80  
Edward Mendelson similarly reads the letter as Auden’s way of making sure that 
Kallman did not “miss the point” of For the Time Being (1944), a modern restaging of 
the infancy narratives from the gospels of Matthew and Luke—namely, that Joseph’s 
barroom worries about Mary’s faithfulness to him represent Auden’s jealousy.81 
Kirsch’s and Mendelson’s readings ignore the form of the prose poem, though, a 
feature of the text that brings it closer to worship than elegy.  Following a strict pattern of 
anaphora, caesura, and epistrophe, the text reproduces exactly the repetitive structure of 
litanies, public call-and-response prayers of supplication:  “Because [of something you 
have taught me or caused me to feel or because of some feature you possess]; / As this 
morning I think of [something about the Christian faith], I think of you” (emphasis 
added).82  Like an icon or a monstrance, Kallman facilitates Auden’s contemplation of 
God; Auden’s contemplation of God, in turn, reminds him of his erstwhile lover.  The 
liturgical form clinches the point, making eros itself a spiritual discipline.  More than 
                                                
79 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 284. 
80 Kirsch, Auden and Christianity, 26.  In his edition of The Sea and the Mirror, Kirsch again 
writes that “[t]his remarkable letter is an elegy, however, not an epithalamium” (SM xviii). 
81 Mendelson, Later Auden, 182.  By the time he gave Kallman the Christmas Day letter, Auden 
had written about half of For the Time Being.  Auden identified “The Temptation of St. Joseph” as one of 
his works depicting “the Crisis” in “l’affaire C,” ALS to Alan Ansen, 27 August 1947, Berg. 
82 Take, for an example with which Auden would have been very familiar, the structure of the 
Great Litany in the Book of Common Prayer:  “That it may please thee to [bless us in a particular way], / 
We beseech thee to hear us, good Lord.” 
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mourning the end of a sexual relationship, then, the Christmas day letter celebrates gay 
love as an especially felicitous mode of Christian devotion. 
The letter suggests a couple of ways in which, for Auden, gay love amounts to an 
apt mode of Christian devotion.  First, living counter to a norm leads to spiritual 
knowledge:  “Because in the eyes of our bohemian friends our relationship is absurd; / As 
this morning I think of the Paradox of the Incarnation, I think of you.”  By participating 
in a queer Christian marriage—and thereby at once undermining and upholding 
bohemian values—Kallman and Auden serve as a gloss on the odd dogma of a creator-
god-qua-created-person.  And second, the spiritual discipline of sex trains the lovers’ 
attention on their embodied god.83  Kallman’s and Auden’s “resentment against” their 
own bodies anticipates Auden’s remark to a friend six years later that “all homosexual 
acts are acts of envy.”84  But here the Anglican vow to “worship” his lover with “my 
body” transforms Auden’s envy of Kallman into adoration of God’s body.  Making a 
sexual pun on a word that in religious contexts refers to Jesus’s humanity, the letter 
gestures towards a reading of gay shame as charism:  Auden’s “resentment against being 
small” makes him think of “the Manhood.” 
A similar taxonomy informs the construction of gay subjectivity as a spiritual 
faculty in Auden’s published poetry.  Sometimes the focus is on shame and the 
frustrations of embodiment as the engine of the charism.  In such instances (e.g., parts of 
“In Praise of Limestone”) I use the word “gay,” for the most part avoiding the 
                                                
83 Like the earlier poem “Leap Before You Look” (1940), the letter constructs Kallman as a 
potential convert:  “I believe that if we only have faith in God and in each other, we shall be permitted to 
realize all that love is intended to be.” 
84 Quoted in Mendelson, Later Auden, 268.  As Mendelson explains, “all such acts are based on 
the envy of a partner’s greater strength […] Heterosexual partners, in Auden’s implicit contrast, can have 
strengths that the other does not have at all, and that each can therefore give the other.” 
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pathologizing, essentializing, and psychologistic connotations of the term “homosexual.”  
At other times the focus is on living counter to a norm as the engine of the charism.  Thus 
(for example) I have chosen the term “queer” over “gay” to describe the design of “New 
Year Letter,” following similar moves by Robert Caserio, Richard Bozorth, and Douglas 
Mao.85  “Queer” gives us better purchase on “New Year Letter,” a text that rejects the 
identitarian commitment of nationality, understands subjectivity as a discursive process 
rather than an essential property,86 and resists liberalism’s insidious suppression of 
difference (as I will show). 
To this explanation of terms I must now add that, over the course of my argument 
for why we ought to reconstruct the modernist literary history of “citizen queer” to 
include Auden’s later theo-ethical apologies for friendship, I will, in addition to the term 
“coterie,” employ several different terms from Auden’s poetry that are roughly equivalent 
to “coterie.”  Each term emphasizes a slightly different aspect of the coterie’s vocation.  
As we will see in chapter one, the “suburb of dissent” refers to the prophetic dimension 
of the coterie’s vocation (Nones 7); and “the Homintern,” a portmanteau of 
“homosexual” and “Comintern” (the abbreviation of the Communist International, also 
known as the Third International, an organization that began in Moscow in 1919 and 
lasted until 1943), underlines the shameless defiance of Auden’s writing about gay 
friendship during the Cold War (Prose iii 184-188).  As we will see in chapter three, “the 
green world” calls attention to the coterie’s work of preserving and handing down its 
                                                
85 For a reading of The Orators alongside Auden’s essays of the 1930s and early 1940s as 
elevating the “shamanic role” of “queers” and other political outsiders “of critically queer disposition,” see 
Douglas Mao, “A Shaman in Common:  Lewis, Auden, and the Queerness of Liberalism,” in Bad 
Modernisms, ed. Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2006), 218-
232. 
86 “New Year Letter” argues that “each great I / Is but a process in a process / Within a field that 
never closes” (DM 27); that “we are conscripts to our age” (DM 53); and that “the powers / That we create 
with are not ours” (DM 69).  No one is autonomous:  “we are changed by what we change” (27). 
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insights (Age 49).  And as we will see in chapter four, “the Great Good Place” gives an 
eschatological significance to the already politically valuable quasi-institution of the 
coterie (SP 130).  In spite of the fact that Auden had a penchant for taxonomies, he was a 
poet and not a systematic theologian:  organizing these various terms under the 
conceptual rubric of “coterie” allows us to throw light on the different facets of his 
theological ethics of friendship. 
I want to address the silences of Queering the City of God before I close.  First, 
from time to time I will have reason to bring up Auden’s biography.  Nevertheless, this is 
first and foremost a literary-critical and theological study of Auden’s theorizing of the 
practice of friendship, not a biography of Auden’s friendships.  Therefore, I offer no 
discussion of events that do not make it in some (however remote) way into his later 
poetry.87  Second, except for brief mention in the notes, I have, in the interest of space, 
left out discussion of Auden’s opera libretti, which make up a significant portion of his 
post-emigration, post-conversion literary output.  Moreover, I by no means offer an 
exhaustive account of Auden’s later poetry.  Instead, I have chosen to focus largely on 
longer poems and poetic sequences (The Age of Anxiety, For the Time Being, “New Year 
Letter,” The Sea and the Mirror, “Thanksgiving for a Habitat”).  I see my treatment as 
building on the work of Richard Bozorth, who focuses primarily on Auden’s lyrics of the 
1920s and ’30s.  I hope that, as Bozorth so wonderfully puts it, “[i]f such responses 
indicate the limits of this study, […] they also point to its suggestiveness and utility.”88  
                                                
87 To name an example that, had Auden written about it, would have been relevant to the topic of 
this study:  the demise of Auden’s friendship with Benjamin Britten.  Alluding to his friendship with 
Britten, Auden said, “If I am loyal to my friends it is only because nobody I know has been as lucky as I 
have in the friends he has made.  Only from one (he is famous and you can probably guess his name) have I 
been estranged, and that is a constant grief to me.”  Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, 375.  For more details 
on the history of Auden’s estrangement from Britten, see Humphrey Carpenter, 323-324. 
88 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 17.  
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Having just finished his BA at Cambridge, Rickie Elliott, the protagonist of E. M. 
Forster’s novel The Longest Journey (1907), complains to his friend Stuart Ansell that no 
institutions exist to recognize the value, or to encourage the longevity, of their 
undergraduate friendship: 
 “I should say you’ve been fortunate in your friends.” 
“Oh—that!”  But he was not cynical—or cynical in a very tender 
way.  He was thinking of the irony of friendship—so strong it is, and so 
fragile.  We fly together, like straws in an eddy, to part in the open stream.  
Nature has no use for us:  she has cut her stuff differently.  Dutiful sons, 
loving husbands, responsible fathers—these are what she wants, and if we 
are friends it must be in our spare time.  Abram and Sarai were sorrowful, 
yet their seed became as sand of the sea, and distracts the politics of 
Europe at this moment.  But a few verses of poetry is all that survives of 
David and Jonathan. 
 “I wish we were labelled [sic],” said Rickie.  He wished that all the 
confidence and mutual knowledge that is born in such a place as 
Cambridge could be organized.  People went down into the world saying, 
“We know and like each other; we shan’t forget.”  But they did forget, for 
man is so made that he cannot remember long without a symbol; he 
wished there was a society, a kind of friendship office, where the marriage 
of true minds could be registered. 
 “Why labels?” 
 “To know each other again.”1 
 
The “irony of friendship” that Rickie Elliot calls attention to is its simultaneous 
significance and invisibility, its importance for the friends who enjoy it and its 
irrelevance to the rest of society.  The modern Western world, with its sharp division 
                                                
1 Forster, The Longest Journey (Norfolk, Connecticut:  New Directions, 1922), 78.  See also David 
M. Halperin’s reading of this passage (on which my own discussion leans) in One Hundred Years of 
Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love (New York: Routledge, 1990), 75. 
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between the public sphere of politics and the private sphere of affects, looks down on the 
persistence of friendships like Rickie’s and Stuart’s:  men ought to scrap such boyish 
undergraduate loyalties in order to take on fully the professional and familial 
responsibilities of adulthood. 
To the modern Western mind, such boyish undergraduate loyalties pose a threat to 
the democratic polity.  Forster’s famous credo makes plain why:  “[I]f I had to choose 
between betraying my country and my friend,” he writes in What I Believe (1939), “I 
hope I should have the guts to betray my country” (a credo that we will revisit at length in 
the next chapter).2  Male friendship looks like a threat to civil society because the 
particular—which is to say exclusive and elective—ties of friendship undercut the 
Kantian mandate of universal benevolence.3  In other words, democracy depends on 
unconditional mutual regard, a sentiment that the chosen bonds of friendship undermine.4 
Hence Foucault suggests that what disturbs people about homosexuality is not gay sex, 
but gay friendship and the queer culture to which it gives rise (a point that I will take up 
in chapter three); and hence George Steiner, alluding to Forster’s credo above in an 
explicitly anti-gay exposé of Anthony Blunt, a British art historian and Soviet spy, 
famously regards friendship between men with hateful suspicion (a point to which we 
will return later in this chapter).5 
It is male friendship that poses the threat to civil society because, as Rickie Elliot 
knows, men must grow up and enter the democratic public sphere, the only “legitimate 
                                                
2 E. M. Forster, What I Believe (London:  The Hogarth Press, 1939), 8. 
3 Mark Vernon, The Meaning of Friendship (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 136. 
4 Alan Bray The Friend (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 2; Vernon, 138. 
5 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. I: Ethics. Subjectivity and 
Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York:  The New Press, 1997), 136-138; George Steiner, “The Cleric of 
Treason,” The New Yorker (8 December 1980): 158-195. 
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site of the male collective,” a place that has no use for schoolboy friendships.6  
Friendships between women, by contrast, pose no threat because the Enlightenment 
political dictates that repudiate friendship between men happen to classify women as 
private:  there is no pressure on women to grow up.  Moreover, friendship between 
women is presumed to be always interruptable by women’s relations with men.  That is, 
unless female friendships explicitly exclude men, as in lesbian networks.7 
In addition the to the modern secular democratic suspicion of friendship, some 
strains of Christian theology treat friendship as suspect.  Such theologies emphasize 
family metaphors in the New Testament:  Christians must forsake the bond of friendship, 
which is transient and exclusive, for the more lasting and inclusive sociality of 
brotherhood and sisterhood in Christ.8  Theologies that do endorse friendship, on the 
other hand, focus on the celebrations of friendship in the Gospel of John:  e.g., the author 
of the Gospel, styling himself “the disciple whom Jesus loved” (John 20:2); Jesus, 
weeping at the tomb of Lazarus (John 11:35); Jesus, telling his disciples that there is no 
greater love than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends (John 15:13). 
Friendship has not always had such a bad reputation, though.  Before the 
Enlightenment, friendship enjoyed public significance in political and ecclesiastical 
spheres.  To name one political example, for Aristotle, the justice of a democracy 
                                                
6 David Caron, My Father & I: The Marais and the Queerness of Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2009), 205. 
7 Caron continues:  “That women do not face exactly the same pressure to repudiate their 
community of female friends is due to the fact that they have been privatized as a group in the first place.  
No maturity is necessary, and female group friendship is as (deceptively!) easy to dismiss as a sewing 
circle, a Tupperware party, or a gossip network,” 205.  But as Bray points out, with the advent of feminism, 
female friendship has become “increasingly” a “public matter,” 2. 
8 For an account of Augustine’s and Kierkegaard’s suspicion of friendship as too exclusive and too 
transient, see Andrew Sullivan, Love Undetectable: Notes on Friendship, Sex, and Survival (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 240-243; and Vernon, 129-132.  For an account of Aelred of Rievaulx’s defense of 
friendship as central to Christian discipleship, see Bray, 254-261; and Vernon, 183-185.  
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depends on the extent to which its citizens are friends, supporting each other and 
pursuing common interests and values together (Nicomachean Ethics 1155a25, 1159b25-
1160a10).9  And to name one ecclesiastical example, in medieval and early modern 
England, friends would pledge commitments to each other by receiving the Eucharistic 
together, a bond that could heal disputes between families or reconcile rival factions in 
the church.10  Accordingly, civil and religious institutions existed to recognize and 
support friendships:  e.g., the ancient Greek quasi-institution of the symposium, an “all-
male drinking party,” as David Halperin describes it;11 or medieval and early modern 
Christian burial monuments celebrating a sworn friendship between two people.  There is 
no historical consensus, then, about “the equivocal ethics of friendship,” as Alan Bray 
puts it.12 
Auden’s oeuvre reflects the ethical ambiguity of friendship.  On the one hand, as 
Alan Jacobs has noticed, “no other major poet dedicates so many poems to his friends,” a 
quasi-institutional means of publicly canonizing a commitment between friends.13  
(What’s more, Auden’s friendship inspired many memoirs.)14  As I argue in this chapter, 
Auden’s poetry formalizes gay male friendship as a quasi-institution with public value—
a queer church that I will interchangeably refer to as the coterie, the suburb of dissent, 
                                                
9 Similarly, in Plato’s Symposium, Pausanius says that eros between men is of inestimable “value 
to the city as a whole and to the citizens” because eros “compels the lover and his loved one alike to make 
virtue their central concern” (185c), trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett). 
10 This is one of the central stories that Alan Bray’s monumental history The Friend tells. 
11 Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality, 113.  
12 Bray, 10. 
13 Alan Jacobs, What Became of Wystan:  Change and Continuity in Auden’s Poetry (Fayetteville:  
University of Arkansas Press, 1998), 68.  
14 To name some examples:  Alan Ansen, The Table Talk of W. H. Auden, ed. Nicholas Jenkins 
(New York: Sea Cliff Press, 1989); Thekla Clark, Wystan and Chester:  A Personal Memoir of W. H. 
Auden and Chester Kallman (London:  Faber & Faber, 1995); Dorothy J. Farnan, Auden in Love (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Charles Miller, Auden: An American Friendship (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1983); and A. L. Rowse, The Poet Auden: A Personal Memoir (London: Methuen, 1987). 
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and the Homintern.15  He thus defends the ethics of friendship against the Christian 
theological as well as secular political attacks that I have just summarized.  Moreover, he 
does so in surprising ways:  (1) he responds to the Cold War denunciation of gay 
networks as spy rings by corroborating the attack and rewriting it as an affirmation, and 
(2) the ethical praxis of the queer church of the Homintern includes the erotic.  But early 
in his career, Auden himself was equivocal about the ethics of friendship.  A good liberal 
humanist, he saw private friendship as contributing nothing to the public sphere.  Having 
flirted briefly with Marxism, he also saw the exclusive love of friends in a coterie as a 
temptation to classism and quietism.  And, as will become clear in the next two chapters, 
doubts about the privilege of his Homintern would linger even after he began to write 
poignant and pointed apologies for friendship. 
This chapter, then, traces a shift in Auden’s poetry after his conversion:  from his 
prior dismissal of coteries as politically suspect (which I discuss in the first section of this 
chapter), to his embrace of friendship as a form of queer spirituality with potential for 
prophetically critiquing and remaking the city (which I discuss in the remaining sections).  
There are, I argue, at least two explanations for Auden’s change of heart about the ethics 
of friendship—one theological, one political.  (1) Christianity gave Auden a vocabulary 
for understanding queer networks as erotic schools of virtue.  For example, Ischia, a 
Neopolitan island featuring Catholic pageantry and transactional sex, frees its English 
gay summer residents from their capitalistic sins of productivity and power, forming 
these queer expats in the virtues of humility and faith (the burden of the second section of 
                                                
15 I say “quasi-institution” because, as will become clear by the end of Queering the City of God—
especially after my discussion of “Thanksgiving for a Habitat” (1965) in chapter five—Auden’s coterie 
poetry, rather than institutionalizing the coterie, aims to invent new forms of relationality (like the coterie) 
and new ways of formalizing those relationships (like the aforementioned practice of dedicating nearly 
every poem to a friend). 
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this chapter).16  Moreover, the New Testament, with its picture of the network of agape 
resisting the Roman Empire, gave Auden a framework for understanding small affective 
collectivities as politically valuable (a fact that I will put aside for the time being and 
unpack in detail in chapters two and five).  (2) After the Nazis rose to power, Auden gave 
up on the promise of liberal democracy (or the Marxist revolution, for that matter) to cure 
social evils; he lost faith in the very kind of politics that doubts the ethical value of 
friendship (the burden of the third section of this chapter). 
 
 
I.  SUBURBS OF DISSENT 
“We, too, had known golden hours” (1950) propounds a vision of the coterie as a 
site of prophetic critique and civic renewal.  It is a dedicatory poem:  it precedes the table 
of contents in Nones; in the place where a title would normally appear, it bears the 
dedication, “To Reinhold and Ursula Niebuhr” (Nones 7).17  The poem opens with a 
celebration of Auden’s paradisiacal community with the Niebuhrs.18  They had “danced,” 
“body and soul […] in tune,” as their “tongues grew witty and gay” among “the wise and 
good.”  (Dancing is a recurrent image in Auden’s oeuvre.  With its suggestion of a 
positive experience of the body—something that eluded Auden—dancing generally 
connotes all things Edenic, Trinitarian, or matrimonial when it appears in an Auden text.)  
Divine grace goaded and sustained their intimacy:  they “[h]ad felt the intrusive glory / 
Which tears reserve apart.”  The pluperfect tense dampens the celebratory tone, though 
                                                
16 As well as the camp virtues of innocence, pleasure, and charm.  
17 The poem was printed entirely in italics, and my quotations here follow the original typography. 
18 Auden befriended the Niebuhrs in New York City, dining frequently at their home from 1940s 
on.  As I mentioned in the prologue, Auden also participated with them in the ecumenical theological 
discussion group The Third Hour. 
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(“had known,” “[h]ad danced,” “[h]ad felt”).  And when the pluperfect morphs into the 
past conditional (“would […] have sung”), the reader begins to sense a real weed in this 
Eden.  They “would in the old grand manner / have sung from a resonant heart. / But …”  
In other words, they might have said important things in a serious way, were it not for a 
decidedly ungodly invasion of uncultivated language.19 
After the adversative conjunction, the poem describes the political debasement of 
“[a]ll sane affirmative speech.”  The text sets up an opposition between “the promiscuous 
crowd,” along with “editors” and demagogues who “befuddle the crowd” with “spells” 
that reduce language to “a horrid mechanical screech,” on the one hand; and the coterie, 
the “we” of the poem, on the other.  (Recall from the introductory chapter Auden’s 
taxonomy of groups:  a “crowd,” unlike a “community,” refers to an aggregation of 
people who share no more than the basic fact of “togetherness” [Prose iii 227].)  The 
coterie must trade “the grand manner” for “the wry, the sotto-voce, / Ironic and 
monochrome”; it is the only “civil style” that has “survived” the “pandaemonium,” “the 
promiscuous crowd[’s]” awful co-opting of “words like peace and love.”  Critics read the 
dedicatory poem as Auden’s apology for the prosy levity of his later work—for the very 
style that characterizes Nones.20   
I submit that the poem also makes an ethical claim about the public role of the 
coterie.  The last four lines present a syntactic ambiguity: 
And where should we find shelter 
For joy or mere content 
                                                
19 I take “the grand manner” to refer to Matthew Arnold’s definition of “the grand style” in poetry:  
“when a noble nature, poetically gifted, treats with simplicity or severity a serious subject,” Thoughts on 
Education Chosen from the Writings of Matthew Arnold, ed. Leonard Huxley (New York:  MacMillan, 
1912), 84. 
20 Edward Mendelson, “The European Auden,” in The Cambridge Companion to W.H. Auden, ed. 
Stan Smith (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 55. 
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When little was left standing 
But the suburb of dissent. 
 
The full stop clashes with the interrogative syntax, so that the poem threatens to leave its 
own question unanswered even as it proposes an answer:  “the suburb of dissent” is either 
the place where “we find shelter,” or it is one of the few things “left standing” when other 
places that did offer shelter have been destroyed.  The syntactic ambiguity describes the 
ethical precariousness of coteries.  It acknowledges the temptation of coteries to ignore 
rather than reform the destruction around them.  The syntactic ambiguity thus serves to 
trouble the coterie’s conception of “shelter” and to show the coterie its proper telos.21  
Rather than enjoy the “mere content” of dinners inspired by “Escoffier,”22 the coterie 
should create a real “shelter” from the “pandaemonium” by becoming “the suburb of 
dissent,” a place where people rescue language from the abuses of “the promiscuous 
crowd.”  (Auden would eventually make the same argument in defense of the poet’s 
vocation.)23 
 If one rereads “We, too, had known golden hours” in light of the syntactic 
ambiguity of its conclusion, one sees that the poem divides coteries into what I call 
coteries of “dissent” (the reformers) and “Escoffier” coteries (the escapists).  The first 
                                                
21 Lest I resemble the hapless critic mentioned by Auden in the Foreword to Collected Shorter 
Poems 1927-1957—who “made a great to-do about what was in fact a typographical error” (CSP 16)—I 
must point out that subsequent versions of “We, too, had known golden hours” only slightly diminish some 
of the suggestive ambiguity by replacing the full stop with a question mark. 
22 Georges Auguste Escoffier was an early twentieth-century French gourmet known as “le roi des 
cuisiniers et le cuisinier des rois” [“the king of chefs and the chef of kings”].  See Pellegrino Artusi, 
Murtha Baca, and Stephen Sartarelli, Science in the Kitchen and the Art of Eating Well (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2003), lvii. 
23 In a lecture in 1968, Auden speaks “in the name of all my fellow-citizens of the Republic of 
Letters, that holy society which knows no national frontiers, possesses no military hardware, and where the 
only political duty incumbent on all of us at all times is to love the Word and defend it against its enemies.”  
He goes on to distinguish between two forces that corrupt language:  the “Idle Word,” which one speaks or 
reads out of boredom (e.g., “[c]ocktail-party chatter” and “journalism”); and “the Black Magician,” who 
uses words to dominate others (e.g., “[p]olitical and religious propaganda”), “The Idle Word, The Black 
Word,” ALA Bulletin 62.4 (April 1968):  403-406.   
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half of the poem (up to the adversative conjunction at line 13) describes the Escoffier 
coterie.  The second half of the poem describes the city’s ruination by demagogues (lines 
13 to 20); the unadorned, sardonic language that the coterie ought to use (lines 21-24); 
and the dissenting role that the coterie ought to play (lines 25-28).  Rereading Auden’s 
dedicatory poem in this way, one can see it as a joke and an exhortation.  Auden pokes 
fun at his own Escoffier tendencies “in the grand manner,” using overwrought 
abstractions (“golden hours,” “noble dish,” “true loves,” “the wise and good,” “resonant 
heart”) that exist in an exaggerated relationship of contrast with the city’s ruination 
(“debased,” “promiscuous crowd,” “mechanical screech”).  He then exhorts himself to 
inhabit “the suburb of dissent” using the more restrained idiom that he prescribes for it 
(“shelter,” “joy or mere content”).24 
With its worry about the redemptive role of the coterie, “We, too, had known 
golden hours” recalls Auden’s much earlier poem “Out on the lawn I lie in bed” (1933), 
later titled “A Summer Night” after a poem by Matthew Arnold.  Dedicated to Geoffrey 
Hoyland (master of the Downs School, a college preparatory school where Auden taught 
from 1932-1935), the poem describes a mystical experience of neighbor-love that Auden 
shared with Hoyland and two other colleagues in 1933.  As they chatted together on the 
lawn after dinner, they perceived an unexpected rush of caritas.25  Alan Jacobs has 
                                                
24 John Fuller speculates that the conclusion of the dedicatory poem to the Niebuhrs echoes a 
quote from E. M. Forster’s essay on T. S. Eliot in Abinger Harvest (1936), W. H. Auden:  A Commentary 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1998), 405.  Of Eliot’s deflated anti-hero Prufrock, Forster 
writes that “[h]ere was a protest, and a feeble one, and the more congenial for being feeble.  For what, in 
the world of a gigantic horror, was tolerable except the slighter gestures of dissent?” Abinger Harvest (New 
York:  Harcourt Brace & Company, 1964), 90.  The allusion to Prufrock via Forster would resolve the 
syntactic ambiguity of the poem’s conclusion and underline my reading of it as Auden’s mocking himself 
for his Escoffier tendencies.  
25 In 1964, Auden revisited the event in his introduction to Anne Fremantle’s The Protestant 
Mystics (Boston:  Little, Brown, 1964).  The introduction reuses the mystical language of “We, too, had 
known golden hours” to characterize what happened that summer night as “a Vision of Agape” (FA 70):  “I 
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argued—perhaps a bit too strongly—that the poem regards coteries as “morally and 
politically indefensible.”26  (Crucially, though, Jacobs uses the misleading phrase “local 
culture” rather than coterie, a problem that I will address in a moment.)  The speaker 
worries about the injustices that make his “[l]ucky,” egalitarian “ring” of “colleagues” 
possible (SP 30) as well as the “dangerous temptation to social quietism” that such 
privilege creates.27 
As oblivious to penury and war as the blank moon above them, the chatting 
colleagues form an Escoffier coterie.  Stanzas that Auden later cut from the poem (when 
he titled it and republished it in his collections) make the classism that sustains their 
intimacy especially apparent: 
The creepered wall stands up to hide 
The gathering multitudes outside  
     Whose glances hunger worsens; 
Concealing from their wretchedness 
Our metaphysical distress, 
     Our kindness to ten persons. 
 
And now no path on which we move 
But shows already traces of 
     Intentions not our own, 
Thoroughly able to achieve 
What our excitement could conceive, 
     But our hands left alone. 
 
For what by nature and by training 
We loved, has little strength remaining: 
     Though we would gladly give 
The Oxford colleges, Big Ben, 
And all the birds in Wicken Fen, 
     It has no wish to live.  (SP 32) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
felt myself invaded by a power which, though I consented to it, was irresistible and certainly not mine.  For 
the first time in my life I knew exactly—because, thanks to the power, I was doing it—what it means to 
love one’s neighbor as oneself” (FA 69, emphasis mine). 
26 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 55. 
27 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 56. 
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The colleagues love the familiar:  “Oxford colleges, Big Ben.”  Their easy ethic of 
“kindness to ten persons” reveals them as selfish, selective in their altruism.  (The phrase 
recalls the novel by E. M. Forster with which I opened this chapter.  The Longest Journey 
[1907] celebrates just the sort of Oxbridge friendship that Auden’s poem depicts.  During 
his callow Cambridge years, Rickie Elliott “believes in humanity because he knows a 
dozen decent people.”28)  But a power more capable than the coterie suffuses it with 
better “[i]ntentions,” reminding the colleagues how to love the “outside.”  (The 
“wretchedness” of the “gathering multitudes” echoes the “huddled masses” and 
“wretched refuse” of the American poet Emma Lazarus’s ironic welcome to immigrants 
arriving in New York City, “The New Colossus” [1883].29  Thus Auden’s poem wants to 
dismantle barriers of nation as well as of class.) 
As a subtle portrait of a divine power’s operations on a group of friends, “Out on 
the lawn I lie in bed” offers an inkling of Auden’s later theology of queer community as 
an instrument of social justice.  The equal “ring,” for example, alludes to the early 
Christian love-feast, where the faithful would eat dinner together and then sing, arrange 
themselves in a ring-formation, share the kiss of peace, and do spiritual exercises.30  Such 
hints of a queer spirituality remain theoretical, though.  The group never puts its mystical 
experience of agape into practice.  They can “conceive” of God’s love, but their “hands” 
leave it “alone.”  Even so, the experience of neighbor-love within the coterie has moved 
the speaker to rebuke the coterie for not carrying neighbor-love “outside” the “wall.”  A 
word that reappears in “We, too, had known golden hours” indicates the scandal of their 
                                                
28 E. M. Forster, The Longest Journey, 75. 
29 Emma Lazarus, Selected Poems, ed. John Hollander (New York:  Library of America, 2005), 
58. 
30 Fuller, 149.  
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“[l]ucky” community (SP 30):  like a flood, a social revolution will break “through the 
dykes of our content,” and it will “[h]old sudden death before our eyes” (SP 32, emphasis 
mine).  The speaker of the poem accuses the group of having nourished mere “river-
dreams” that “long hid the size / And vigours of the sea.”  Their contentment has 
restricted—and their small dreaming, obscured—social change. 
The poem thus articulates a vaguely Marxist political critique of friendship.  
Marxism, like some strains of Christian theology and like modern Western political 
thought, rejects the exclusive, particular love of friendship:  where some strains of 
Christian theology oppose friendship to the idea of brotherhood and sisterhood in Christ, 
and where Kantian ethics opposes it to universal benevolence, Marxism opposes 
friendship to comradeship.  Auden briefly flirted with Marxist ideas at the beginning of 
the 1930s, enough to earn him a reputation as a Marxist, but he never actually became a 
Marxist.  He was something of a Marxist manqué:  about a year before he wrote “Out on 
the lawn I lie in bed,” Auden told a friend, “No.  I am a bourgeois.  I shall not join the 
C.P.”31 
Although “Out on the lawn I lie in bed” castigates the complacent coterie for 
impeding social progress, the poem hopes (in each of its printed versions) that the coterie 
may somehow participate in the germination of a new order.  But unlike “We, too, had 
known golden hours,” it concludes with a vague supplication about, rather than a specific 
prescription for, the coterie’s role in achieving social justice: 
But when the waters make retreat 
And through the black mud first the wheat 
     In shy green stalks appears; 
When stranded monsters gasping lie, 
                                                
31 Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, W. H. Auden: A Biography (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1981), 153.  See also Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 57. 
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And sounds of riveting terrify 
     Their whorled unsubtle ears: 
 
May this for which we dread to lose 
Our privacy, need no excuse 
     But to that strength belong; 
As through a child’s rash happy cries 
The drowned voices of his parents rise 
     In unlamenting song.   
 
After discharges of alarm, 
All unpredicted may it calm 
     The pulse of nervous nations; 
Forgive the murderer in his glass, 
Tough in its patience to surpass  
     The tigress her swift motions.  (SP 32-33) 
 
In other words:  May coteries require no defending; may this happy circle “belong” to 
that biblical vision of shalom.  (The retreating of “the waters” recalls Psalm 77:16; the 
“shy green stalks” recall the 1928 Anglican hymn, “Now the green blade riseth.”)32  Note 
the optative mood of the stanzas:  May our circle be an ancestor of the new order where 
“stranded monsters gasping lie”; may we bring calm, forgiveness, patience, and peace to 
the “nervous nations.”  (The “tigress” likely alludes to Wilfred Owens’s “Strange 
Meeting,” in which soldiers “will be swift with the swiftness of the tigress.”)33  What, 
then, allowed Auden eventually to make the firmer, clearer injunction of “We, too, had 
known golden hours”—that the coterie must function as “a suburb of dissent,” a critical 
“shelter” from uncritical, ideologically driven corruptions of language? 
We could trace the narrative of Auden’s evolving thoughts about coteries even 
further back, starting with his cryptic poetry of the late 1920s.  Readers disagree about 
whether to read the telegraphic, elliptical style of Poems (1930) as a secret code for a 
                                                
32 Auden later rewrote the last two stanzas for clarity:  “May these delights we dread to lose, / This 
privacy, need no excuse”; “All unpredicted let them [i.e., the delights] calm / The pulse of nervous nations” 
(CP 118-119). 
33 The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen (New York:  New Directions, 1965), 35. 
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coterie.  Edward Mendelson argues that “[r]eviewers and critics missed the point when 
they inferred from the poems’ elusive privacy the existence of a coterie who shared the 
meanings and got the jokes; Auden’s friends were as much in the dark as everyone else 
was” (SP xix).  For Richard Bozorth, by contrast, Auden’s earliest poems divide his 
audience into the initiated (Auden’s circle of gay literary friends, including the poet 
Stephen Spender and the novelist Christopher Isherwood) and the uninitiated (everyone 
else).  The poems “tell the uninitiated they are just that” by drawing on Spender’s and 
Isherwood’s code words for gay desire.34  And the poems employ “tropes of espionage” 
to portray “the closeted homosexual and the homosexual poet.”35   
If we accept Bozorth’s account, I think we can conclude two things.  One, 
Auden’s sense of what a coterie might (or should) look like changed after his conversion 
to Christianity.  Ever suspicious of Escoffier coteries, he began to imagine a coterie of 
dissent—a coterie with a public role.  And two, it is his pre-conversion conception of 
coteries as private language games that Auden rejected when he said, in an “Address on 
Henry James” to the Grolier Club in 1947, that “the brilliant salon, the defiant 
revolutionary group in the cheap café, the costly romantic tie, all the old charms and 
cozinesses have vanished forever, and every attempt at their reconstruction is a fake and 
doomed to failure” (Prose ii 302).  Unlike each of these three collectivities, Auden’s 
post-conversion conception of coteries recognizes the fundamental “aloneness” of every 
person in modern industrial societies (as we will see in the next chapter) and the 
                                                
34 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge: Poetry and the Meanings of Homosexuality (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 2001), 24. 
35 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 20.  Reading Auden’s early tropes of espionage as a 
practice of gay self-fashioning (and as a practice of self-conscious coding) becomes especially interesting 
in light of the discourse of the “Homintern” that Auden adopts after his emigration and conversion, a trope 
that I will discuss later in this chapter. 
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consequent responsibility of communities to guard against fascistic restorations of “the 
old charms and cozinesses.”36 
The afterlife of  “Out on the lawn I lie in bed”—as “A Summer Night”—shows us 
another way of reading the poem, one that brings it more in line with Auden’s post-
conversion depictions of queer community as sacramental (e.g., “New Year Letter,” as 
we will see in the next chapter).  In Epistemology of the Closet (1990), Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick writes of discovering the poem via a New York Times obituary dated 23 July 
1988.  The unsigned obituary quotes the fourth stanza of the poem in memory of a man 
who had died the previous day (presumably of AIDS, as the year and the anonymity of 
the memorial suggest): 
That later we, though parted then 
May still recall these evenings when 
     Fear gave his watch no look; 
The lion griefs loped from the shade 
And on our knees their muzzles laid, 
     And Death put down his book.37   
 
The obituary reads the poem as a prayer that this privileged opportunity may turn out to 
have fortified the coterie durably for the real trials that lie ahead.  Auden’s revisions to 
“Out on the lawn I lie in bed” for Collected Poetry (1945) downplay the indictment of 
coteries, encouraging appropriations like the obituary’s.  Dropping the class analysis of 
stanzas 10–12 entirely, the rewrite no longer rebukes the coterie for the naiveté of its 
“kindness to ten persons” on the wealthy side of the ivy “wall.”  It retains the reference to 
the dispute over the Polish Corridor, though:  the colleagues still “do not care to know, / 
                                                
36 In the “Address,” Auden goes on to say that “each must go his way alone, every step of it, 
learning for himself by painful trial and shaming error, and never resting long on any triumph, but soon 
proceeding to risk total defeat in some fresh or more difficult task” (Prose ii 303). 
37 Quoted in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2008), 181. 
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Where Poland draws her Eastern bow” (CP 118).  Thus the coterie no longer plays a role 
in a system of oppression; it simply offers respite from newspaper headlines about global 
“violence.”  The variant analogies for the moon’s blank stare—an “orphan” in the 
original (SP 31), a “butcher” in the revision (CP 118)—reinforce the different emphases 
of the two versions. 
But to return to the question at hand:  what explains the ethical shift from the 
vague hope of “Out on the lawn I lie in bed” to the clear imperative of “We, too, had 
known golden hours?”  If we believe Alan Jacobs, Auden concluded by 1940 that “all 
dreams of universal or even national unity” were “fundamentally absurd,”38 and he 
therefore decided “to cultivate local knowledge and local attachments.”  Contrasting what 
he calls Auden’s exaltation of “locality and particularity” in “New Year Letter” (1941) 
with T. S. Eliot’s repudiation of “the insular and the parochial” in “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” (1921),39 Jacobs goes as far as calling Auden “one of the more 
interesting, if largely unacknowledged, predecessors of the contemporary communitarian 
movement.”40  Duly noting that different thinkers have poured wildly divergent meanings 
into the catch-all term “communitarianism,” Jacobs gives a broad definition:  
communitarianism prefers a small polity of tight-knit affective bonds to large 
organizations like national governments and multinational corporations.41 
Jacobs’s argument about Auden has a number of problems—not the least of 
which is the contrast that he draws between a purportedly cosmopolitan Eliot and a 
purportedly communitarian Auden.  Part of the trouble with the argument is that Jacobs 
                                                
38 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 51, 53. 
39 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 66. 
40 Alan Jacobs, “Auden’s Local Culture,” The Hudson Review 47.4 (Winter 1995): 54. 
41 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 50. 
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contrasts Auden’s supposedly communitarian portrayal of friendship in “New Year 
Letter” with Eliot’s supposedly cosmopolitan theory of literary tradition in “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent.”  In other words, Jacobs treats these two phenomena—friendship, 
on the one hand, and theory of literary tradition, on the other—as if they were close 
enough in kind to allow for a meaningful contrast.42  But a more meaningful question to 
ask would be, “How do Eliot’s and Auden’s views of literary tradition differ?”  Or, “How 
do Eliot’s and Auden’s representations of community differ?” 
Regarding the first question, a quick glance at “New Year Letter”—with its 
Augustan rhyming octosyllabic couplets, its frequent code-switching (from English to 
German, French, and Latin), and its crazy annotations referencing ancient as well as 
modern texts from a variety of disciplines and cultures—shows clearly that Auden rejects 
any “insular and parochial” conception of literary tradition.  Moreover, in essays written 
around the time of “New Year Letter,” Auden shares Eliot’s conception of a 
transhistorical, transnational literary tradition.  For Eliot, tradition entails, not “following 
the ways of the immediate generation before us,” but rather “feeling that the whole of the 
literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his [i.e., the 
writer’s] own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”  
In other words, tradition “involves” a writer’s “perception, not only of the pastness of the 
                                                
42 Jacobs’s comparison reads in full:  “what most clearly distinguishes Auden from Eliot is the fact 
that Eliot’s chosen tradition is universal and objective:  the “ideal order” of all great works of art, the 
forerunner of Northrop Frye’s archetypically organized “imaginative universe.”  It by definition cannot be 
confined to a place; it repudiates the insular and parochial—opprobrious terms which in its dialect are 
synonymous with the local.  But as we have already seen, for Auden it is precisely the limited particularity 




past, but of its presence.”43  Likewise, in “Criticism in a Mass Society” (1941), Auden 
argues that 
[i]nstead of working within the limits of one regional or national esthetic 
tradition, the modern artist works with a consciousness of all the cultural 
productions, not only of the whole world of his day, but also of the whole 
historical past […] If we talk of tradition today, we no longer mean what 
the eighteenth century meant, a way of working handed down from one 
generation to the next; we mean a consciousness of the whole of the past 
in the present.  (Prose ii 92) 
 
Auden echoes Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” almost word for word. 
And as for the second question—“How do Eliot’s and Auden’s representations of 
community differ?”—no one who has read After Strange Gods (1934), Eliot’s infamous 
anti-Semitic plea for cultural homogeneity, could contrast Eliot and Auden in the way 
that Jacobs does.  Indeed, Auden’s modernized retelling of the nativity story mocks the 
most notorious passage from After Strange Gods, where Eliot insists that “reasons of race 
and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable” for 
reviving or establishing a tradition or a way of life in the American South.44  The narrator 
of For the Time Being (1944) observes that Caesar’s “recent restrictions / Upon aliens 
and freethinking Jews”—the reason for the census requiring the holy family to travel to 
Bethlehem—“are beginning / To have a salutary effect upon public morale” (CP 373).45  
Furthermore, Jacobs overlooks the fact that “New Year Letter” exalts “locality and 
                                                
43 T. S. Eliot, Selected Prose, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 
38. 
44 T. S. Eliot, After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), 
20.  
45 Auden also privately rebuked Eliot for the political vision of After Strange Gods, writing him 
that “[s]ome of the general remarks, if you will forgive my saying so, rather shocked me, because if they 
are put into practice, and it seems quite likely [they will be], would produce a world in which neither I nor 
you I think would like to live.”  Quoted in Mendelson, Later Auden (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1999), 150n.   
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particularity” not to celebrate local culture—a phrase that connotes the local color of 
literary regionalism—but rather to promote interaction among different cultures: 
And all real unity commences  
In consciousness of differences, 
That have needs to satisfy 
And each a power to supply. 
We need to love all since we are  
Each a unique particular 
That is no giant, god, or dwarf, 
But one odd human isomorph [.] (DM 69) 
 
Simply put, the poem promotes a multiculturalist vision of “[d]iversity in unity” (DM 
34). 
Thus a more sensible way of contrasting Eliot and Auden—and one that is central 
to my argument about Auden’s vision of the coterie as a place of prophetic civic 
renewal—is to say that Auden’s “suburb of dissent” is cosmopolitan where Eliot’s 
“Community of Christians” is not.  In The Idea of a Christian Society (1939), Eliot 
imagines a group of “consciously and thoughtfully practicing Christians, especially those 
of intellectual and spiritual superiority,” who will counteract the tendency of a Christian 
government toward “manipulation” and the tendency of its citizens toward 
“superstition.”46  In “New Year Letter,” Auden proposes almost the opposite:  an 
international, interfaith coterie as a model of reasoned disagreement. 
Chief among the problems with Jacobs’s account, then, is its misleading use of 
the word “local” to describe Auden’s post-emigration ethics and the culture of his chosen 
communities.  Auden in fact turned away from nationalisms because of their tribalist 
logic, because of their exaltation of the local.  Rather, the culture of his “suburb[s] of 
                                                
46 T. S. Eliot, Christianity & Culture (New York:  Harcourt, 1976), 28 
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dissent” was cosmopolitan and multilingual.47  For example, the one demographic feature 
shared by every member of the Long Island-based coterie depicted in “New Year Letter” 
was their status as outsiders.  The group consisted of three British émigrés (Auden, the 
composer Benjamin Britten, and the tenor Peter Pears), a Jew (Chester Kallman), two gay 
couples (Auden and Kallman, Britten and Pears), and a German refugee (Elizabeth 
Mayer, the coterie’s host).48  The poem treats the queer life of these “aliens in New York” 
as a school of virtue (DM 50):  a cross-gender, cross-generational, and mixed-orientation 
coterie49 constitutes a social practice that resists the idolatry that nationalism demands 
(DM 48), training each of the friends in the virtues of love (DM 48), humility (DM 68), 
“reverent frivolity” (DM 47), and “faith balanced by doubt” (DM 47).50   
To characterize the networks of intimacy in which Auden works out his post-
emigration ethics, and to do so in a way that remains faithful to the details I have just 
presented, we need a word that implies physicality and particularity without the insularity 
connoted by “local.”  Borrowing from the philosopher Charles Taylor, I propose the term 
“incarnational.”  For Taylor, “incarnational” approaches to ethics and spirituality 
integrate “the body, history, the place of individuals, contingency, and the emotions.”  To 
apply it to Auden’s work, “[e]mbodied feeling” becomes “a medium” for what the 
                                                
47 Elizabeth Mayer was a German immigrant.  Reinhold Niebuhr was the son of German 
immigrants, and his wife Ursula grew up in England. 
48 Mayer was a lapsed Lutheran, but she fled Germany with her Jewish husband, the psychiatrist 
William Mayer, and their children when the Nazis rose to power.  See Humphrey Carpenter, 275. 
49 Mayer was 24 years Auden’s senior, and Auden regarded her as a surrogate mother when his 
own mother died in 1941; Kallman was 14 years younger than Auden.  Humphrey Carpenter, 257, 275.  
50 As we will see in chapter five, the “suburb of dissent” qua religiously-inflected cosmopolitan 
school of virtue depends on a view of traditions as ongoing dialectical arguments with competing 
interpretations of the world, a notion that looks forward to the work of the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre.  
Alan Jacobs notes the similarity between Auden and MacIntyre in passing, but doesn’t unpack or interpret 
the parallel (What Became of Wystan, xviii, 117). 
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members of his coteries “recognize as rightly bearing an aura of the higher.”51  The term 
“incarnational” stands in opposition to “excarnational,” which describes ethical systems 
that discount the role of emotions and desires.  Put differently, excarnation refers to “the 
steady disembodying of spiritual life, so that it is less and less carried in deeply 
meaningful bodily forms, and lies more and more ‘in the head.’”52   
I will have more to say about “New Year Letter” in the next chapter, and more to 
say about virtue ethics and incarnationality in chapter five, but for now it is important to 
note that Jacobs’s discussion of the poem omits all of the details that I included in the 
previous paragraph.  Jacobs even goes so far as to say that Auden “maintain[s] his 
community in no place but his own mind.”53  The claim effectively excarnates Auden’s 
“suburb[s] of dissent,” a move that allows Jacobs to ignore the queer specificity of 
Auden’s so-called “local culture.”54 
Jacobs acknowledges that communitarianism normally requires its adherents to 
return home.  He resolves the obvious contradiction in Auden’s biography by claiming 
that “there was no place in England which Auden could think of as home,” that Auden 
                                                
51 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2007), 288. 
52 Taylor, 771. 
53 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 67. 
54 Under the chapter title “Local Culture,” Jacobs quotes the last two stanzas of the six-stanza lyric 
“The Garrison” (a poem that, as we saw in the introductory chapter, details Auden’s life with Chester 
Kallman in Kirchstetten).  Jacobs thus leaves out the stanzas that identify the first person plural as Kallman 
and Auden.  The “we,” as far as Jacobs’s epigraph is concerned, could be anyone, not two gay companions 
and “the choir we sort with” (CP 846).  Jacobs separates Auden’s gayness from his communitarianism, 
restricting all discussion of Auden’s sexuality to one chapter on his love poems (What Became of Wystan, 
73-95).  Considering that Jacobs elsewhere refers to Auden’s sexuality with a genteel homophobia—Jacobs 
calls Auden a “practicing homosexual” in a magazine article (“Auden and the Limits of Poetry,” First 
Things [August/September 2001], <http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/auden-and-the-limits-of-
poetry-10>] and a “lifelong homosexual” in his edition of The Age of Anxiety (Age xiii)—one wonders if 
de-gaying Auden’s post-conversion ethics is a calculated move on Jacobs’s part.  Although Auden’s poetry 
portrays his queer networks in Christian terms, he employed a strategy similar to Jacobs’s in his personal 
life, keeping his queer and his Christian communities largely separate, a point that I will revisit in chapter 
three.  See Miller, 81, 84; as well as Robert L. Chapman, “Auden in Ann Arbor,” Michigan Quarterly 
Review 17.4 (Fall 1978): 519. 
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left England “because the English intelligentsia rejected and scorned the convictions he 
had come to find essential.”55  In fact, Auden left England precisely because it was 
home.56  He wanted to escape the tribalist regime of the local, and America promised a 
rootless life.  Moreover, when Auden left England, he had not yet settled on the Christian 
convictions that would invite scorn from some British intellectuals.57 
Jacobs also misreads the role of Christian theology in the ethical shift from 
Auden’s early lyric “Out on the lawn I lie in bed” to the much later “We, too, had known 
golden hours.”  Jacobs claims that, because some strains of Christian theology express a 
deep suspicion of friendship’s exclusivity, Auden’s conversion explains nothing about his 
rehabilitation of the coterie.58  In fact, though, Auden rescues friendship from 
Christianity’s suspicion of it by using the language of Christian ritual and belief to 
describe the nature and purpose of the coterie.  Auden gives us a fresh understanding of 





                                                
55 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 66. 
56 “English life is for me a family life, and I love my family but I don’t want to live with them,” 
Auden said.  Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, 243.  Auden’s introduction to Henry James’s The American 
Scene includes a covert explanation of why Auden left England in the form of a hypothetical biography of 
any budding European writer.  The text asserts that indolence is “[t]he great danger for the European 
writer,” because unlike their American counterparts, European writers begin as apprentices of an 
established literary tradition:  “It was easier for him to write fairly well, but much harder to write as well as 
he possibly could, because he was a cultural rentier […]  He had in fact to become by art what the 
American writer is by nature, isolated, and perhaps the only advice as to how to achieve this that his wise 
uncle could have given was:  ‘Get out, or get drunk, or get ill’” (Prose ii 281). 
57 For example, in a piece written for Yale Review in 1960, Thom Gunn accuses Auden of “High 
Church snobbery” that “tends to repress the active intelligence, replacing it with the habit of continual 
trifling,” in W. H. Auden: The Critical Heritage, ed. John Haffenden (London: Routledge, 1983), 423.  
58 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 57. 
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II.  THE CHURCH OF MAD CAMP 
“In Praise of Limestone” (1948) identifies Ischia as the site of just such a queer 
ecclesial “suburb of dissent.”  Two gay visitors—an Englishman and his “dear”—
encounter a culture of physical pleasure that opposes imperial ambition.59  (The term 
“coterie” and the phrase “suburb of dissent” apply to Auden’s poems about Ischia 
because, as we will see, through such details as the dedications and the first person plural 
perspective, the poems recreate the lively artistic, intellectual, and spiritual community 
that Auden enjoyed with other English-speaking gay visitors to the island.)60  Ischia is a 
“region / Of short distances and definite places” where each spring fills “a private pool 
for its fish” and carves “[i]ts own little ravine” (SP 189).  The “eyes” of the people who 
grew up there have “[a]djusted to the local needs of valleys” (SP 190).  Living in such a 
“dilapidated” place “calls into question / All the Great Powers assume” (SP 191):  that a 
country powerful enough to preserve its independence from other countries deserves the 
worship of its citizens.  (“Out on the lawn I lie in bed,” by contrast, conceives of privacy 
as irresponsible.  Because the colleagues enjoy each other’s company behind the 
“creepered wall,” they can ignore the social problems around them.)  And Ischia’s “map 
camp” helps the Englishman discover the affirmation of the body inherent in his own 
Anglican faith (SP 190).  The poem thus indirectly articulates what I will call a 
Christological cosmopolitanism:  (1) since we are embodied, relational creatures and not 
                                                
59 The poem addresses “my dear” in the middle; and “Dear,” at the end.  Dropping the first person 
possessive from the appellation “Dear” at the end of the poem, “In Praise of Limestone” employs the 
“technique of a delayed declaration of intimacy” that Edward Mendelson observes in Auden’s earlier 
poems “Law Like Love” (1939) and “Atlantis” (1941).  Mendelson notes that ‘My dear’ was commonly 
used among English upper-middle-class male friends, without sexual connotations, until around the middle 
of the [twentieth] century, but ‘dear’ was used among sexual or family intimates.”  See Edward Mendelson, 
Later Auden, 167. 
60 Remember that, as I noted in the introductory chapter, Ischia was the place where Auden’s and 
Kallman’s fruitful collaboration with the gay German composer Hans Werner Henze began.  
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pure fleshless minds, sacramental “goods” like culture provide a key resource for 
hermeneutical reflection on divine revelation, but (2) since we are all “sinners,” no 
culture is “wholly good,” so responsible theological inquiry and reflection depends on 
cross-cultural exchange.61 
The argument of “In Praise of Limestone” unfolds ethnographically.  A British 
expatriate explains Italy to readers who share his northern European vantage point.  (The 
commands to “[m]ark” and “[w]atch” invite outsiders to look in [SP 189].)  The 
Englishman invokes a series of contrasting groups:  “the inconstant ones,” who admit 
their humanness and never leave the responsive rock that dissolves in water (SP 189); 
“the best and worst of us,” saints and despots who, refusing to admit their limitations, 
follow the call of indissoluble rocks like granite and gravel; and “the really reckless,” 
who forsake community for the ocean (SP 190).  “Immoderate” landscapes (the “blazing 
fury” of a crater or the “infinite space” of a desert or the jungle’s “monstrous” fungi and 
insects) lure adamantine personalities; Ischia (“[w]here everything can be touched or 
reached by walking”) generates humbler, more flexible personalities (SP 190). 
The southern Italian psyche looks queer to the English ethnographer. The Ischians 
refuse to aspire to ethical perfection.  The shady squares and narrow backstreets of the 
limestone valley encourage an easygoing homo-social intimacy that accepts human error.  
Urchins chase a scientist away from his study of nature and back to the ambiguous realm 
of people.  I take the “lively offers” of these “gamins” to refer to the prevalence of 
transactional sex on the island:  young Ischian men would sell sex to older (mostly 
                                                
61 The quotes in this paragraph are from a notebook in which Auden laid out plans for an essay on 
religion and theology.  The Berg, Holograph notebook, 1966-67. 
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English-speaking) male tourists.62  But Ischia’s ethos of manipulative seduction goes 
beyond the sexual.  The island’s genius loci is a feckless mama’s boy for whom work 
means “the power to charm.”  No one asks him to change—he knows “[t]hat for all his 
faults he is loved” (SP 189).  (Perhaps to avoid narrowly sexual readings of Ischia’s queer 
charm, Auden bowdlerized the description of the boy in later editions of the poem.  The 
“nude young male who lounges / Against a rock displaying his dildo” becomes “the 
flirtatious male who lounges / Against a rock in the sunlight” [CP 538].)  A whole “band” 
of such “rivals” for the attention of “Mother”—i.e., the personified island, or the maternal 
instinct that makes any lover indulgent—creates a culture of shameless inconstancy (SP 
189).  Richard Bozorth notes that Auden here “wears his Freudianism more lightly” than 
in his early poems (a shift that I will discuss in more detail in the conclusion):  the 
maternalized landscape is “a trope for the comfortable fit between body, soul, and 
world,” a “camp Freudianism in the spirit of Auden’s habit of referring to himself among 
friends as ‘Mother,’” “not a discourse for diagnosing” a “psychosexual disorder.”63  The 
Ischians keep no secrets; they take life lightly; they worship an operatic God; they suffer 
“stereotypically Italian demises,” as Bozorth puts it, such as “pimp[ing] / Or deal[ing] in 
fake jewelry or ruin[ing] a fine tenor voice / For effects that could bring down the house” 
(SP 190).64 
The Englishman’s description of a backwater where everyone delights in petty 
schemes looks like acid condescension at first—hardly praise at all.  But Ischia has made 
                                                
62 See Humphrey Carpenter, 363-364, 386-387. 
63 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 245-246.  
64 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 248.  For more on “In Praise of Limestone” as part of 
the “modern homoerotic cult of the Mediterranean,” see Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 247-248.  
See also Robert Aldrich, The Seduction of the Mediterranean:  Writing, Art, and Homosexual Fantasy 
(London:  Routledge, 1993), 69-100. 
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the speaker realize that, like scientists who ignore the human order and poets who 
evacuate it of its sacred meaning,65 he has the wrong ethic: 
   I, too, am reproached, for what 
And how much you know.  Not to lose time, not to get caught, 
   Not to be left behind, not, please! to resemble  
The beasts who repeat themselves, or a thing like water 
   Or stone whose conduct can be predicted, these 
Are our Common Prayer, whose greatest comfort is music 
   Which can be made anywhere, is invisible, 
And does not smell.      (SP 191) 
 
The speaker confesses his mistakes to his lover, who knows them only too well.  They all 
boil down to the fact that he has tended to make the determinist’s petition, the Common 
Prayer (the allusion to the Anglican order of service is ironic) of people who would like 
to find salvation in this life:  “[n]ot to lose time, not to get caught,” not to experience a 
resurrection of the body that seems more like animal repetition than redemption.  Unlike 
such people for whom time will not be redeemed, Ischia’s naked sunbathers and tricking 
gamins exude patience and candor. 
What looks queer to the English ethnographer thus proves spiritually instructive.  
Like each “[c]ounterfeit” reality that (as we saw in the introductory chapter) the queer 
traveler visits in “Atlantis” (1941), Ischia can help its visitors “recognise the true” (SP 
126) if they accept it at face value.  For the Englishman, then, celebrating the Italians’ 
belief in a counterfeit reality—their mercenary charm, their culture of physical 
pleasure—becomes a charism.  He usually shrinks from the messiness of sex, naming 
“music” his “greatest comfort” because it “can be made anywhere, is invisible, / And 
                                                
65 The secular poet that “In Praise of Limestone” snidely describes as “[a]dmired for his earnest 
habit of calling / The sun the sun, his mind Puzzle” refers to Wallace Stevens, who called his own “The 
Comedian as the Letter C” an antimythological poem (SP 191).  See Fuller, 409.  For an extended 
comparison of the construction of religious belief in the poetry of Stevens and Auden that takes the allusion 
to Stevens in “In Praise of Limestone” as its starting point, see Tony Sharpe, “Final Beliefs:  Stevens and 
Auden,” Literature & Theology 25.1 (March 2011):  64-78. 
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does not smell” (SP 191).  (That the Englishman prefers what “does not smell” is a hint at 
the wrongness of his ethic and the rightness of Ischia’s rebuke:  Auden’s oeuvre contains 
numerous references to smell [or lack thereof] as an index of moral health [or trouble].  
In The Age of Anxiety [1947], a dictator “smells of the future, / Odorless ages, an ordered 
world” [Age 14], a passage to which I will return in chapter three.  “Under Which Lyre” 
[1946], which, like “In Praise of Limestone,” appears in Nones (67-70), includes the 
injunction not “to make love to those / Who wash too much” [SP 187].  And in a much 
later “Epithalamium” [1965] for his niece, Auden describes marriage as a “diffy 
undertaking […] to us, whose dreams are odorless” and for whom “what is real / seems a 
bit smelly” [SP 288].)  But the Italians’ uncomplicated comfort with their own bodies 
assuages the Englishman’s discomfort, helping him to swap his ironic version of the 
Anglican prayer book for the real one. 
The Englishman’s healing experience of Ischia’s counterfeit reality provides a 
commentary on the hope of the Christian creeds, as the conclusion of “In Praise of 
Limestone” shows.  Switching from the ethnographer’s mode to the lover’s, the speaker 
confides in his “[d]ear” what the island has taught him: 
   […] Insofar as we have to look forward 
   To death as a fact, no doubt we are right:  But if 
Sins can be forgiven, if bodies rise from the dead, 
   These modifications of matter into 
Innocent athletes and gesticulating fountains, 
   Made solely for pleasure, make a further point: 
The blessed will not care what angle they are regarded from, 
   Having nothing to hide.  Dear, I know nothing of 
Either, but when I try to imagine a faultless love 
   Or the life to come, what I hear is the murmur 




Richard Bozorth reads the passage as a demythologized treatment of Christianity,66 “a 
gay fantasy” of the Garden of Eden “as a realm of free sex” that recognizes its “fantasy of 
[a] home free of frustrated desire and guilt” as “only a fantasy.”67  But “In Praise of 
Limestone” does something even more radical than queering orthodoxy:  it reclaims the 
early Christian insistence on the resurrection of the body to tease out orthodoxy’s 
compatibility with queerness.  If, after the fact of death that we all face, we rise as 
physical people, not just as disembodied spirits, three (overlapping) points follow.  One, 
contrary to Gnostic heresy, our bodies present neither an evil that we must overcome nor 
a mere irrelevance that we can ignore.  Two, death will not erase our stories in all their 
queer specificity—it will merely transfigure them.  A stone defined by its faults 
symbolizes “a faultless love / Or the life to come,” where Jesus still has scars.68  And 
thus, three, blessedness consists not in perfection but in innocence.  Like the artistic 
process that modifies “matter into / Innocent athletes,” forgiveness and resurrection free 
us to be shamelessly ourselves. 
The contemporaneous poem “Ischia” (1948) offers a similar thanks to the island 
for bringing Auden’s perspective in line with that of its native residents.  Auden 
dedicated the poem to Brian Howard, another gay exile from England in Ischia who 
prompted Auden to write the poem by accusing him of lacking “visual sense.”69  Like “In 
Praise of Limestone,” “Ischia” paints a picture of backward desuetude:  occasionally a 
visitor “sighs for a Brooklyn / where shirts are silk and pants are new” (CP 542); the 
                                                
66 I here mean “demythologized” in more or less the sense that Rudolf Bultmann, a twentieth-
century German Lutheran New Testament scholar and theologian, gives the term:  “demythology” refers to 
the project of restating biblical stories like the incarnation and resurrection in the language of Heideggarian 
existentialism.  See Rudolf Bultmann, New Testmant & Mythology and Other Basic Writings, ed. and trans. 
Schubert M. Ogden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1984). 
67 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 248, 250. 
68 John 20:20; Rev. 5:6. 
69 Humphrey Carpenter, 358. 
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island’s patron saint may or may not elicit a blood sacrifice every year (CP 543).  And it 
paints a picture of sensual pleasure:  the island’s “short but shapely dark-haired men,” its 
wine, its honey, and its hot springs that “improve the venereal act” offer “a cure” to exiles 
like Auden.  Such pleasures make the exiles “believe that our / lives are as welcome to us 
as / loud explosions are to your saints” (CP 542).  Moreover, the culture of embodied 
enjoyment on the ramshackle island “correct[s]” the “injured eyes” of the speaker and his 
“dear friends,” who come from “soiled productive cities.”  Ischia “train[s]” them “to see / 
things and men” in a “perspective” that refuses “to admit how much the sword decides.”  
It trains them to turn away from writing odes for “the conqueror” (perhaps an allusion to 
Mussolini) and to write odes for St. Francis of Assisi instead (CP 541).  It trains them, in 
the words of “In Praise of Limestone,” to base their allegiances on more humane 
principles than those of “the Great Powers” (SP 191).  Not unlike the coterie depicted in 
“New Year Letter,” Ischia is an erotic school of virtue.  (I will have more to say about my 
choice of the word “erotic” in chapter three.) 
“Ischia” and “In Praise of Limestone” contradict Jacobs’s description of Auden’s 
communitarianism as placeless, as nowhere “but his own mind.”70  Moreover, these 
celebrations of “private pool[s]” and “local needs” show why using the word “local” to 
describe Auden’s post-emigration ethics and the culture of his communities actually 
distorts Auden’s project:  the local is not parochial.  Because Ischia is a world of 
limestone imperfection, its particular locality is more open to difference than the granite 
of the Swiss Alps.  And the Englishman prone to Gnosticism and liberal ambition takes 
seriously the Neapolitan correctives of Catholic pageantry, hot springs, and transactional 
sex.  Superimposing the limestone statues of beautiful men on the Anglican creeds, he 
                                                
70 Jacobs, What Became of Wystan, 67.  
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dialectically incorporates the decidedly un-British culture of Ischia into his spirituality.  
Nor does he do so alone, it must be said, but with fellow British gay exiles like the 
dedicatee of the poem “Ischia.”  In other words, Auden grounds his ethics in the concrete 
communal life of multiple particular places.71 
My correction of Jacobs thus points us to an important conclusion.  Insofar as the 
queer church of Ischia’s “steep stone gennels” (SP 189) teaches the English ethnographer 
to resist the Great Powers, to recognize the goodness of his body, and to replace his 
determinist’s petition with the Christian creeds, “In Praise of Limestone” propounds a 
theo-ethical cosmopolitanism based on a Christological account of culture.  By 
“Christological account of culture,” I mean that Auden concludes, from body-affirming 
doctrines like the incarnation and the resurrection, that (a) our status as embodied, 
relational creatures (as opposed to pure fleshless rationality) affects how we interpret 
revelation, creeds, etc.; and (b) culture is thus a key sacramental resource for 
hermeneutical reflection on revelation, creeds, etc.  Different places—“definite places” 
(SP 189)—tell different stories that can adumbrate the kingdom of God in different ways.  
If one understands culture and place Christologically, the reason for espousing a theo-
ethical cosmopolitanism becomes clear:  as Auden would later put it in a notebook 
containing plans for an essay on religion and theology, “since man is created by God a 
culture-making creature, culture is itself a good, since he is a sinner, there is no culture 
                                                
71 Ten years later, when Auden stopped summering in Ischia and bought a farmhouse in 
Kirchstetten, he gave a much less sentimental portrayal of Ischia’s backward desuetude.  “Good-bye to the 
Mezzogiorno” (1958), though thankful to southern Italy, describes the people as “without hope”; and their 
decadence, as a way of anaesthetizing themselves to “all the metaphysical threats” (SP 250). 
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which is wholly good.”72  Therefore, cross-cultural exchange is crucial to responsible 
theological inquiry. 
In the undated essay “Postscript:  Christianity & Art,” Auden makes 
pronouncements about Christianity and culture that might seem to conflict with my 
reading of “In Praise of Limestone.”  He dismisses “all works of art which make overt 
Christian references” because “[t]hey seem to assert that there is such a thing as a 
Christian culture, which there cannot be.  Culture is one of Caesar’s things” (DH 458).  
But what Auden rejects here is the opposite of theo-ethical cosmopolitanism:  namely, a 
Christian tribalism, the idea that an explicitly Christian culture (or an explicitly Christian 
work of art) has “gospel authority” over other cultures (or works of art).  He remarks that 
“[t]he only kind of literature which has gospel authority is the parable, and parables are 
secular stories with no overt religious reference.”  The point of the “Postscript,” then, is 
not to deny the sacramentality of culture but to urge reticence on the part of Christian 
writers—a point that Auden repeated throughout his later years73—and to caution against 
giving worldly power to Christianity. 
 
 
III.  THE HOMINTERN 
After his conversion to Christianity, not only does Auden position himself against 
Christian theological attacks on the ethics of friendship, but he also positions himself 
against secular political concerns about friendship’s ethical value.  To recap briefly, the 
                                                
72 The Berg, Holograph notebook, 1966-67. 
73 See “The Truest Poetry is the Most Feigning” (1958), which ends with the lines “love, or truth 
in any serious sense, / Like orthodoxy, is a reticence” (CP 619); and the essay “Writing,” where Auden 
quotes an unnamed bishop as saying that “[o]rthodoxy is reticence” (DH 21).  
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modern—which is to say, Enlightenment—secular suspicion of friendship stems from the 
fact that, as a particular and exclusive love, friendship militates against the Kantian 
mandate of universal benevolence.74  Democracy depends on unconditional mutual 
regard, a sentiment more closely approximated by the given bonds of family than the 
chosen bonds of friendship.75  E. M. Forster conveys the political suspicion of friendship 
well in his infamous motto, “if I had to choose between betraying my country and 
betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country” (a statement that 
I will revisit in more detail in the next chapter).76 
To that brief recap I will now add the historical link between the end of friendship 
as a politically useful and socially accepted practice and the emergence of homophobia.  
Until the eighteenth century, friendship played a significant role in the public sphere:  in 
England, for example, Eucharistically-sealed friendships between two men or two women 
united different families in extended household networks and provided a symbolic ritual 
for resolving ecclesiastical conflicts.  Moreover, after the eighteenth century, the life of 
the body changed significantly:  where activities like sleeping in the same bed together 
used to cement friendships (hence the term “bedfellow”), they now took place solely 
within the marital space.  Consequently, the social meaning of bodily intimacy changed 
significantly, from a way to secure friendship in public (e.g., the kiss of peace at mass), to 
a purely private sexual matter between opposite-sex spouses.77  When extended 
household networks fell away and the private institution of the family became the basic 
                                                
74 Vernon, 136. 
75 Bray, 2; Vernon, 138. 
76 Forster, What I Believe, 7-8. 
77 Interestingly, Charles Taylor’s discussion of excarnation (see above as well as chapter five) 
makes nary a reference to Bray. 
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social unit, friendship between men—and the possibility of same-sex desire that for the 
first time it signified—started to look threatening.78 
It is this homophobic strain of the secular political suspicion of friendship that 
Auden positions himself against.  Read in their original historical context, Auden’s poetic 
celebrations of Ischia, for example, defy a Cold War fear about gay men.  By celebrating 
a refuge for gay exiles from the “Great Powers” (SP 191), Auden brazenly answers the 
accusation that gay men form a lawless, anti-patriotic subterranean network that cuts 
across divisions of class, age, ethnicity, and nation; and that this network wields a “power 
that [is] somehow illegitimate because its members [are] predominately gay men.”79  In 
earlier decades this fear took the form of a “gay freemasonry” accusation; during the 
Cold War, it took the form of a “gay espionage” accusation; and in later decades it would 
take the form of a “gay mafia” accusation.  (Coincidentally, the same year that Auden 
published “In Praise of Limestone” and “Ischia” in Nones [1951], the island briefly 
became the center of the emerging “gay spy” narrative after a British double agent 
working for the Soviet Union tried to contact Auden.)80  Auden’s post-emigration, post-
conversion coterie poetry defends homosexuality against the many versions of this 
conspiracy theory by corroborating them and rewriting them as affirmations. 
                                                
78 Bray, 218; Foucault, Ethics, 171; Vernon, 177. 
79 Gregory Woods, “The ‘Conspiracy’ of the Homintern,” Gay and Lesbian Review (May-June 
2003): 11. 
80 In May 1951, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, two of the infamous Cambridge Five, defected 
to the Soviet Union when Maclean was exposed as a double agent.  Before leaving London, Burgess tried 
to contact Auden a number of times to no avail; Auden was in transit to Ischia.  According to rumor, 
Burgess wanted to seek refuge with Auden.  A tumult of reporters and police greeted Auden upon his 
arrival in Ischia, and a friend intending to visit Auden in Ischia was mistaken for Burgess and arrested in 
Naples.  Auden had no knowledge of Burgess’s impending defection; Burgess probably just wanted to 
divert attention to Ischia as he made his way to Moscow.  Auden responded to the situation by pubicly 
refusing to renounce his friendship with Burgess.  For more on the whole episode, see Auden’s description 




Paranoia about an antisocial network of gay men has preoccupied the Anglo-
European literati from the Wilde trials to the present.  Proust made the worry famous in 
the fourth volume of A la recherche du temps perdu [“In search of lost time”].  The first 
section of Sodome et Gomorrhe (1921), a thirty-page disquisition on “des hommes-
femmes, descendants de ceux des habitants de Sodome qui furent épargnés par le feu du 
ciel” [“the men-women, descendants of those inhabitants of Sodom who were spared by 
the fire of heaven”],81 likens gay men to “les Juifs,” especially “les dreyfusards,” 
“rassemblés à leurs pareils par l’ostracisme qui les frappe” [“Jews,” especially 
“Dreyfusards,” who are “assembled with their own sort by the ostracism that afflicts 
them”];82 and to “une franc-maçonnerie bien plus étendue, plus efficace et moins 
soupçonnée que celles des loges” [“A freemasonry much more extensive and efficient 
and less suspected than that of the lodges”].83  Their “identité de goûts, de besoins, 
d’habitudes, de dangers, d’apprentissage, de savoir” [“identity of tastes, needs, habits, 
dangers, apprenticeship, knowledge”]84 creates subversive cross-class alliances:  “dans 
cette vie romanesque, anachronique, l’ambassadeur est ami du forçat” [“in this 
anachronistic novelistic life, the ambassador and the prisoner are friends”].85  Similarly, 
the opening of Gide’s L’immoraliste (1902) asks of its queer protagonist, “[e]n quoi 
Michel peut-il servir l’Etat?” [“can Michel serve the state?”]86  The book posits a conflict 
between same-sex desire and state loyalty. 
                                                
81 Marcel Proust, A la recherche du temps perdu, vol. III, ed. Jean-Yves Tadié (Paris:  Editions 
Gallimard, 1988), 3. 
82 Proust, 17, 21, 18.  The Dreyfusards were or supporters of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French 
army officer falsely accused of treason in 1894.  
83 Proust, 18. 
84 Proust, 18. 
85 Proust, 19. 
86 André Gide, L’Immoraliste (Paris:  Le Livre de Poche, 1958), 13. 
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The paranoia about an antisocial network of gay men has wielded a particularly 
strong grip on the English imagination.  From the 1910s to the early ’30s, the 
Bloomsbury Group—a modernist collective of writers, artists, and philosophers including 
Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry, Vanessa Bell, and Duncan Grant—came under attack by 
writers like D. H. Lawrence and Roy Campbell, who reviled the Group’s “insidious 
disease,” their rejection of “the essential blood contact between man and woman,” as 
Lawrence put it.87  From the late 1930s through the Cold War, the accusation tended to 
focus on coteries as Soviet spy rings—witness the portmanteau “Homintern,” a camp 
joke that arose in Auden’s circles to refer to a supposed international cabal of gay 
artists.88  And British literary critics—from George Orwell in The Road to Wigan Pier 
(1937) to Valentine Cunningham in British Writers of the Thirties (1989)—have centered 
their phobic dismissals of gay cultural alliances on Auden.89   
Auden’s own piece “La Trahison d’un Clerc” [“The Treason of a Priest”] (1942), 
a scathing rejoinder to Van Wyck Brooks’s anti-modernist polemic “Primary Literature 
and Coterie Literature” (1941),90 includes a nice summary of the accusation against 
coteries as queer (“perverse,” “highbrow”), antisocial (celebrants of the “death-drive”), 
and anti-patriotic (“expatriate”).  Auden quotes another critic (Dwight Macdonald of the 
Partisan Review) to summarize Brooks’s thesis: 
                                                
87 Quoted in Julie Ann Taddeo, Lytton Strachey and the Search for Modern Sexual Identity:  The 
Last Eminent Victorian (Binghamton, NY:  The Haworth Press, 2002), 45, 121.  In 1931 Roy Campbell 
lambasted the Bloomsbury Group in his long satirical poem The Georgiad. 
88 The origin of “Homintern” is disputed.  In Memoirs of a Bastard Angel, Harold Norse writes 
that “[t]he word Homintern, which I coined in 1939, is attributed to Auden […] A takeoff on Comintern 
(Communist International), it was meant to convey the idea of a global homosexual community” (New 
York:  Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1989), 77. 
89 Indeed, a large cartoon of Auden is centered on the front page of Woods’s “The ‘Conspiracy’ of 
the Homintern.”  English literary critics aim their coterie-phobia at Auden’s friendship with Stephen 
Spender and Christopher Isherwood. 
90 Van Wyck Brooks presented “Primary Literature and Coterie Literature” as a talk at Columbia 
University in September 1941 (Prose ii 524). 
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The […] “coterie” writer, on the other hand, is a thin-blooded, niggling 
sort of fellow, whose work reaches “a mere handful of readers.”  His stuff 
has brilliant “form” but lacks “content.”  He is “a mere artificer or master 
of words” who perversely celebrates the “death-drive” instead of the “life-
drive.”  He is a doubter, a scorner, a sceptic, expatriate, highbrow and city 
slicker.  His work is pessimistic and has lost contact with The People and 
The Ideas of Greatness.  (Prose ii 149) 
 
Brooks identifies Proust, Joyce, and Eliot as examples of his conception of the coterie 
writer.  Auden’s criticism of Brooks pulls no punches:  “Mr. Brooks in his minor way, 
like Hitler in his major, are punishments for the sins of which all of us who have grown 
up in a liberal-democratic capitalistic culture are guilty” (Prose ii 149).  In other words, 
Auden sees Brooks’s attitude as characteristic of people reared in a liberal-democratic 
capitalistic culture.  Such a culture trains people to believe several propositions, says 
Auden:  (a) people are born equal and free, a truth attributable to (b) the natural goodness 
of humankind; and (c) when a person knows the good, she automatically wills the good; 
so (d) because our knowledge increases with time, so, too, progress must increase with 
time.  When an “over-sensitive and not very bright individual” like Brooks surveys the 
world and sees, to his chagrin, that it does not conform to his creed about progress, he 
flees into the sanctum of art, calling any artist who expresses skepticism about progress a 
bad artist (Prose ii 149-150). 
The title of Auden’s excoriation of Brooks alludes to Julien Benda’s La Trahison 
des Clercs (1927), a book that censured nineteenth- and twentieth-century German and 
French intellectuals for their nationalism and racism.  (On the other hand, Benda 
supported traditional Christianity’s internationalism, a very Auden-like move.)  As we 
will see in chapter four, “At the Grave of Henry James” (1941) also alludes to Benda’s 
book.  The speaker implores James to “make intercession / For the treason of all clerks,” 
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that is, to pray for “all writers living or dead” who need forgiveness on account of their 
unrelenting “vanity.”  The poem tempers the tone of the review by implicating the coterie 
writer in the sins of liberal-democratic capitalistic culture:  we who creatively resist the 
melioristic creed remain guilty of an “arrogant / Spirit” (SP 132), the poem confesses. 
Almost forty years after Auden’s “La Trahison d’un Clerc” appeared in The 
Michigan Daily, George Steiner inverted the title for his account of the British art-
historian and Soviet spy Anthony Blunt.  Steiner’s “The Cleric of Treason” (1980) makes 
an even more explicitly homophobic and insistently anti-intellectual version of Brooks’s 
chauvinistic complaint.  Steiner attributes Blunt’s betrayal of England to his 
antiquarianism (which “can compact a man’s mental and nervous powers to the pitch of 
ecstatic fury”) and his homosexuality (or, as Steiner calls it, “the freemasonry of golden 
lads”).91 
Auden defiantly styles his own oeuvre as an affirming corroboration of 
accusations like Brooks’s and Steiner’s by explicitly self-identifying as a member of the 
Homintern in an essay on his gay predecessor, Oscar Wilde:  “A Playboy of the Western 
World:  St Oscar, the Homintern Martyr” (1950).  Published the same year that Auden 
wrote “We, too, had known golden hours” (the lyric about the prophetic vocation of the 
coterie qua “suburb of dissent” that we encountered at the beginning of this chapter), “A 
Playboy of the Western World” draws a connection between gay shame and the 
eschatological imagination.  According to Auden, Wilde needed everyone to love him 
“for himself alone” (Prose iii 185), “as he really was” (Prose iii 186), because he felt 
guilty about his sexuality.  Auden explains Wilde’s shame with a generalization:  “a 
                                                
91 Steiner, “The Cleric of Treason,” 184, 183.  “The Cleric of Treason” has enjoyed a long 
publication life.  It has appeared most recently in George Steiner at the New Yorker (New York:  New 
Directions, 2009), 13-46. 
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person with a need to be loved universally is frequently homosexual” (Prose iii 185).92  
And Auden argues that Wilde’s intense need for acceptance drove his central project:  “to 
portray the Garden of Eden as a spot quite different from the pagan island of the blessed” 
(Prose iii 187); in other words, to imagine it as including everyone, even, or perhaps 
especially, “the weak, the ugly, the poor, the old, the stupid” (Prose iii 188).  Auden thus 
suggests that in Wilde’s case the experience of gay shame inspired a picture of social 
justice.  “Given his nature,” Auden concludes, “it is not suprising that this subject,” i.e., a 
vision of an inclusive Eden, “should have excited Wilde to write a masterpiece,” namely, 
The Importance of Being Earnest (Prose iii 188).  The campy title of Auden’s essay, “St 
Oscar, the Homintern Martyr,” establishes a spiritual lineage that casts Auden’s oeuvre as 
continuing Wilde’s subversive project of imagining a queer Eden.93 
Perhaps, then, another simple explanation for Auden’s change of heart about 
coteries is that when the Nazis rose to power he gave up on the promise of liberal 
democracy (or the Marxist revolution, for that matter) to cure social evils.  In other 
words, he lost faith in the very kind of politics that doubts the ethical value of friendship.  
As we began to see in Auden’s rejoinder to Van Wyck Brooks, and as we will see in 
more detail in our reading of “New Year Letter” (1941) in the next chapter, Auden’s 
post-conversion work paints liberalism in a negative light:  far from achieving the 
universal benevolence envisioned by Kantian ethics, liberalism in fact turns people into 
competitive, hyperrational machines of productivity and consumption (DM 55-58).  So 
                                                
92 See “September 1, 1939,” where Auden alludes to a comment in Nijinsky’s diaries that 
Diaghilev wanted “to be loved alone” (SP 96). 
93 In keeping with the vocabulary of Auden’s essay on Wilde, I here use the word Eden.  Note, 
though, that in Auden’s writings, “Eden” sometimes functions as shorthand for nostalgia.  See “Caliban to 
the Audience” (Sea 45) as well as Auden’s critical autobiography, “Reading” (DH 6-7).  When trying to 
articulate a redemptive queer social vision that transcends nostalgia, Auden more often uses phrases like 
“the City of God,” “the Just City,” and Henry James’s “the Great Good Place.” 
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what in the 1930s struck the idealistic liberal humanist Auden as a zone of elitist insular 
intimacy protected from the harsh realities of the world,94 in the 1940s began to appear to 
the disenchanted Auden more like a much-needed conspiracy against the liberal-
democratic capitalistic nation state—a conspiracy that could in the end benefit democracy 
by refashioning it into something more just.  Indeed, “New Year Letter” makes the 




V.  LOOKING FORWARD 
Now that we have established the broad narrative outline of Auden’s change of 
heart regarding the ethics of friendship, we can begin to refine our picture by zeroing in 
on two of Auden’s major American works:  “New Year Letter,” the centerpiece of 
Auden’s first American book, The Double Man (1941); and Auden’s Pulitzer Prize-
winning The Age of Anxiety (1947).  Looking at “New Year Letter” in the next chapter, I 
will argue that Auden’s emphasis on his own shameful status as an expatriate and a queer 
gives a shamelessly defiant edge to his theo-ethical apologies for friendship.  And 
looking at The Age of Anxiety in chapter three, I will argue that Auden’s coteries 
construct queer friendship as a reformulated erotic practice. 
                                                
94 I say “liberal humanist” rather than Marxist because, as I mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
although Auden flirted briefly with Marxism in 1932, he never actually joined the Communist Party. 
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 The later Auden remains a discomfiting figure for lesbian and gay studies.  After 
he returned to the Anglican fold in 1940, Auden considered same-sex eros “sinful, though 
he fully intended to go on sinning” (as Christopher Isherwood remembers).1  He 
continued to proclaim the sinfulness of gay relationships even as the Church of England 
softened its position on the matter.2  And in a letter to a friend in 1970, he dismissed the 
Gay Liberation Front that formed after the Stonewall riots.  The letter’s sexological 
jargon accentuates Auden’s conceptual distance from a post-Stonewall reader:  “I’m no 
advocate of the purely Uranian society myself.  I mean, I certainly don’t want to live only 
with queers,” he confessed,3 using the Victorian anglicization of “Urning,” Karl Heinrich 
Ulrich’s term for a female psyche in a man’s body. 
 But Auden put his negative views on gay desire to affirming uses.  Consider, for 
example, his 1944 review of Henry James’s Stories of Writers and Artists.  I will look at 
the review in a bit more detail in chapter four, but for now note the paradoxical 
                                                
1 Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, W.H. Auden:  A Biography (London:  George Allen & Unwin, 
1981), 299.  Just how much stock we should place in Isherwood’s statement remains an open question, 
though, one that I will revisit in chapter four and in the conclusion. 
2 Auden found the Church of England’s growing acceptance of homosexuality puzzling.  In March 
1954 the Moral Welfare Council of the Church of England issued a report recommending the overturning 
of laws penalizing gay sex.  Auden shared the following reaction with a friend:  “Have you seen the C of E 
report on homosexuality?  In its wish to be fair, it falls into the odd position of declaring that only the act is 
sinful which is, of course, heretical and, from a practical point of view, ineffective.  Nobody, where there is 
mutual consent and pleasure, can possibly feel an act is wrong: if it is, the reason must lie in the personal 
relationship which desires the acts,” ALS to Wendell Stacy Johnson, 26 June 1954, Berg. 
3 Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter, 433. 
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construction of queer desire as a weakness and a blessing:  the review elevates marriage 
as “the highest and hardest” vocation and implicitly labels queerness a “disability.”  Yet a 
writer must consider that particular disability a “guardian angel”:  if “physical or 
psychological troubles” make “marriage impossible,” they protect a writer’s “gift” from 
competing “responsibilities” (Prose ii 244).  Auden took the same paradoxically 
affirming approach to the matter of queerness as a sin, welcoming his perceived 
abjection.  A 1963 letter to Isherwood reworks the logic of his comments on Henry 
James’s sexuality:  “[t]hough I believe it sinful to be queer, it has at least saved me from 
becoming a pillar of the Establishment.”4  Prestige, not sex, is the real sin.  Every version 
of “Letter to Lord Byron” singles out prestige as a poet’s greatest temptation.  It is 
“treason,” for it worships “Normality,” the “Goddess of bossy underlings,” with a liturgy 
“[r]eeking of antiseptics.”  Prestige cleans away the gift of “neurosis” that enables a poet 
to critique the Establishment (CP 108). 
 I say all of this to point out an opportunity for inquiry:  what could Auden add to 
queer theory’s explorations of shame as a positive ethical framework?  Michael Warner 
argues in The Trouble with Normal (1999) that shame has the potential to create non-
identitarian communities.  “Queer scenes are the true salons des refusés,” he writes, 
“where the most heterogeneous people are brought into great intimacy by their common 
experience of being despised and rejected in a world of norms that they now recognize as 
false morality.”5  And queer studies has recently turned to the pre-Stonewall era to 
“search for viable forms of queerness as alternatives to standardized, and standard-
                                                
4 Quoted in Edward Mendelson, Later Auden (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 455-
456. 
5 Michael Warner, The Trouble With Normal:  Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life 
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2000), 35-36. 
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enforcing, gayness.”  Scholars have reclaimed embarrassing figures from the past to resist 
gay pride’s bourgeois discourses of “normalization” and “identity-affirming” 
authenticity.6  But no one has considered Auden’s work as a possible resource.   
Aside from biographers who excavate the sexual contexts of Auden’s work, 
scholars read him mainly as a poet of universal human values.7  Recently, Richard 
Bozorth has made a persuasive case against universalizing interpretations of Auden’s 
poetry.8  Still, the readings that do acknowledge the queer concerns of his post-
emigration, post-conversion oeuvre tend toward hagiography or humiliation.  Dennis 
Paddie praises “the existential saint” for “refus[ing] to take onto himself the mantle of 
[queer] oppression,”9 while Paul Dean phobically asserts that Auden “ended in” spiritual 
“darkness.”10  In contrast to the lionizing or stigmatizing practices of commentators like 
Paddie and Dean, I will consider what Auden’s poetry actually does with shame. 
Asking these questions of Auden’s first major American poem—the version of 
“New Year Letter” in Auden’s much-neglected volume The Double Man (1941)—reveals 
a link between queer shame and expatriation.11  When Auden credited his “sinful” 
queerness with protecting him “from becoming a pillar of the Establishment,” he added, 
                                                
6 David Caron, “Shame on Me:  Or the Naked Truth About Me and Marlene Dietrich,” in Gay 
Shame, ed. David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 128. 
7 Even Timothy Murphy’s Reader’s Guide to Gay and Lesbian Studies asserts that in his “texts 
about same-sex relationships, Auden’s work remains universal both in its purpose and its impact” 
(Chicago:  Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000), 63. 
8 Richard Bozorth, “Auden:  Love, Sexuality, Desire,” in The Cambridge Companion to W.H. 
Auden, ed. Stan Smith (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 175-187. 
9 Dennis Paddie, “Cool Distance:  Auden’s ‘Gay’ Version of Christian Spirituality,” in W.H. 
Auden:  A Legacy, ed. David Garrett Izzo (West Cornwall, CT:  Locust Hill Press, 2002), 57, 59. 
10 Paul Dean, “Mr. Auden & Miss God,” The New York Sun (13 October 2005), 
<http://www.nysun.com/arts/mr-auden-miss-god/21439/>. 
11 For a similar meditation on the connections between disidentifying with heteronorms and 
disidentifying with citizenship, see David Caron, My Father & I: The Marais and the Queerness of 
Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 16-20. 
 
 73 
“it might not even have done that if I hadn’t bolted to America.”12  Thus the shame of 
“one unsocial English boy” (DM 22)—as “New Year Letter” describes the young 
Auden—cleared the ground for a defiant shamelessness.  Sailing from Southampton to 
New York City in 1939, Auden consciously placed himself in a line of writers who lived 
against the grain: 
Great masters who have shown mankind 
An order it has yet to find,  
What if all pedants say of you 
As personalities be true?  
All the more honor to you then  
If, weaker than some other men,  
You had the courage that survives  
Soiled, shabby, egotistic lives, 
If poverty or ugliness,  
Ill-health or social unsuccess  
Hunted you out of life to play  
At living in another way.  (DM 18) 
 
In Auden’s case, though, too much success drove him out of England; he wanted freedom 
from the stifling aesthetic and ideological expectations that literary acclaim entailed, from 
the antiseptic effects of prestige.  After the outbreak of World War II, British writers 
publicly attacked him for deserting his country in wartime.13  He responded by declaring 
in “New Year Letter” that even if he continued to feel a connection to the Pennines (DM 
51-52), “such a bond is not an Ought” (DM 53).  Meanwhile, he met frequently with 
                                                
12 Quoted in Mendelson, Later Auden, 456.  Auden made a similar comment about the British 
double agent Guy Burgess (for more on Burgess’s story, see chapter one above):  “I know exactly why [he] 
went to Moscow.  It wasn’t enough to be a queer and a drunk.  He had to revolt still more to break away 
from it all.  That’s just what I’ve done by becoming an American citizen.  You can become an Italian or a 
French citizen—and that’s all right.  But become an American citizen and you’ve crossed to the wrong side 
of the tracks.  I found even the nicest people in Oxford tried to forget I’d ever done such a thing. I had to 
keep reminding them by starting sentences with ‘Speaking as an alien … .” Quoted in Robin Maugham, 
Escape from the Shadows (London:  Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), 203.  
13 Humphrey Carpenter, 290-291.  A comment that Anthony Powell made to Kingsley Amis after 
Auden died reveals the extent of these writers’ disgust.  Powell, who in 1940 wrote a short satirical poem 
attacking Auden and Isherwood for leaving England (Mendelson, Later Auden, 116), reportedly said upon 
reading Auden’s obituary, “I’m delighted that shit has gone.  It should have happened years ago … 
scuttling off to America in 1939 with his boyfriend like a … like a …”  He was too angry to end his 
thought.  See Richard Davenport-Hines, Auden (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 180. 
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other exiles and sexual outlaws (homosexuality was still illegal throughout the U.S. in 
1940, as it remained until 2003) at the Long Island home of Elizabeth Mayer, a German 
refugee and patron of the arts whom he met through Benjamin Britten and Peter Pears.14  
America had begun to look like “the great Rome / To all who lost or hated home” (DM 
63)15—for Auden, a refuge from the role of “mouthpiece” for the British literary left.16 
At the same time Auden returned to the Anglican faith of his childhood, a 
decision that clashed with his explanation for leaving England:  “to live deliberately 
without roots.”17  But “New Year Letter” fuses Anglican theology and American politics 
to articulate a post-roots ethic for “mankind’s imperium” (DM 48), one that does not 
depend on the coercive myths that fueled World War II:  “local customs” or “bonds of 
blood and nation” or “chances of a neighborhood / Or class or party” (DM 65).  The 
poem propounds a model of democratic conflict based on the syncretic ecclesiology of 
the lay Anglican poet and novelist Charles Williams.  A public thank-you to Elizabeth 
Mayer, “New Year Letter” depicts her outsider coterie as a “real republic” (a phrase that 
anticipates Auden’s later shorthand for Williams’s account of the Christian church).18  
Finding community in difference, the émigrés resist the autocratic logic of nationalism.  
The poem’s cosmopolitan remix of Williams calls Americans (and expats in America) to 
                                                
14 Humphrey Carpenter, 275. 
15 Such jabs at England litter the text—e.g., the use of the phrase “splendid isolation” to describe 
the atomizing effects of industrial modernity (DM 55). 
16 In an undated letter written circa February 1939, Auden responds to his father’s wish to see him 
“the mouthpiece of an epoch” by asserting that “the best art of any period […] is usually rather disliked 
when it appears,” “An Unpublished Letter by W.H. Auden,” ed. Judith Priestman, The Bodleian Library 
Record XV.4 (April 1996): 325-329. 
17 ALS to E.R. Dodds, 16 January 1940, in W.H. Auden:  ‘The Map of All My Youth,’ Auden 
Studies I, ed. Katherine Bucknell and Nicholas Jenkins (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1990), 109-111. 




a democracy that looks like Mayer’s coterie.19  This chapter, then, takes a closer look at 
Auden’s ecclesiological re-imagination of coteries, focusing on the role that gay shame 
and shamelessness play in the construction of what “New Year Letter” calls the “Just 
City.” 
A couple of points about my terminology.  First, I do not use the term “shame” to 
read feelings into Auden.  George Chauncey cautions wisely against such readings:  “[t]o 
claim that all queers in the 1950s were the passive victims of shaming rituals or were 
governed or even incapacitated by an overwhelming sense of shame—as we typically 
do—is to misunderstand and condescend to them.”20  Rather, I use “shame” as a way to 
talk about how Auden’s ideas give political power to the stigmatized—as a way to talk, 
in other words, about the shamelessness that comes out of shame.  The historical record 
indicates that Auden did not feel ashamed of same-sex desire, even if some of his ideas 
have a shaming effect.21   
                                                
19 “New Year Letter” first appeared as “Letter to Elizabeth Mayer” in the January and February 
1941 issues of The Atlantic Monthly, and The Double Man appeared in America two months before the less 
authoritative British version of the book (a point to which I will return).  Thus “New Year Letter” first 
exalted Mayer’s community of émigrés for a largely American readership.  The poem portrays exiles as 
constituents of a pluralist America:  “our democracy” (DM 42). 
 Not only did Auden first frame “New Year Letter” for an American audience, but he also 
increasingly treated American culture as his imaginative reference point when he revised the notes to “New 
Year Letter”:  in one annotation, the book replaces a quote from Wuthering Heights with an American folk 
song (DM 119-120); references to a poem by Vachel Lindsay as well as to Henry James’s The Spoils of 
Poynton (DM 82-83) and The American Scene (DM 144) are not present in the manuscript (Holograph 
notebook, Berg).  The use of Henry James is fitting, for the Auden of “New Year Letter” is a reversal of the 
typical James character:  a European escaping continental corruption to live as an American idealist. 
20 George Chauncey, “The Trouble with Shame,” in Gay Shame, 282. 
21 Chauncey notes that “[e]ven W.H. Auden praised Constantine Cavafy’s unashamed celebration 
of his homosexual experiences in his 1961 introduction to a collection of the poet’s Greek work,” 281.  
That said, we would do well to remember that Auden did suffer the marginalizing effects of homophobia.  
Three examples:  (1) the landlady of the Brooklyn Heights apartment where Auden lived while he wrote 
“New Year Letter” reportedly spied on him, “spending entire nights parked in her car outside the house, 
keeping an eye on the comings and goings of tenants whose activities had caused complaints,” as Sherill 
Tippins notes in February House (New York: Mariner Books, 2006), 39.  Given the illegal status of 
homosexuality in America in 1940, Auden had good reason to worry about the landlady’s vigilance.  
According to Tippins, it was partly to get away from the “intrusive landlady” that Auden moved to the 
famous “February House” (which he shared with Jane and Paul Bowles, Benjamin Britten, Peter Pears, 
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Second, when I call Auden’s ethic “cosmopolitan,” I mean “critically 
cosmopolitan” in the sense that Rebecca Walkowitz uses the term.  Critical 
cosmopolitanism unpacks Kant’s claim (in “What Is Enlightenment?”) that a 
cosmopolitan society leaves every citizen “completely free as well as obliged to impart to 
the public all his carefully considered, well-intentioned thoughts.”22  It questions the 
“social uses” and “political interests” of cosmopolitanism “in the past.” 23  “New Year 
Letter” notices, for example, the limits of Enlightenment “rights” language:  the French 
slave trade peaked after the storming of the Bastille (DM 36, 109). 
Critical cosmopolitanism also cultivates an ironic style to challenge rationalism 
and positivism:  it expresses an anti-Enlightenment preference for “mad prophets” like 
Baudelaire and Blake over liberalism’s “Empiric Economic Man” (DM 55-58).  “New 
Year Letter” nevertheless makes its queer arguments (e.g., its invention of a relational 
model that subverts the tribalism of nation and family) through a conservative form (the 
Augustan verse epistle).24  Following some eighteenth-century epistolary conventions 
(the digressive wartime meditations on civic renewal, the personification of philosophical 
abstractions,25 the typography,26 the hudibrastics), and flouting others (the nobleman 
                                                                                                                                            
Golo Mann, Gypsy Rose Lee, Oliver Smith, and Carson McCullers from October 1940 until he moved to 
Ann Arbor to teach at the University of Michigan in September 1941).  (2) In 1942, the U.S. Army 
excluded Auden from military service because of his sexuality (see Mendelson, Later Auden, 207).  And 
(3) in 1945, Auden denied Robert Duncan permission to publish an essay on the “homo-erotic patterns in 
his poetry” because he worried that any “public admission” of his sexuality would jeopardize his teaching 
career (see Woods, 247).  Though published admissions might be trouble, Auden was careful to come out 
to a number of acquaintances in Ann Arbor, for example.  See Charles Miller, Auden: An American 
Friendship (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983). 
22 Quoted in Rebecca L. Walkowitz, Cosmopolitan Style:  Modernism Beyond the Nation (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 2006), 3. 
23 Walkowitz, 3. 
24 A queer thing to do in 1941.  
25 For example, “Yet Time can moderate his tone / When talking to a man alone” (DM 16). 
26 Proper nouns appear in small capitals. 
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addressee, the belletristic scorn for scholarly commentary,27 the straightforward syntax 
and end-stopped lines), the poem subverts the Augustan tradition.28  As I will show, it 
replaces an organicist civics of reason with an egalitarian civics of empathy.29 
 
 
I.  ROOTS & MIRRORS 
A major theme of Auden’s post-emigration writing is the atrophy of local ethical 
bodies (family, neighborhood, parish) in the modern era.  As “New Year Letter” puts it, 
“the machine has now destroyed / The local customs we enjoyed” (DM 65).  Auden 
argued along lines that a reader familiar with Raymond Williams’s survey The Country 
and the City will recognize as a recurrent feature of English literary history:  the 
telephone and the automobile made personal relationships a matter of choice rather than 
chance; the printing press and the radio supplanted the epistemic role of communal 
                                                
27 The version of “New Year Letter” in The Double Man has 85 pages of annotation and a 
hodgepodge of “Modern Sources.” 
28 Heidi Hartwig has recently read the collaborative opera libretti of Auden and Chester Kallman 
as queering the civic thematics of Augustanism, “W.H. Auden’s Public Art:  From Poetic Reticence to 
Operatic Performance,” Text and Performance Quarterly 29.4 (October 2009): 367-382.  She argues that 
opera gives Auden “a more practicable means” to a public “homoerotic revisionism” than poetry (378, 
380).  The cross-art collaboration of composer, librettist(s), and singer lets Auden circumvent the socio-
historical constraints on expressing same-sex love, because musical performance disarticulates a libretto.  
But Auden’s opera collaborations actually provide the same means to a public homoeroticism as Auden’s 
early coterie poems:  they involve a code that only insiders would hear.  Often the mute aspects of an 
Auden-Kallman libretto (epigraphs and stage directions) signal the opera’s queering of prior traditions.  To 
distinguish between poetic reticence and operatic performance also makes little sense in view of “Letter to 
Lord Byron,” which amounts to a veritable “coming out” even in its later expurgated versions.  Hartwig’s 
reading of the libretti as a queer revision of the Augustan tradition is nevertheless a useful insight.  “New 
Year Letter” anticipates the libretti’s strategy.  
29 Eighteenth-century England saw the “providentially ordained, hierarchically ordered, and 
organically interconnected” Great Chain of Being as an “objective account of the world,” “the natural order 
of things,” David Cannadine, The Rise & Fall of Class in Britain (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1999), 26-27.  Alexander Pope’s “Essay on Man” is a prime example of this point of view. 
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traditions; and the global market weakened class affiliations.  The city displaced the 
village, so a person no longer learned her values but chose them.30 
“New Year Letter” celebrates the personal freedoms of city life.  It rewrites the 
urban trope of “the lonely figure walking the streets” as an image of discovery rather than 
confusion or contempt:  every anonymous city-dweller has the worldmaking abilities of a 
novelist.31  And the poem praises America for accepting that “[a]loneness is man’s real 
condition, / That each must travel forth alone / In search of the Essential Stone” (DM 65-
66).  Douglas Mao thus rightly sees “the necessity of increasing individuation” as “one of 
Auden’s central convictions.”32 
At the same time, though, Auden regretted that (as he saw it) “communities” were 
no longer possible, only “collective masses” of “individuals” (Prose ii 92).  He rejected 
the fascist response to the problem:  Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler recuperated “habits of 
mind which were more or less adequate to the relatively closed society of the eighteenth 
century” (Prose ii 90) but which made no sense when every household had become “a 
                                                
30 This is the premise of “The Quest,” the sonnet sequence that follows “New Year Letter” in The 
Double Man.  The “adventure” or “journey” (DM 167) begins in the fifth sonnet, “The City,” once the 
anonymous seekers have left their childhood “villages.”  If the villages had “taught” them communal rules, 
the city “offered” them a grab bag of temptations, and every seeker “[f]ound” a different one “fit to govern 
him.”  A shift in pronouns underlines the contrast between village unity and the city’s atomizing freedoms.  
The villages treat the seekers as a group—“their,” “they.”  But in the city “they” become individuals—
“each,” “he,” “his”:  “[t]he city, though, assumed no such belief, / But welcomed each as if he came alone” 
(DM 169).  See also Auden’s January 1940 essay “Tradition and Value” (Prose ii 51-53). 
31 Lab technicians are “Kafkas” puzzling over an intractable “Near-distant Castle” of laws and 
facts.  Operatives striking for “liberty and justice” in factories “know” that they are in “the champ-clos / 
And drawing-room of Henry James” and that “[l]ike any Jamesian character” they must “draw the careful 
line, / Develop, understand, refine.”  Even every “subway face” is “the Pequod of / Some Ishmael hunting 
his lost love” (DM 66), an image that manages to avoid the typically dehumanizing work of synecdoche:  
the Pequod (not peaked) faces of Auden’s New York have narrative hope.  For more on the trope of “the 
lonely figure walking the streets,” see Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1973), 235, 240. 
32 Douglas Mao, “A Shaman in Common:  Lewis, Auden, and the Queerness of Liberalism,” in 




completely foreign country” to the house next door.33  For the same reason Auden 
rejected modernism’s obsession with national roots, particularly the “organicist 
nostalgia” of writers like Eliot, Lawrence, and Pound.34  But what do ethics look like 
after roots?  And how might people form knowable communities without narratives of 
“Blood and Soil” exceptionalism (DM 80)?35  The questions preoccupied Auden from the 
1940s on. 
He rejected liberal humanism as an answer; Nazi Germany had demolished its 
rationalist foundations.  In an extended detective-story analogy (where modernity is a 
“baffling crime” that neither democracies nor dictatorships have solved), “one inspector 
dressed in brown” (i.e., Hitler) “makes a nonsense of our laws” because he “makes the 
murderer whom he pleases / And all investigation ceases” (DM 23).  Auden’s 1941 
review of Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny of Man puts it more forcefully:  “It 
                                                
33 ALS to E.R. Dodds, 16 January 1940, in W.H. Auden:  ‘A Map of All My Youth,’ 110. 
34 Paul Giles, Atlantic Republic:  The American Tradition in English Literature (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2006), 252. A note that Auden cut before publishing The Double Man 
summarizes his critique of fascism.  He originally glossed the lines “[…] the machine has now destroyed / 
The local customs we enjoyed” with the following politico-historical argument: 
 
Like all other creatures the life of Man 
In a closed society once began 
But at once his invention set about 
Finding Discovering ways to open it out, 
Though stubbornly he refused to admit 
What it was he was really doing to it 
And in all his politics pre-supposed 
A community that still was closed. 
Now political failure has forced us to face 
The fact that this is not the case 
But instead of concluding from this that we 
Had better accept our destiny, 
We get angry and frightened and try in vain 
To close society up again 
And every man’s hand is against his brother 
And we’re busy hating and killing each other. 
 
The industrial revolution made a closed society impossible, a fact that countries like Germany and Russia 
refused to accept.  Holograph notebook, Berg.  See also “Romantic or Free?” (Prose ii 63-72). 
35 I borrow the phrase “knowable community” from Raymond Williams,165. 
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has taken Hitler to show us that liberalism is not self-supporting” (Prose ii 131).  As 
Auden later explained, Nazism’s  
utter denial of everything liberalism had ever stood for was arousing wild 
enthusiasm […] in one of the most highly educated countries in Europe 
[so] it was impossible any longer to believe that the values of liberal 
humanism were self-evident.  Unless one was prepared to take a relativist 
view that all values are a matter of personal taste, one could hardly avoid 
asking the question, ‘If, as I am convinced, the Nazis are wrong and we 
are right, what is it that validates our values and invalidates theirs?’  
(Prose iii 578) 
 
He concluded that only religious belief could provide firm grounds for rejecting Nazism.  
“Either we serve the Unconditional,” he wrote in “Christmas 1940,” “[o]r some Hitlerian 
monster will supply / An iron convention to do evil by” (EA 460).  As he recounted in “A 
Thanksgiving,” a short spiritual autobiography written the year he died,  
     […] hair-raising things 
that Hitler and Stalin were doing 
     forced me to think about God. 
 
     Why was I sure they were wrong? 
Wild Kierkegaard, Williams, and Lewis 
     guided me back to belief.  (CP 890) 
 
One of the first theological works Auden read was Charles Williams’s The Descent of the 
Dove:  The History of the Holy Spirit in the Church.36  (The book appeared in 1939; 
Auden read it in February 1940 while drafting Part III of “New Year Letter.”)37   
More an apology for ecumenism than a survey of church history, The Descent of 
the Dove labels “schism” the “worst sin” and promotes an ecclesial ethic of inclusion and 
dialogue, reasoning that “[h]owever right a man’s ideas,” they would “go wrong if he 
nourished them by himself.”38  Williams calls his anti-schismatic ethic “co-inherence”:  
                                                
36 Humphrey Carpenter, 283. 
37 Humphrey Carpenter, 285. 
38 Charles Williams, 38. 
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conflicting stances (e.g., asceticism and affirmation) should mutually co-inhere just as, 
for Williams, the church and God mystically co-inhere.  To picture the practice, Williams 
borrows Montaigne’s concept of “the double man” (hence Auden’s title and epigraph):  
members of the church ought to believe with “the quality of unbelief,” never ceasing to 
reevaluate their “hypotheses” in view of “other possibilities.”39  
“New Year Letter” adapts the dialectical ethic of Williams’ ecclesia for the 
secular civitas, imagining America as a polity of “belief-in-disbelief.”40  Auden’s 
America would see its core values as presuppositions, not universal truths, and it would 
continually reexamine and revise its presuppositions in light of new information.  
Recognizing, then, that “[n]o route is truly orthodox,” constituents with opposing 
viewpoints would facilitate the evolution of these core values by engaging in cooperative 
debate:  
O once again let us set out, 
Our faith well-balanced by our doubt,  
Admitting every step we make  
Will certainly be a mistake [.]  (DM 47)41 
 
Their self-skeptical “conference” (DM 25) would sustain an integrated cosmopolitan 
version of Williams’s “redeemed City”: 
How readily would we become 
The seamless live continuum 
Of supple and coherent stuff, 
Whose form is truth, whose content love, 
Its pluralistic interstices 
The homes of happiness and peace,  
Where in a unity of praise 
The largest publicum’s a res, 
                                                
39 Charles Williams, 193.  The epigraph to The Double Man is actually a direct quote from 
Williams, 192. Since I am primarily engaged in literary critical questions and not in the history of ideas, my 
interest lies in how Auden uses Williams directly, not in recovering Montaigne’s thought. 
40 Charles Williams, 193. 
41 Auden again portrays exiles as members of a pluralist America (see note 19 above). 
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And the least res a publicum; 
How grandly would our virtues bloom 
In a more conscionable dust 
Where Freedom dwells because it must, 
Necessity because it can, 
And men conferederate in Man.  (DM 67)42 
 
I will have more to say about this in chapter five.  What’s important to note now, though, 
is that the “Just City” of “New Year Letter”—seamless with interstices, neither rigid nor 
unruly—avoids abstraction, grounding itself in the particularities of real lives.  Auden 
builds on the notion of the res publica from Roman law, literally “concrete thing” (res) 
“pertaining to the public” (publica).  The largest publicum has the concrete quality of a 
res; likewise, the tiniest, most personal res concerns the publicum.  In the “Just City,” 
then, the personal (res) would shape the political (publicum), so autonomy and 
responsibility would interpenetrate (a point that we will revisit in more detail in chapter 
five).43 
Thus Auden insisted that (in his “Just City”) aloneness and neighborliness would 
mutually coinhere:  “[a]loneness is man’s real condition” (DM 65), but “every day in 
sleep and labor / Our life and death are with our neighbor” (DM 71).  The health of the 
civitas depends on their co-inhering because, as a note to the poem’s distinction between 
“the public space” and “the inner space” (DM 49-50) explains, 
New Facts will not be known 
Until we part and live once more alone: 
New Values not be found 
Until we meet again on common ground.  (DM 122) 
 
                                                
42 The antepenultimate and penultimate lines that I have quoted here allude to Williams:  “For this 
quotation, and for the source of many ideas in the poem, v. The Descent of the Dove” (DM 153). 
43 See Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone, 2002), 26.  
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Accepting her own responsibility for inquiry and self-scrutiny equips a person to 
participate in the cooperative debate that forms the essence of Auden’s construction of 
democracy. 
While Auden drafted the poem, he urged this theo-ethical vision on American 
readers in several essays for political magazines like Common Sense and The Nation as 
well as in talks at Smith College and Columbia University.44  America had “no past,” he 
told an interviewer in 1940.  “No tradition.  No roots—that is, in the European sense.”45  
It “had worshiped no Virgin before the Dynamo, / Held no Nicea nor Canossa, / Hat 
keine verfallenen Schlösser” (DM 63).46  Its relative newness suggested that 
More even than in Europe, here 
The choice of patterns is made clear 
Which the machine imposes, what 
Is possible and what is not, 
To what conditions we must bow 
In building the Just City now.  (DM 65) 
 
Because America had no roots to romanticize, Auden regarded it as favorable soil for a 
cosmopolitan ethic. 
 The task of establishing social justice in America echoes the promise of Spanish 
Republicans “[t]o build the just city” in “Spain 1937” (SP 56)—but with a theological 
reversal.  The earlier plea mocks Christian eschatology (“O descend as a dove or / A 
furious papa or a mild engineer, but descend” [SP 55]); in the context of “New Year 
Letter,” Auden’s “Just City” reverently channels Williams’s “co-inherence of the whole 
                                                
44 See “The Double Focus:  Sandburg’s Lincoln” (Prose ii 55-57), “Romantic or Free?” (Prose ii 
63-72), “What Is Culture?” (Prose ii 72-73), “Mimesis and Allegory” (Prose ii 78-87), and “A Note on 
Order” (Prose ii 100-103). 
45 Quoted in Samuel Hynes, “The Voice of Exile:  Auden in 1940,” Sewanee Review 90.1 (Winter 
1982): 34. 
46 “Has no old castles.”  The line comes from Goethe’s poem “Den Vereinigten Staaten” 
(“Amerika, du hast es besser”) in Zahme Xenien (Gentle Epigrams) IX.  Auden quotes the German text at 
length in the notes (DM 146-147). 
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redeemed City.”47  And the commitment to “the struggle” in “Spain 1937” contrasts with 
the emphasis on caution and balance in “New Year Letter.”  Part II rebukes “Simon-pure 
Utopian[s]” who seesaw between extreme positions when one or the other fails (DM 41):  
e.g., early Christianity versus the Constantinian shift (DM 36), Wordsworth’s post-Terror 
conservatism (DM 36), “anarchists” and “Agrarian[s]” who reject “democracy” (DM 42). 
Tempting people to such seesawing is a “favorite strategy” of the Devil (DM 36).  The 
poem applauds “the gift of double focus” instead, the ability to “synthesize” the “half-
truths” of conflicting viewpoints (DM 42).   
The “gift of double focus,” the key ingredient of Auden’s democracy, anticipates 
John Paul Lederach’s concept of “paradoxical curiosity.”  A Mennonite sociologist and 
expert in peace studies, Lederach writes that paradoxical curiosity 
approaches social realities with an abiding respect for complexity, a 
refusal to fall prey to the forced dualistic categories of truth, and an 
inquisitiveness about what may hold together seemingly contradictory 
social energies in a greater whole.  This is not primarily a thrust toward 
finding the common ground based on a narrowly shared denominator.  
Paradoxical curiosity seeks something beyond what is visible, something 
that holds […] even violently opposed social energies together.  […] 
 Rather than moving to immediate conclusions, paradoxical 
curiosity suspends judgment in favor of exploring presented contradictions 
[…] for the possibility that there exists a value beyond what is currently 
known that supersedes the contradiction.48 
 
Such an approach to conflict relies “on a capacity to mobilize the imagination.”49  It 
requires intuition as much as cognition.   
Lederach thus promotes metaphor as a crucial part of conflict transformation: 
When I watch a metaphor, I take care not to approach it with 
instrumentalist purposes in mind.  I approach it as a creation.  The 
                                                
47 Charles Williams, xiii. 
48 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination:  The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2005), 36. 
49 Lederach, 36. 
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metaphor—like a movie, a painting, or a poem—invites interaction, 
probing, and echoes.  […]  In conflict conversations I don’t just listen for 
metaphors, I watch them.  They take on lives of their own and they speak 
to the conflict, to the problems, and to the ways forward.  Metaphors are 
like a living museum of conflict resources.50 
 
The analogy between metaphors and museums can help us better understand Auden’s 
post-emigration perspective on the role of art in social change.  Auden abandoned 
political poetry shortly after he arrived in New York City (as we saw in the introductory 
chapter).  “New Year Letter” finds a social role for poetry that avoids political 
partisanship.  Art “cannot say” what people “should do” because “it presents” the 
“[a]lready lived experience” of a “particular artist” (DM 17-18).  A poet’s “particulars” 
provide “[a]n abstract model of events / Derived from dead experiments” (DM 18).  
Every reader, then, must decide how to apply a poem to her life.  Or, to put it in 
Lederach’s terms, art “invites interaction.” 
 If metaphors are a museum of conflict resources, an array of queer figures 
populates the main exhibit in “New Year Letter.”  First, the poem recruits negative 
images of homosexuality to picture the antithesis of cosmopolitan democracy.  It 
homoeroticizes fascism’s nationalist and organicist tenets with epithets like “the 
Beischlaf of the Blood” and “an ordre du coeur” (DM 32).51  In manuscript drafts, Auden 
glossed the second epithet with an anecdote about same-sex incest, the first queer figure 
of the text: 
P, a young musician, has an elder brother of whom he is very fond.  One 
day in Texas he felt a sudden wish to see him.  All he knew was that he 
was worki his brother was working on a road-gang somewhere between 
Mexico city and the United States border, and that his nickname was 
Avocado.  He set off on foot asking at every filling station if they knew of 
anyone called Avocado working ro working in the neighbourhood.  In this 
                                                
50 Lederach, 72. 
51 The “sexual intercourse of the Blood”; an “order of the heart.” 
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way he traveled down the road for nearly four hundred miles until one 
evening on the outskirts of a small town some forty miles from Mexico 
City, he came to a hut and heard his brother singing inside with some 
friends and whores.  His brother was so delighted to see him that he 
offered P his new girl.  P wanted to sleep with his brother but had to take 
the girl so as not to disappoint him.52 
 
He dropped the anecdote for publication, replacing it with a gibe at the fragility of liberal 
values: 
His father was a liberal politician and very anti-Nazi.  His mother, who 
was divorced from his father, spent much of her time in Germany and was 
very anti-semitic [sic].  Yet, when he married a rich Jewess, his father was 
furious and his mother delighted.  (DM 103) 
 
The liberal politician’s public anti-Nazi persona clashes with his reaction to his son’s 
marriage; the mother’s greed trumps her prejudice.  The revision downplays the worry 
that gay love shares in fascism’s self-love.  But it does so to imply what Auden’s essays 
of the same period make explicit:  liberalism suppresses the differences it pretends to 
value.53 
Just as fascism enslaves people to the myth of “Blood-and-Soil” exceptionalism 
(DM 80), liberalism enslaves people to the myth of progress.  “New Year Letter” argues 
that the Renaissance and the Enlightenment produced a new subjectivity:  the sovereign, 
self-interested, hypercognitive “Empiric Economic Man” (DM 55), who believes in the 
“law” of “progress” (DM 127) and grounds his existence in the “rational incentive” of 
“[p]rofit” (DM 55).  The liberal state thus makes “envy the one basis of all moral acts” 
rather than, say, cooperation and fellow-feeling (DM 91).  The poem pictures the liberal 
subject’s enslavement to the principles of progress and gain as an arid sexuality:  “boys” 
suckle machines; “girls” marry typewriters; “old men” fall in love with bargain prices 
                                                
52 Holograph notebook, Berg. 
53 For example, Auden rejected the normalizing function of education in liberal democracies in his 
review of Mortimer Adler’s How to Read a Book (Prose ii 59-61). 
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(DM 58); “business men” become sexually impotent when the stock market crashes (DM 
128).  Far from freeing citizens to think for themselves, liberalism forces them to think 
along the same profit- and progress-fixated lines.  They are “at liberty” only “[t]o starve 
or be forgotten” (DM 55).54 
As a metaphor for the erasure of difference that results from liberalism’s fixation 
on progress, “New Year Letter” presents a second queer figure after the homoerotic 
anecdote about fascism.  Drawing an arrow from “homo” to “neuter” to “[u]npolitical” 
and “afraid,” the poem invokes a common homophobic dismissal of effete men: 
All in their morning mirrors face 
A member of a governed race. 
Each recognizes what LEAR saw, 
The homo THURBER likes to draw, 
The neuter outline that’s the plan 
And icon of Industrial Man, 
The Unpolitical afraid 
Of all that has to be obeyed. 
 
But still each private citizen 
Thanks God he’s not as other men.  (DM 58-59) 
 
“LEAR” refers doubly here.  The citizen of a modern democracy knows what King Lear 
discovered on the heath:  the “barbarism […] implicit in the individualism […] of the 
emergent Renaissance culture,” as Benjamin T. Spencer put it (quoting the “morning 
mirrors” passage from The Double Man) in a 1944 article on Shakespeare’s play.  Each 
knows “the fallibility of the social institutions” that “keep human barbarism so insecurely 
in check.”55  And far from the self-possessed participant that liberalism promises to make 
                                                
54 As we will see in chapter three, The Age of Anxiety (1947) makes the point even more 
emphatically.  “Empiric Economic Man” earns a new name:  “the new barbarian,” whose “mind” was 
“[m]othered by “[c]orporate companies” and “college towns” (Age 16).  Under his dispensation of 
progress, no one has freedom:  “all march in step / Led by that liar, the lukewarm Spirit / Of the Escalator” 
(Age 35). 




of all citizens, each sees himself as epicene, upside down—like the line drawings of 
Edward Lear (for whom zoomorphism was a favorite method of social criticism) or 
James Thurber (for whom meek husbands and henpecking wives were a favorite subject). 
My reading does not require that Thurber intentionally or explicitly depicted gay 
men in his cartoons.  (He did not.)56  By juxtaposing Thurber’s and Lear’s work, though, 
                                                
56 The word “homo” could, of course, function as shorthand for “Homo sapiens,” a designation 
Thurber occasionally gives his characters—e.g., in “Courtship through the Ages” (1939).  We can read the 
passage as polyvalent, though, because of the truncation of the phrase (and, for that matter, the lowercase 
“h”).  Elsewhere (and around the same time) Auden uses “homo” to refer to a gay man—e.g., in “The 
Queen’s Masque, by Bojo the Homo,” which Auden wrote in 1943 for a group of friends in Ann Arbor (see 
the introductory chapter above as well as Humphrey Carpenter, 321-322).  According to the OED, English 
speakers began to use the abbreviation “homo” for “homosexual” in the late 1920s. 
Until now, the image of Thurber’s “homo” in “New Year Letter” has received no attention apart 
from Benjamin Spencer’s allusion and Nicholas Jenkins’ discussion of Faber & Faber’s editorial practices 
(see below).  We can attribute the silence to the fact that most critics read the poem in Edward Mendelson’s 
collected editions of Auden, which inadvertently bowdlerize the passage. 
Shortly after The Double Man appeared in America, Faber & Faber printed a very different 
version of the book as New Year Letter in the U.K.  In addition to several other significant differences that I 
will discuss in the last section of the chapter, the Faber & Faber version eviscerates the “morning mirrors” 
passage:  it erases the polysemy of “Lear” and blurs the central image of the passage by rewriting “Each 
recognizes what LEAR saw, / The homo THURBER likes to draw” as “Each recognizes what Lear saw, / And 
he and Thurber like to draw,” W.H. Auden, New Year Letter (London:  Faber & Faber, 1941), 62.  Auden’s 
original version clarifies what Lear saw through apposition, so that Thurber’s “homo” is a symbol of 
liberalism’s failure.  But Faber & Faber’s revision turns the mention of Thurber into meaningless metric 
filler.  Nicholas Jenkins blames the deletion of “homo” on Faber & Faber’s typographer, Seán Jennett, A 
Critical Edition of W.H. Auden’s The Double Man (D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1996), 659.  
Edward Mendelson’s editions of Auden’s Collected Poems (1976, 1991, 2007), which ostensibly 
represent Auden’s final wishes, retain Jennett’s awkward bowdlerization of the “morning mirrors” passage 
even though Auden did not use Jennett’s rewrite when he assembled Collected Poetry (1945).  Collected 
Longer Poems (1968) does use Jennett’s variant, but correspondence between Mendelson and Faber reveals 
that Mendelson, not Auden, took charge of the editing of this volume.  See Jenkins, A Critical Edition, 767-
769.  An unsigned textual note at the back of the volume indicates that Mendelson collated the “latest 
revised version of each poem with earlier versions […] to include all revisions,” Collected Longer Poems 
(New York:  Random House, 1968), 354.  The note further indicates that Mendelson based the text of 
“New Year Letter” in Collected Longer Poems on the twenty-first printing of Collected Poetry (1945), 
which appeared in 1967.  But even the twenty-first printing uses The Double Man version of the “morning 
mirrors” passage.  And so we must conclude that Mendelson’s decision to follow the Faber reading for 
Collected Longer Poems and Collected Poems mistakenly treats New Year Letter as a “latest revised 
version” of The Double Man.   
Auden’s private correspondence supports that conclusion.  A few months before the publication of 
The Double Man, Auden told a British friend that he would “send you a copy, if the invasion hasn’t started, 
as it has changes from the English mss and, anyway, I’m sure the latter will be full of mistakes,” ALS to 
Mrs. Dodds, 30 January 1941, Bodleian.  And as Jenkins has shown, Auden delivered the manuscript of 
The Double Man to Random House three months after sending a typescript to London.  Despite the fact 
that The Double Man appeared first, it contains many revisions that Auden made during the three-month 
interim.  See A Critical Edition, 706-708.  So Mendelson is wrong to suggest that Auden “forgot about the 




“New Year Letter” redraws Thurber’s henpecked husbands as homophobic caricatures.  
A sonnet in Another Time, Auden’s previous book, reads Edward Lear’s work as 
intentionally, if quietly, queer.57  Thus Auden remakes Thurber’s straight humor (pun 
intended) into a camp joke. 
A third queer figure in “New Year Letter”—after the anecdote of same-sex incest 
and Thurber’s “homo”—also involves a mirror:  people who lack “the gift of double 
focus.”  The poem describes such people contemptuously as “either-ors […] / Who find 
truth in a mirror” (DM 42)—their dogmatism stems from a failure of the self-other 
dialectic.  The mirror metaphor recalls Freud’s interpretation of the homosexual as caught 
in an infantile state of primary narcissism.58 
 But contradiction adorns the poem’s exhibit of queer figures.  Thurber’s “homo” 
is not Auden’s, for “New Year Letter” reverses the image in the morning mirror to make 
the queer person’s abjection her empowerment.  The poem presents a fourth figure, the 
coterie of queer émigrés, a network rooted in affect, choice, and cooperation that avoids 
either of two damaging social extremes:  (a) “Empiric Economic Man” (DM 55) or (b) 
“Blood-and-Soil” fascism (DM 80).  “New Year Letter” suggests that, precisely because 
queer love is non-normative and non-reproductive, it plays a crucial role in building a 
“Just City” that circumvents these extremes.  It is to this idea that I now turn. 
 
 
                                                
57 Another Time (New York:  Random House, 1940), 12.  Another Time includes several other 
sonnets to queer predecessors and queer contemporaries.  See also “A. E. Housman” (11), “Rimbaud” (18), 
“Herman Melville” (20), “The Novelist,” about Christopher Isherwood (33), and “The Composer,” about 
Benjamin Britten (35). 
58 See “Homotextuality:  A Proposal,” Jacob Stockinger, in The Gay Academic, ed. Louie Crew 
(Palm Springs:  ETC Publications, 1978), 141. 
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II.  “AMERICA I’M PUTTING MY QUEER SHOULDER TO THE WHEEL” 
 Sixteen years before Allen Ginsberg wondered how he could possibly “write a 
holy litany” in America’s “silly mood,” Auden put his own shoulder to the wheel with 
praise and optimism.59  Auden’s “great Rome” of possibility (DM 63) is a poignant 
contrast to Ginsberg’s “sinister” nation of atom bombs, prisons, and Time Magazine.60  
“New Year Letter” does qualify its paean to America, however.  It candidly describes the 
tendency of Americans to relocate rather than to negotiate when conflicts arise (DM 64).  
It never forgets the alienating, isolating characteristics of New York City, seeing “man’s 
real condition” of “[a]loneness” as blessing and curse (DM 65).  And it regrets that real 
freedom remains beyond the reach of most citizens.61  Like “America,” “New Year 
Letter” ends with a queer commitment to social justice.  But where Ginsberg’s resolve 
smacks of rueful sarcasm, Auden concludes sincerely, prayerfully. 
 To understand how the final prayers of “New Year Letter” constitute a queer 
pledge to social justice, we must look at the poem’s departure from its Augustan models.  
Auden’s queering of the eighteenth-century verse epistle begins in the occasion of his 
poem:  a gay man writing a thank-you note, in the form of “versified metaphysical 
argument,”62 to a straight married woman he regards as a surrogate mother (privately 
Auden nicknamed Mayer “Dearest and Best of Fairy Godmothers”).63  As a rule 
                                                
59 Allen Ginsberg, Collected Poems 1947-1980 (New York:  Harper & Row, 1984), 147. 
60 Ginsberg, 146. 
61 In the notes to “New Year Letter,” Auden remarks that successful professional artists (like the 
members of his coterie) enjoy special freedom by virtue of their trade:  “As citizens they are the only 
people for whom a capitalist democracy is a completely open society” since “laissez-faire economics really 
applies” to their relationship with the public (DM 78). 
62 Auden, ALS to Elizabeth Mayer, 22 February 1940, Berg. 
63 Auden, ALS to Elizabeth Mayer, undated, Berg.  
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Augustan epistolary exchanges took place between men—though the dedication of “New 
Year Letter” to Mayer does call to mind Jonathan Swift’s “A New Year’s Gift for Bec.”64 
The poem’s gratitude to Mayer seems to rehearse Augustan gender imperatives.65  
Auden chooses an exclusively male tribunal of poets to judge the worth of his work:  
Dante, Blake, Rimbaud, Dryden, Catullus, Tennyson, Baudelaire, Hardy, Rilke, Kipling 
(DM 19-22).  And only one woman makes Auden’s list of “Modern Sources”:  Margaret 
Meade [sic] (DM 161).  So we might conclude from the fulsome praise of Elizabeth 
Mayer that for Auden, men adjudicate while women soothe.  We could also speculate 
about how Mayer might have taken analogies that interpellate the reader as a straight 
male misogynist—for example, the suggestion that “we” love “our lives” like “attractive” 
but scheming “wives / Whom we adore but do not trust” (DM 46).  And critics have seen 
                                                
64 And Pope, whom Auden identified as one of his “three main influences” along with Dante and 
Langland (Prose ii 92), had already departed from the convention by addressing epistles to his friend 
Martha Blount.  But the general misogyny of “To a Lady on Her Birthday” and “Epistle to a Lady” hardly 
needs unpacking, and at least one critic argues convincingly that Pope’s specific praise of Blount in fact 
reinscribes her as an inferior object and reinforces eighteenth-century gender norms.  See Ellen Pollak, The 
Poetics of Sexual Myth:  Gender and Ideology in the Verse of Swift and Pope (Chicago:  University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), 96-127.  Like Pope’s letters to Martha Blount, Swift’s poems to women—e.g., the 
birthday letters to Stella and “An Epistle to a Lady”—merely evaluate the women addressed.  “New Year 
Letter” is less interested in sizing up Mayer’s femininity.  The poem not only praises her, but presents her 
as a fellow-exile contemplating the problems of the day with Auden.  Outside the text, though, Auden did 
play Pope to Mayer’s Blount, gushing to her about how she “would have delighted Goethe and shocked 
Baudelaire who expected La Femme to be ‘naturally c’est-à-dire abominable,’” ALS to Elizabeth Mayer, 1 
January 1940, Berg.  Auden told a mutual acquaintance that what drew him to Mayer was “Das Ewig-
Weibliche,” the eternal womanly,” an allusion that he had used in “New Year Letter” to describe his 
experience of the Pennines (see Humphrey Carpenter, 276). 
65 One aspect of “New Year Letter” in particular imposes norms of gender and sexuality:  the 
construction of mother England.  One could argue that by thanking Mayer for nurturing a community of 
artists, Auden implicitly likens her to England-as-motherland and therefore reinscribes her as “Das 
Weibliche that bids us come / To find what we’re escaping from” (DM 53).  Such a reading might 
harmonize with Auden’s later poem “In Praise of Limestone.”  But here Auden queers the “bond” to the 
motherland, going as far as to imply that England is for him “lost or hated” (DM 63), so a comparison 
between England and Mayer has less force. 
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Mayer as Auden’s Beatrice.66  Focusing on Elizabeth Mayer as a Beatrice-figure, 
however, misses the queering of marriage that the poem’s gratitude encodes. 
The two passages that thank Mayer for her nourishing friendship deserve quoting 
at length.  In the first (a little more than halfway through the poem), Mayer knits “ragged 
egos” into a wedding party: 
Warm in your house, Elizabeth 
A week ago at the same hour 
I felt the unexpected power 
That drove our ragged egos in 
From the dead-ends of greed and sin 
To sit down at the wedding feast, 
Put shining garments on the least, 
Arranged us so that each and all, 
The erotic and the logical,  
Each felt the placement to be such 
That he was honored overmuch [.]  (DM 43) 
 
Switching back and forth between the memory of a recent Christmas celebration at 
Mayer’s Long Island cottage and the present scene of writing the letter at Auden’s 
Brooklyn Heights apartment, the poem sets up a contrast between past “wedding feast” 
and present solitude:  Auden, “a tiny object in the night” (DM 47), watches the glinting 
lights of Manhattan and listens to the New Year revelry outside as he writes (DM 43).  
The expression of solitude spotlights the poem’s elision of Chester Kallman.  While 
Auden referred directly to Kallman in later poems (as we will see in a moment), and 
while in real life Kallman spent much of his time with Auden in the Brooklyn Heights 
apartment, there is no sign of him in the poem’s writing-haunt (a blank I will soon fill).67   
                                                
66 See Anthony Hecht, The Hidden Law:  The Poetry of W.H. Auden (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 241; and Lucy McDiarmid, Auden’s Apologies for Poetry (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 5, 79-86. 
67 Although Auden and Kallman honeymooned together during the summer of 1939 and wore 
wedding rings for a time, they did not share an apartment when they returned to New York at the end of 
August.  Kallman was still an undergraduate at Brooklyn College.  In fact, Auden and Kallman did not 
officially live together until Kallman went to graduate school in Ann Arbor, long after the sexual 
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In the second passage (at the end of the poem), Auden uses marriage imagery to 
praise Mayer: 
Dear friend Elizabeth, dear friend 
These days have brought me, may the end 
I bring to the grave’s dead-line be 
More worthy of your sympathy 
Than the beginning; may the truth 
That no one marries lead my youth 
Where you already are and bless 
Me with your learned peacefulness, 
Who on the lives about you throw 
A calm solificatio, 
A warmth throughout the universe 
That each for better or for worse 
Must carry round with him through life, 
A judge, a landscape, and a wife.  
We fall down in the dance, we make 
The old ridiculous mistake, 
But always there are such as you 
Forgiving, helping what we do.  (DM 70-71) 
 
No actual marriage celebration took place at the Long Island cottage; Mayer’s friendship 
bathes people in a sacramental glow.  Mayer makes good the lacks of marriage. 
As Lucy McDiarmid notes, the first passage echoes the wedding parables in 
Matthew 22:2-14 (where a king casts a man without proper wedding garments “into outer 
darkness”) and in Luke 14:8-11 (where Jesus warns the Pharisees not to take the 
“highest” seat at a wedding); the second passage echoes “The Solemnization of 
Marriage” in The Book of Common Prayer (“for better or for worse”).68  The poem thus 
elevates Mayer to the role of helpmeet.  But McDiarmid’s account elides the coterie 
context of “New Year Letter,” where the poem’s evocation of wedding parties and 
marriage vows with a subtext of theological exile would have had special significance.  
                                                                                                                                            
relationship between them had ended.  Nevertheless, Kallman spent weekdays after class and weekends 
with Auden at the Brooklyn Heights apartment.  See Humphrey Carpenter, 276-279. 
68 McDiarmid, 83, 85. 
 
 94 
Two gay couples formed the core of Mayer’s group:  Auden and Chester Kallman, 
Benjamin Britten and Peter Pears.69 
If a reader listens for the poem’s coterie inflections, the wedding and marriage 
metaphors actually suggest a queering of marriage.  The poem queers marriage through 
expressions of exile that seemingly grant normativity to heterosexuality.  Mayer’s power 
to make “ragged egos” whole anticipates Auden’s private confession to her a few years 
later (long after his romance with Kallman ended) that “[b]eing anders wie [sic] die 
Andern has its troubles,” an allusion to Magnus Hirschfeld’s film on homosexuality, 
Anders als die Andern (1919).  Auden goes on to thank Mayer, as in “New Year Letter”:   
There are days when the knowledge that there will never be a place which 
I can call home, that there will never be a person with whom I shall be one 
flesh, seems more than I can bear, and if it wasn’t for you, and a few—
how few—like you, I don’t think I could.70   
 
The wording of Auden’s grateful confession resembles the end of “New Year Letter”:  
We fall down in the dance, we make 
The old ridiculous mistake, 
But always there are such as you 
Forgiving, helping what we do.  (DM 70-71) 
 
The image of falling down in the dance, moreover, hints at sexual otherness.   
Throughout his oeuvre, Auden associates dancing with marriage, the co-inherence 
of the persons of the trinity, and a reconstituted Eden.  In a hymn to the trinity a few lines 
before the final thank-you to Mayer, “New Year Letter” beseeches Christ, symbolized by 
the unicorn, “[t]o call thy true love to the dance” (DM 69).  The last chorus of “For the 
                                                
69 A friend and housemate of Auden from the latter’s University of Michigan days recalls that 
when Benjamin Britten and Peter Pears visited their house in Ann Arbor, Auden whispered, “Now there’s a 
happily married couple.”  Miller, 57.  Having worked together on song cycles, films, and poetic dramas 
since 1935, Auden and Britten began to collaborate on the operetta Paul Bunyan (1941) after they both 
settled in New York in 1939. 
70 ALS to Elizabeth Mayer, 20 February 1943, Berg. 
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Time Being” (Auden’s coded portrayal of “the Crisis” in “l’affaire C,” or Chester 
Kallman’s infidelity) with its final command to “[l]ove Him in the World of the Flesh; / 
And at your marriage all its occasions shall dance for joy,” presents gay sex as a way of 
worshipping Christ (CP 400).  “Compline” ends with a prayer for the freeing of the poet 
and (in another reference to Chester Kallman) “C (dear C),” along with “all poor s-o-b’s 
who never / Do anything properly,” so “[t]hat we, too, may come to the picnic / With 
nothing to hide, join the dance / As it moves in perichoresis” (CP 639).71  The recurrence 
of paradisal and matrimonial dance imagery in Auden’s poetry displays his conflicted 
thinking about gay love:  on the one hand (as the last chorus of “For the Time Being” 
shows) it could spark joyful spiritual discovery; on the other (as we see at the end of 
“Compline”) it could send the lovers into hiding. 
“New Year Letter” captures both elements of Auden’s experience.  The image of 
Elizabeth Mayer’s warm and revivifying Marian glow as a tonic for Auden’s lonely 
writing and missteps in dancing appears to essentialize same-sex eros as loss.  But the 
poem in fact complicates the experience of queerness as exile and the status of 
heterosexuality as normative.  In the “wedding feast” passage, Auden queers marriage by 
collapsing the hierarchical distinctions that render friendship less important.72  And in the 
final apostrophe to Mayer, Auden queers marriage by arguing that no one marries (no 
two can sustain a one-flesh ecstasy) but that everyone makes vows (we all choose to have 
obligations to people and places).   
                                                
71 See Kirsch, 35, 44, 57, 137, 145. 
72 On the day that Auden began his poem to Mayer, he told her in a private letter that “1939 was a 
very decisive year for me and one of its most important events was meeting you.  I’m not going to say you 
can’t imagine what peace and joy you give to me every time, because you know it very well,” ALS to 
Elizabeth Mayer, 1 January 1940, Berg.  He had also fallen in love with Chester Kallman in 1939. 
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We can thus read the passage’s sober echo of the Anglican wedding service as a 
performative utterance enacting a queer double vow that denaturalizes heterosexuality 
and downplays romance—a coded vow of marriage to Chester Kallman in the context of 
a spoken vow of friendship to Elizabeth Mayer.  Auden publicly dedicated The Double 
Man to Mayer (DM 5), and “New Year Letter” pays public tribute to her as a resource for 
those who would undertake the tough, unromantic work of marriage:  “We fall down in 
the dance,” “you / help […] what we do.”  But Auden privately inscribed a copy of the 
book for Kallman:  “To Chester who knows both halves.”73  The public declaration 
fortifies the private inscription.74 
 If we listen for these queer inflections, the allusions to the wedding parables 
invent an alternative to traditional models of kinship.  And the coterie’s rejection of 
received relational forms (like country and family) becomes an act of civil disobedience 
that points the way to civic renewal.  Alone in his Brooklyn apartment, Auden reminds 
himself that he 
must not […] 
[…] worship blindly the ornate 
Grandezza of the Sovereign State. 
Whatever wickedness we do 
Need not be, orators, for you; 
We can at least serve other ends, 
Can love the polis of our friends 
And pray that loyalty may come 
To serve mankind’s imperium.  (DM 48) 
 
The call to serve friends rather than the state echoes E. M. Forster’s ethic of friendship in 
What I Believe (1939), an ethic that (as we saw in the previous chapter) fueled British 
fears about a treasonous network of gay men (or “Homintern,” as Auden jokingly 
                                                
73 Humphrey Carpenter, 310. 
74 I do not mean to suggest that Auden felt pressured to keep such a dedication secret.  He 
dedicated his previous book to Chester Kallman.  See Another Time, v. 
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referred to it), making critics like Valentine Cunningham and George Steiner so 
suspicious of homo-social coteries.  Auden’s ethic of “serv[ing] other ends” is self-
consciously subversive:  his Double Man is a double agent. 
In its first description of Mayer’s coterie, “New Year Letter” flags Forster’s ethic 
as an influence.  On the morning of the Nazi invasion of Poland, sunlight floods Mayer’s 
Long Island cottage as the exiles listen to Buxtehude.  The music makes 
Our minds a civitas of sound 
Where nothing but assent was found. 
For art had set in order sense 
And feeling and intelligence, 
And from its ideal order grew 
Our local understanding too. 
To set in order—that’s the task 
Both Eros and Apollo ask; 
For Art and Life agree in this 
That each intends a synthesis, 
That order which must be the end 
That all self-loving things intend 
Who struggle for their liberty, 
Who use, that is, their will to be.  (DM 16-17). 
 
As the notes to “New Year Letter” explain, the injunction “[t]o set in order” alludes to 
Jacopone da Todi, a thirteenth-century Franciscan friar, “quoted by E. M. Forster in What 
I Believe” as saying “O Thou who lovest me, set my love in order” (DM 76).  (Though 
Auden here redacts Forster’s text, replacing “this love” with “my love” for clarity.)75   
Forster’s arguments leave a visible watermark on the theo-ethical vision of the 
coterie in “New Year Letter.”  What I Believe is itself a coterie text:  Leonard and 
Virginia Woolf, who along with Forster were key members of the Bloomsbury Group, 
published it as the first installment of their “Sixpenny Pamphlets” series at the Hogarth 
                                                
75 E. M. Forster, What I Believe (London:  Hogarth Press, 1939), 20. 
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Press.76  Identifying himself as “a liberal who has found his liberalism crumbling beneath 
him,”77 Forster instead places his hopes for humanity in “personal relationships.”78  He 
anticipates exactly George Steiner’s chauvinistic suspicion of such affect-driven, non-
institutionalized relationships: 
Personal relations are despised to-day.  They are regarded as bourgeois 
luxuries, as products of a time of fair weather which is now past, and we 
are urged to get rid of them, and to dedicate ourselves to some movement 
or cause instead.  I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between 
betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the 
guts to betray my country.  Such a choice may scandalize the modern 
reader, and he may stretch out his patriotic hand to the telephone at once 
and ring up the police.79 
 
But Forster rewrites the condemnation of coteries as an affirmation: 
I believe in aristocracy though—if that is the right word, and if a democrat 
may use it.  Not an aristocracy of power, based upon rank and influence, 
but an aristocracy of the sensitive, the considerate and the plucky.  Its 
members are to be found in all nations and classes, and all through the 
ages, and there is a secret understanding between them when they meet.  
They represent the true human tradition, the one permanent victory of our 
queer race over cruelty and chaos.80 
 
One could lift Forster’s description directly out of the introductory pages of Proust’s 
Sodome et Gomorrhe (1921)—the treasonous world of the “men-women” descendents of 
Sodom, where ambassadors and prisoners are friends, that we caught a glimpse of in the 
previous chapter—except for the fact that Forster praises what Proust’s narrator despises. 
 Like Forster’s “aristocracy of the sensitive,” Mayer’s coterie is a prototype of the 
“Just City.”  Auden’s descriptions of the coterie upstage the radicalism of the biblical 
wedding parables to which they allude.  Where Jesus shows the Pharisees how to dodge 
                                                
76 Forster published a different version of the essay as “Two Cheers for Democracy,” The Nation 
147.3 (16 July 1938):  64-68.  Forster reprinted the Hogarth Press version of the essay under the title “What 
I Believe” in his collection Two Cheers for Democracy (New York:  Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951). 
77 Forster, What I Believe, 21. 
78 Forster, What I Believe, 7. 
79 Forster, What I Believe, 7-8. 
80 Forster, What I Believe, 16-17. 
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humiliation, the coterie gives everyone unexpected honor.  Where Jesus warns of exile 
for impropriety, these sexual and civic outsiders exalt “the least” among them.  They 
embody a Williams-esque dialectic:  “each and all, / The erotic and the logical” find a 
place (DM 43).  (We can take Auden’s annotation of this line to mean that the coterie 
welcomes even the bourgeois:  Auden notes that “[i]n Le Bourgeois, Soubart [sic] divides 
men into the erotics and the bourgeois” [DM 117].) 
In a sense, then, “New Year Letter” rehabilitates the local ethical body—but 
instead of the (predetermined) family or the parish, the (adopted) coterie becomes a key 
ethical resource.  It is, as I hinted at the end of the previous chapter, a queer 
communitarianism:  it displays the benefits of proximity and intimacy without the 
drawback of insularity.  At the end of the poem Auden asks a shape-shifting, half-
Christian and half-Spinozan God (“Dove of Science,” “Ichthus,” “Wind,” “Voice,” 
“Clock and Keeper,” “Source,” “It without image”) to 
Instruct us in the civil art  
Of making from the muddled heart 
A desert and a city where 
The thoughts that have to labor there 
May find locality and peace [.]  (DM 70) 
 
Auden wants locality that depends on mobility:  people make (or choose) the sites of 
solitary reflection and cooperative labor where their thoughts find (or learn) 
neighborhood.  The poem synthesizes communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.81 
Auden made a remark several years later that further explains why a polis of 
queer love might serve as a good social model for the imperium.  Commenting (in his 
1948 introduction to The Portable Greek Reader) on Diotima’s discourse, Auden 
                                                
81 See Alan Jacobs, What Became of Wystan:  Change and Continuity in Auden’s Poetry 
(Fayetteville:  University of Arkansas Press, 1998), 66-67, and my discussion of Jacobs in chapter one. 
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politicizes his earlier argument about Henry James and the enabling disability of 
homosexuality: 
If erotic passion can or ought to be transformed [from love of a beautiful 
individual to love of justice], then it was sound psychological insight on 
Plato’s part and not simply the cultural pattern of erotic life in Greece that 
made him exclude the heterosexual relation [from the stages of the soul’s 
growth], for the latter leads beyond itself, not to the universal, but to more 
individuals, namely the love of and responsibility for a family, whereas, in 
the homosexual case, since the relation of itself leads nowhere, the love 
which it has aroused is free to develop in any direction the lovers choose, 
and that direction should be towards wisdom which, once acquired, will 
enable them to teach human beings procreated in the normal way how to 
become a good society.  For love is to be judged by its social and political 
value.  (Prose ii 370) 
 
Same-sex lovers have the freedom (and, as Auden’s “should” implies, the responsibility) 
to channel their love into critical social thought.  (In the next chapter we will see how The 
Age of Anxiety (1947) explicitly invokes the Platonic notion of same-sex lovers’ being 
“pregnant in soul,” birthing poetry and political thought [Symposium 208e-210b].)82   
To translate this claim about the ethical value of queerness into the language of 
“New Year Letter,” the queer periphery can teach the imperial center how to become a 
good society because émigrés and outlaws escape the “Verbürgerlichung of / All joy and 
suffering and love” (DM 57) that happens under liberalism.83  A note to “Empiric 
Economic Man” (DM 55)—Auden’s phrase for the new calculating, hyperrational, self-
interested subjectivity that liberalism has produced—indicates what the 
“Verbürgerlichung” might look like by enumerating the beliefs of Middletown 
(sociologists R.S. and H.M. Lynds’ code name for Muncie, Indiana c. 1890-1925):  
“[t]hat progress is a law of life,” that work and play can never overlap, “[t]hat education 
                                                
82 I am relying on the translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 1989). 
83 “The process of becoming bourgeois,” i.e., “embourgeoisement.” 
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and too much contact with books unfit a person for practical life,” “[t]hat ‘culture and 
things like that’ are more the business of women than of men,” “[t]hat a person is ‘queer’ 
who enjoys solitary leisure” (DM 127).  Auden’s queer periphery unsettles these Middle 
American beliefs. 
At this point Auden’s construction of queerness as an enabling disability starts to 
look like W. E. B. Du Bois’s account of racism in The Souls of Black Folk (1903): 
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and the Roman, the 
Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a 
veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which 
yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself 
through the revelation of the other world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through 
the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul through the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity.  One ever feels his two-ness,—an 
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; 
two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it 
from being torn asunder. 
 The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—, 
this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self 
into a better and truer self.  In this merging he wishes neither of the old 
selves to be lost.84  
 
The similarity is particularly striking if one agrees with Richard Bozorth that the epigraph 
to The Double Man indicates Auden’s preoccupation with “Christian sexual dictates” 
against homosexuality.85  The epigraph reads, “We are, I know not how, double in 
ourselves, so that what we believe we disbelieve, and cannot rid ourselves of what we 
condemn” (DM iii).  Such an interpretation would link “double focus” directly to gay 
                                                
84 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver 
(New York:  Norton, 1999), 10-11. 
85 Richard R. Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge:  Poetry and the Meanings of Homosexuality 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 2001), 222. 
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shame.  We could then draw a parallel between queerness as a prophetic gift and the 
Moses-like “veil” of “second-sight.”86 
In addition to echoing Du Bois’s “double consciousness,” Auden’s “gift of double 
focus” recalls Edward Carpenter’s depiction of homosexuality as a boon to democracy in 
The Intermediate Sex (1896).  An English socialist poet and early gay activist, Carpenter 
argues that the “double nature” of gay men and women gives them the ability to reconcile 
straight men and women by explaining “the two sexes” to each other.  Prefiguring 
Auden’s defiant embrace of the Homintern (which we encountered in the previous 
chapter), Carpenter creatively rewrites the threat of a secret queer network as an 
affirmation.  Queer people have “a certain freemasonry of the secrets of the two sexes 
which may well favour their function as reconcilers and interpreters.”87  Moreover, 
precisely because gay desire builds cross-class alliances, it bolsters “true Democracy.”88 
Whether or not we use The Souls of Black Folk or The Intermediate Sex as an 
optic for reading “New Year Letter,” the poem reproduces the phobic logic of the mirror 
to shatter it.  It overturns the Freudian association of queerness with narcissism and non-
reproductivity:  the relationship that “leads nowhere” becomes most fertile, “develop[ing] 
in any direction”; procreative lovers merely generate more instances of themselves.  
Auden thereby gives the post-Stonewall reader an alternative to antisocial reclamations of 
shame (a point that I will take up in more detail in chapter five).  Lee Edelman’s No 
Future (2004) epitomizes the antisocial turn in queer theory.  While Edelman recognizes 
the “all-pervasive, self-congratulatory, and strategically misrecognized” narcissism 
                                                
86 Du Bois, 10-11. 
87 Edward Carpenter, The Intermediate Sex:  A Study of Some Transitional Types of Men and 
Women (New York:  Mitchell and Kennerley, 1921), 36.  
88 Edward Carpenter, 107. 
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inherent in pronatalism, he embraces the “wholesale rupturing of the social fabric” that 
conservatives attach to the sterility of queerness.89  For him, queerness attains its ethical 
value insofar as it resists the “secular theology” of “reproductive futurism” on which civil 
society depends.90  By figuring childless queers as intellectually fecund teachers of self-
propagating straights, Auden’s reclamation of shame offers a middle way for readers who 
want to resist heteronorms without giving up their faith in the social. 
But how would the queer periphery teach the imperial center?  How can the 
coterie speak to Middletown?  Another way of putting the question is to ask how “New 
Year Letter” might kindle in its reader what Douglas Mao calls “the queer angle of 
view,” meaning the “critical consciousness” that could help build the “Just City” by 
animating the civic dialectic.91  (A key question, given the poem’s caveats about the 
propensity of Americans to migrate when conflict happens and given the émigré-coterie’s 
awareness of its own privilege [DM 43].  It is a question to which The Age of Anxiety 
[1947] perhaps gives a more satisfying answer, as we will see in the next chapter.)  
The multivocality of “New Year Letter” forces us to ask in whom “New Year 
Letter” could kindle a queer angle of view.  Auden sets no explicit limits on the epistle’s 
potential readership: 
May such heart and intelligence 
As huddle now in conference 
Whenever an impasse occurs 
Use the good offices of verse; 
May an Accord be reached, and may 
This aide-mémoire on what they say, 
This private minute for a friend, 
Be the dispatch that I intend; 
                                                
89 Lee Edelman, No Future:  Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC:  Duke University 
Press, 2004), 13, 14. 
90 Edelman, 12, 2. 
91 Mao, 231. 
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Although addressed to a Whitehall 
Be under Flying Seal to all 
Who wish to read it anywhere, 
And, if they open it, En Clair.  (DM 25) 
 
The letter serves as a formal memorandum of the war and an intimate note to Mayer; 
Auden addresses it to the British government with the seal attached but not closed, 
hoping that anyone who forwards the letter to its final destination can read it in ordinary 
language and not in cipher.  The fusion of intimacy and publicity democratizes Auden’s 
coterie.  Still, Auden’s insistence that readers can access the annotated text “En Clair” 
should give us pause:  how do the polyglot poem and its polymorphous commentary 
negotiate the tension between empowering and excluding readers?92 
And the Augustan form of the poem poses a related problem.  Auden’s frequent 
code-switching (from English to German to French to Latin) and his mining of a range of 
academic specialties for metaphors (embryology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, 
theology) do reproduce the cosmopolitan ethos of Mayer’s Long Island cottage.93  The 
notes to “New Year Letter” do “set up” an “internal doubling” that looks forward to a 
postmodern poetic by qualifying the body text with questions, anecdotes, taxonomies, 
quotations, and more poems in a variety of forms.94  And we can see the arrangement of 
The Double Man as transatlantic bricolage:  the short “Prologue” and “Epilogue,” written 
in syllabics, employ a “New World” technique that Auden learned from Marianne Moore 
                                                
92 On the one hand the code-switching reflects the fact that Auden’s New York community often 
spoke in German because it was “the language of our friends, the refugees,” James Stern, “The 
Indispensable Presence,” in W.H. Auden:  A Tribute, ed. Stephen Spender (New York:  Macmillan, 1975), 
126.  On the other hand the (sometimes lengthy) untranslated quotations of Goethe, Pascal, Baudelaire, 
Rilke, Wagner, Origen, and Augustine as well as the unmodernized quotations of Chaucer and Langland 
seem to undermine Auden’s democratic critical ethics.  Auden himself misspelled a number of the 
quotations and had to ask Mayer for help with a German squib he composed for the notes.  See ALS to 
Elizabeth Mayer, 10 June 1940, Berg.  
93 Nicholas Jenkins “Auden in America,” in The Cambridge Companion to W.H. Auden, 43. 




and later described as “very difficult for an English ear to grasp” (DH 297); “New Year 
Letter” and “The Quest” represent “Old World” forms. 
But Auden could have created transatlantic effects without reaching back to 
Augustan models that teem with organicist nostalgia.95  The verse epistles of Dryden and 
Pope and Swift mourn the civil war’s disintegration of a traditional agricultural society 
that binds “higher and lower orders […] to one another through ancient ties.”96  They do 
not turn to organicism as a mere “myth” for “genuine community”—they “demand an 
actual return to that organic or traditional order.”97  In addition to asking about the 
poem’s inclusivity, then, it is also worth asking what Auden’s neo-Augustanism means in 
a book that worries about the fascist recuperation of eighteenth-century “habits of mind.”  
I will now turn my attention to answering these questions. 
 
 
III.  NO AUDENARY AUGUSTAN 
 My own view is that Auden revives the Augustan verse epistle not nostalgically 
but ironically.  “New Year Letter” holds that “all real unity commences / In 
consciousness of differences” (DM 69).  Auden’s essays of the same period long for a 
truly “open” society in which “[t]he concept of normality disappears” (Prose ii 95).  
Through its neo-Augustan formal features, the poem invites the reader to develop such 
ethical consciousness.  Patrick Deane has written that the poem’s Augustan conventions 
“seem to work affectively to produce in the reader a non-rational sympathy with the 
                                                
95 See William C. Dowling, The Epistolary Moment:  The Poetics of the Eighteenth-Century Verse 
Epistle (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1991), 53-54. 
96 Dowling, 79. 
97 Dowling, 82. 
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poem’s world-view.”  “New Year Letter” exercises its “ideational power” through “a 
potentially endless procession” of rhyming couplets that mimics the Hegelian logic of the 
poem.98  Dean does not go far enough.  I submit that the poem constructs an anti-
rationalist epistemology—a queer angle of view—by exploding its Augustan models. 
 “New Year Letter” modifies the style of Augustan poetry, first, in that the syntax 
of the poem breaks its hudibrastic restraints.  As readers like Jenkins and Mendelson have 
noted, “New Year Letter” loosens the neoclassical couplet—and not just by virtue of 
choosing tetrameter over pentameter.99  Take, for example, the following lines from 
Swift’s “Death and Daphne”: 
Their President, in Scarlet Gown,  
Harangu’d, and welcom’d him to Town. 
 
BUT, Death had Bus’ness to dispatch:  
His Mind was running on his Match.  
And, hearing much of Daphne’s Fame,  
His Majesty of Terrors came,  
Fine as a Col’nel of the Guards,  
To visit where she sat at Cards:  
She, as he came into the Room,  
Thought him Adonis in his Bloom.  
And now her Heart with Pleasure jumps,  
She scarce remembers what is Trumps.100 
 
Each line contains one end-stopped unit of thought; a sentence usually consists of one or 
two lines (at most four); rhyme-pairs punctuate the sentences as well as the verse 
paragraph that concludes at “to Town.”  By contrast, the lines of “New Year Letter” are 
heavily enjambed.  Sentences sprawl over as many as 34 lines (e.g., the concluding 
prayer, “O Unicorn among the cedars” to “O da quod jubes, Domine” [DM 69-70]).  And 
                                                
98 Patrick Deane, At Home in Time:  Forms of Neo-Augustanism in Modern English Poetry 
(Montreal:  McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 77. 
99 Jenkins, “Auden in America,” 44; Mendelson, Later Auden, 100-101. 




the poem ends sentences and verse paragraphs between rhymes, undercutting the use of 
rhyme as aural punctuation (e.g., “The old Year dies a noisy death. // Warm in your 
house, Elizabeth” [DM 43]).  The sprawling syntax departs from the restrained, cerebral 
tone of Augustan poetry. 
 Warping a major eighteenth-century English verse form provides a non-discursive 
means of critiquing the primacy of reason in Enlightenment thought.  Like the later 
“Memorial for the City” (dedicated to, and written in a form he learned from, Charles 
Williams), “New Year Letter” faults “the Rational City” of the eighteenth-century for its 
homogenizing, meliorist drum-march “of a clear idea” and its attack on “mystery” (CP 
591-592).  In the notes Auden praises Nietzsche for “debunk[ing …] our liberal fallacies” 
and exposing the tyranny of the Greek and Enlightenment overemphasis on reason (DM 
91-92, 138).  The poem argues that an ethical solution to the current international crisis 
lies in prayer and intuition as much as (if not more than) reason:  “all our intuitions mock 
/ the formal logic of the clock” (DM 30); “[c]locks cannot tell our time of day / For what 
event to pray” (DM 75).  Broken hudibrastics clinch the point.101 
“New Year Letter” also departs from its Augustan models through its annotations.  
John Fuller has suggested that the annotations to Pope’s Dunciad are “similarly deployed 
contributive material.”102  The point of the Dunciad, though, is to poke fun at the limits of 
scholarship—hence the mock-epic’s ridiculous apparatus.  Pope annotates the notes and 
                                                
101 Critics have spilled a lot of ink over the question of what poems serve as models for Auden’s 
unconventional hudibrastics.  Jenkins suggests Emerson’s “Each and All” and “The Problem.”  See “Auden 
in America,” 45.  Michael Murphy suggests Marvell’s “Upon Appleton House.”  See “Neoclassicism, Late 
Modernism, and W.H. Auden’s ‘New Year Letter’,” Cambridge Quarterly 33.2 (2004): 111.  Anthony 
Hecht suggests Blake’s “The Everlasting Gospel,” 212.  But none of these poems stretches or remixes the 
octosyllabic couplet in the way I have described.  Oscar Wilde’s epigrams make a better candidate.  Just as 
Wilde’s epigrams reverse the mores they cite, Auden’s couplets disrupt the patterns of reasoned argument 
on which they draw. 




attributes much of the annotation to the pedants he attacks in the body text.103  The notes 
to “New Year Letter” do quarry a “laughably eclectic” list of “Modern Sources,” as 
Rachel Wetzsteon has observed.104  But the laughable eclecticism constitutes a serious act 
of ethical self-fashioning.  It is ideological drag:  the Episcopalian costumed in Voltaire, 
Wagner, and Nietzsche (or the nonbeliever trying on Charles Williams and Kierkegaard 
for size) exhibits camp’s equation of “sincerity” with “intellectual narrowness.”105  The 
citationality has a sincere ethical goal that can only be achieved by insincerity:  it 
“refuses […] the risks of fully identifying with extreme states of feeling.”106  The notes 
practice belief-in-disbelief.  
And unlike the contempt for scholarly commentary evident in Pope’s apparatus, 
the display of erudition in Auden’s notes has a pedagogic design.  Reflecting on the fact 
that modernist writers controlled the reception of their work through glosses, John 
Whittier-Ferguson remarks, 
[i]n our century the note is often assumed to be a democratic addition to 
the text, encouraging rather than exclusive, and more accessible than the 
annotated material.  This assumption regularly runs counter to the nature 
of apparatus, which lends itself to elliptical or abstruse commentary 
addressed to a smaller audience than the text proper.107 
 
T. S. Eliot’s gnomic, teasing annotations to The Waste Land, for example, frustrate more 
often than they elucidate.  The notes to “New Year Letter” are an exception to the 
                                                
103 As Joseph Levine shows in his account of the quarrel between the wits (i.e., Augustan poets) 
and the learned men (i.e., scholars), “[e]ver since Swift had ridiculed the forms of modern learning in A 
Tale of a Tub, the learned commentary had come to look more and more ludicrous to the wits.  Footnotes 
epitomized their concern that the grace and elegance of polite literature were likely to be buried beneath the 
erudition of the drones,” The Battle of the Books:  History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Ithaca, New 
York:  Cornell University Press, 1991), 205. 
104 Rachel Wetzsteon, Influential Ghosts:  A Study of Auden’s Sources (New York:  Routledge, 
2007), 91. 
105 Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York:  Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1966), 
288. 
106 Sontag, 287. 
107 John Whittier-Ferguson, Framing Pieces:  Designs of the Gloss in Joyce, Woolf, and Pound 
(Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1996), 7. 
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modernist rule.  They read like a notebook or a reading diary—sketches for future essays 
and poems.  (An early reviewer of The Double Man described the writing as that of a 
“student, notebook in hand.”)108  In that respect the notes would seem to make all 
possible readers qua audiences irrelevant.  But a closer look reveals more than ethical 
self-fashioning.  The notes also preach their practice of “double focus.” 
The notes fall into six main types.  Just a few of them cite or explain material in 
the body text.  Some of the notes ask rhetorical questions—e.g., Auden glosses the 
Devil’s “favorite strategy” of “treat[ing] babe and bathwater the same” with the question, 
“Are not most neuroses the consequence of so drawing a false general conclusion from a 
true particular instance (the traumatic experience)?” (DM 36, 108).  (A Socratic question 
that nudges the reader into “double focus.”)  Some of them are exercises in criticism—
e.g., Auden’s take on poetry as an excellent vehicle for “double focus,” since “poetry 
might be defined as the clear expression of mixed feelings” (DM 116).  Some of them are 
religious reflections on the order of Pascal’s Pensées—e.g., a definition of “evil” as 
schism and “good” as an “act” that “lessons or removes” the “disharmony” (DM 105-
106).109  (Or “double focus” in black-and-white terms.)  Some of them are teacherly 
anecdotes—e.g., the story of the liberal anti-Nazi father and the anti-semitic mother (DM 
103).  Some of them are scraps of doggerel—e.g., a quatrain opines that a person’s ability 
to convince others exists in indirect proportion to her own conviction (DM 120).   
                                                
108 Louise Bogan, “Briefly Noted,” The New Yorker (12 April 1941): 84. 
109 Auden in fact first wrote some of the material that ended up in the notes to “New Year Letter” 
for The Prolific and the Devourer, a prose catechism modeled on Pascal’s Pensées and Blake’s The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, during a trip across the States in the summer of 1939.  For a detailed 
comparison of The Prolific and the Devourer—which was posthumously published—and The Double Man, 
see Jenkins, A Critical Edition, 919-937. 
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We might even go so far as to say that the annotations activate “the gift of double 
focus” in the reader.  A striking example occurs when “New Year Letter” puts a half-
truth into the Devil’s mouth:  reason cannot save us, so we ought to throw out the 
“killjoy” (the intellect) and “[r]ecover […] the Beischlaf of the blood” (DM 32).  A note 
to the passage offers a paean to the queer angle of view: 
The critical intelligence 
Undermines the State’s defence [sic], 
While the loyal heart refuses 
To reform the State’s abuses; 
Yet all Being needs the blind, 
All Becoming the unkind.  (DM 102) 
 
The note equips the reader to find the Devil’s error:  that while reason cannot save us, we 
ought not to throw it out entirely.  Without the note, a reader could misinterpret the poem 
as rejecting “critical intelligence” entirely.  Even Auden scholars miss the point.  Rainer 
Emig writes that the poem’s “advocation of […] ‘Beischlaf of the blood’ smacks of D. H. 
Lawrence, if not of the blood-based ideology of fascism.”110  Patrick Deane likewise 
quotes the passage without attributing it to the Devil.111  Most recently, Aidan Wasley 
misattributes the passage and misreads the poem as a total rejection of reason.  Failing to 
trace the endorsement of “the Beischlaf of the blood” back to its source, Wasley takes it 
to refer to “a passionate, humane embrace”—not the incestuous tribalism of fascist 
regimes.  Thus for Wasley “New Year Letter” names love “the force that compels” the 
poet, “not intellect,” when in fact the poem promotes a balance of both in the form of 
“double focus.”112 
                                                
110 Emig, 153-154. 
111 Deane, 71. 
112 Aidan Wasley, The Age of Auden:  Postwar Poetry and the American Scene (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 2011), 15. 
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Teaching the reader how (not what) to think, the notes complement the poem’s 
theory of art as an “abstract model” for the reader to apply.  And equipping Middletown 
to practice “double focus,” they line up with Auden’s post-emigration pronouncements 
about the role of art and literary criticism.  He saw art as “one of the most powerful 
means of transforming closed communities into open ones” because it could envision 
new possibilities for the reader (Prose ii 493).  Likewise he saw the critic’s instructional 
task as a matter of social justice “because the situation of all individuals, artist and 
audience alike, in an open society is such that the only check on authoritarian control by 
the few, whether in matters of esthetic taste or political choice, is the knowledge of the 
many” (Prose ii 93).  Auden also had egalitarian critical convictions about “the popular” 
and “the avant garde” (Prose ii 99), imagining a Pennsylvania coal miner “learn[ing] to 
see himself in terms of the world of Ronald Firbank” and “an Anglican bishop find[ing] 
in The Grapes of Wrath a parable of his diocesan problems” (Prose ii 93). 
 
 
IV.  POPE’S GHOSTS 
Despite the fact that The Double Man marks a pivotal moment in Auden’s corpus 
and in the story of literary modernism, it has received almost no attention from critics or 
scholars.  Part of the reason for this silence is the book’s invisibility:  it went out of print 
within two years.113  That Faber & Faber printed a bowdlerized,114 Anglicized115 version 
of the book in the United Kingdom as New Year Letter also contributes to the invisibility 
                                                
113 Bloomfield and Mendelson, Bibliography, 48.  The book was published in one edition of 2,000 
copies.   
114 See note 56 above. 
115 As we will see in a moment. 
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of The Double Man:  extant copies of New Year Letter outnumber The Double Man three 
to one,116 and many critics focus on New Year Letter rather than The Double Man without 
explaining their choice—they discuss neither how the books differ nor the consequences 
of privileging one for study.  (Besides obscuring The Double Man, such a decision 
suggests that the critics do not know or understand the differences between the texts.  
One of them, for example, mistakenly refers to The Double Man as a reprinting of New 
Year Letter.)117   
Auden himself bears some of the blame for the book’s invisibility.  For Collected 
Poetry (1945) he reshaped his corpus along New Critical principles, erasing the social 
and historical contexts of his work.  He dispersed the contents of The Double Man into 
contexts that gave them radically new meanings:  he dropped the annotations to “New 
Year Letter”; on top of that, he repurposed pieces of verse from the notes as stand-alone 
poems.  Critics almost always look at the poem in this stripped-down form.118 
The primacy that critics thereby give to Auden’s final intentions implies what 
Edward Mendelson calls the “gothic-tower” model of the process of authorship.  In “The 
Two Audens and the Claims of History,” Mendelson observes that when an editor selects 
either an early or a late version of a poem as copy-text, she chooses “between two models 
                                                
116 See Bloomfield and Mendelson, Bibliography, 49.  New Year Letter appeared in England two 
months after The Double Man appeared in America. 
117 Giles, 250. 
118 Consider what violence a New Critical hermeneutic does to an occasional coterie poem like 
“New Year Letter.”  It ignores the poem’s epistolary epistemology:  “If in this letter that I send / I write 
‘Elizabeth’s my friend,’ / I cannot but express my faith / That I is Not-Elizabeth” (DM 30).  Naming a real-
life sender-receiver relationship, the poet affirms his faith in a shared external world of signifiers and 
signifieds.  The burden of the poem is to understand—and by understanding, possibly to repair—that 
warring world in the context of a specific friendship. 
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of the act of authorship.”119  We can make the same point about critics who rule out other 
versions of a text for study.  Adherents of the “gothic-tower” model see an author’s 
original conception as a “rough sketch” that revisions animate and clarify.120  By contrast, 
adherents of the “fading-coal” model prize an author’s original conception and mistrust 
revisions:  “the more distant the poet grows from conception, the less well the poet 
comprehends it.”121  Critics have tended to take a “fading-coal” approach to Auden’s ’30s 
poetry, preferring the political engagement (first tentatively Marxian and subsequently 
liberal humanist) of the original versions to the revisions and excisions that Auden later 
made to his canon in light of his retreat from partisan politics and conversion to 
Christianity.122  But it is precisely the transformational quality of Auden’s wartime epistle 
as it appears in The Double Man that demands a third model of the process of authorship, 
one that favors neither the original conception nor the final intention.   
I call it the “living-guts” model, choosing a messier image from Auden’s own 
poem “In Memory of W. B. Yeats” to highlight the messy practicalities of authorship.  
Written shortly after Auden arrived in New York City, and less than a year before he 
began “New Year Letter,” the poem admits that no writer has complete control over the 
meaning of his work (here a bitter admission, since the poem depicts the dead Yeats as 
“scattered among a hundred cities / And wholly given over to unfamiliar affections / […] 
punished under a foreign code of conscience” [SP 89]).  Authoring does not end with the 
                                                
119 Edward Mendelson, “The Two Audens and the Claims of History,” in Representing Modernist 
Texts:  Editing as Interpretation, ed. George Bornstein (Ann Arbor:  The University of Michigan Press, 
1991), 157. 
120 Mendelson, “The Two Audens and the Claims of History,” 159. 
121 Mendelson, “The Two Audens and the Claims of History,” 164. 
122 A prime example of such a critic is Frank Kermode.  In History and Value, Kermode dismisses 
Auden’s “meddlings and recantations” as “imperceptive renunciation” and finds him “lacking in the sense 
other men might have that they needed at least to seem consistent in their opinions, or to give plausible 
reasons for changing them,” (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998), 73, 80. 
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poet who conceives and revises, because a poem itself is an ongoing event—“A way of 
happening, a mouth” through which new magazine and book appearances and new 
readers speak new meanings in new circumstances:  “The words of a dead man / Are 
modified in the guts of the living.”  (The synecdoche amplifies the bitterness of the 
admission:  “mouth” recalls “mouthpiece.”)  Poetry “survives / In the valley of its 
saying,” where authorship survives the author—where, as Jerome McGann puts it, an 
“author’s wishes, the physical texts, and a host of other […] relationships all cooperate” 
in a work’s authority.123   
So the “living-guts” model locates the process of authorship in the social and 
institutional relations of a text’s composition, publication, and reception—not only in the 
words of the poet but also in the mouths and guts of amanuenses, printers, editors, 
marketers, and reviewers.  Adherents of the “living-guts” model might choose to study 
any incarnation of a work by Auden, looking for what its conditions of production reveal 
about its cultural moment and the poet’s evolving aesthetic and ideological commitments.  
Noticing how a reprint of a work changes what it means—the pirating of a privately 
circulated poem, or a scholarly edition that adopts an author’s last revisions as copy-text 
but stamps the date of initial composition on every poem, say—could help us queer the 
construction of Auden as a poet of universal human values.124   
The Auden of “New Year Letter” onward, unlike the Auden of “In Memory of W. 
B. Yeats,” would sympathize with such a notion of textuality.  He chose typeface, layout, 
                                                
123 McGann, A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism (Charlottesville:  University of Virginia 
Press, 1992), 89. 
124 Not that one model necessarily excludes the others:  the case of Thurber’s “homo” (see note 56 
above) shows that taking a “living-guts” editorial approach can make it easier to assess accurately what 
counts as an author’s last revisions. 
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and even paper with care.125  But he also happily defined reading a poem as 
dismembering and scattering its textual body:  if the “meaning” of a poem resides in “the 
outcome of a dialogue” between the text and “the response” of the reader (as his 1967 
lecture “Words and the Word” suggests) and if, therefore, a poem will have a different 
significance “for each reader who responds to it,” poetry escapes the charge of “black 
magic” or propaganda (SW 130).  The model thus recognizes that a critic who recovers an 
invisible text, too, participates in its authorship:  foregrounding another incarnation of the 
work would tell a different story.   
The story I have chosen to tell begins and ends with shame.  When scholars and 
critics privilege the British version of “New Year Letter,” they perpetuate a “regime of 
censorship,” to borrow Richard Bozorth’s phrase for what happens when scholars and 
critics forget the personally inscribed texts that Auden circulated among his friends and 
lovers.126  Random House’s The Double Man and Faber’s New Year Letter have crucial 
differences largely because of a contractual fiasco.  Auden intended to publish the British 
edition of The Double Man with John Lehmann at the Hogarth Press (to replace a travel 
book on America that Lehmann had commissioned), forgetting that to do so would 
breach his contract with T. S. Eliot at Faber.   
Eliot discovered Auden’s mistake through a Hogarth Press announcement.  Not 
wanting to publish a book that another press had advertised, Eliot changed the title 
without consulting Auden (shortening the poem’s title to “Letter”), silently emended a 
                                                
125 For example, Auden chose a Victorian typeface and layout for The Age of Anxiety (1947) to 
underline the poem’s “baroque” quality (Humphrey Carpenter, 347).  Auden argued unsuccessfully for 
Random House to print The Double Man on “shiny paper like a textbook,” a material feature that might 
have settled the question of what kind of relationship the book establishes with its reader.  Quoted in 
Jenkins, A Critical Edition, 648. 
126 Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge, 24. 
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phrase in “The Prologue” from “the Double Man” to “the invisible twin,”127 and 
expurgated the proto-queer imagery of “New Year Letter.”128  Eliot’s changes disrupt the 
book’s conceptual unity, obscuring its dialectical theology as well as its self-consciously 
transatlantic aesthetic.  His ear had become thoroughly English by now; Eliot botched the 
syllabic form of the “Prologue.”  The Faber imprimatur (its minimalist uniform book 
design) also muffles the Americanness of The Double Man.  New Year Letter thus misses 
the Anglican-American synthesis of Auden’s project.129 
To read “New Year Letter” in Auden’s subsequent collections also implicates the 
scholar-critic in suppressions more hidden than the obvious fact of omissions like “Spain, 
1937.”  As Anthony Hecht has suggested, Auden probably devised the non-chronological 
New Critical arrangement of Collected Poetry (1945) as a clever way to thwart hostile 
reactions to his post-emigration work—like Randall Jarrell’s negative review of The 
Double Man.130  To Jarrell, the preachy neo-Augustanism of “New Year Letter” signals 
“the decline and fall of modernist poetry”: 
In 1931 Pope’s ghost said to me, “Ten years from now the leading young 
poet of the time will publish, in The Atlantic Monthly, a didactic epistle of 
about 900 tetrameter couplets.”  I answered absently, “You are a fool”; 
and who on this earth would have thought him anything else?131   
 
Pronouncing “New Year Letter” a “strained,” “pale,” and “diluted” poem that “lacks the 
necessary finality of presentation,” Jarrell remembers wistfully the Egyptian “fleshpots” 
                                                
127 Humphrey Carpenter, 303. 
128 See note 56 above. 
129 On top of all this, Auden made many changes to the manuscript he submitted to Random House 
after his agent sent a second manuscript to Faber.  He gave interpretive titles to the sonnets of “The Quest” 
sequence (like “The Preparations,” “The City,” “The First Temptation,” and “The Garden”), added the list 
of “Modern Sources,” and expanded the notes to “New Year Letter.” 
130 Hecht, 2. 
131 Randall Jarrell, in W.H. Auden:  The Critical Heritage, ed. John Haffenden (London:  
Routledge, 1983), 312. 
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of Auden’s “earlier poetry at its best.”132  Auden responded, like Henry James, by 
rereading his own work under a regime of shame.133  In the preface to Collected Poetry 
(1945) he divides his canon into four categories that echo Jarrell’s criticism:  “the pure 
rubbish,” “the good ideas which his incompetence or impatience prevented from coming 
to much,” “the pieces lack[ing] importance,” and “those poems for which he is honestly 
grateful” but which are so few that a collection of them would be “too depressingly slim” 
(CP45 vii). 
 Yet Auden saw the recuperation of Augustan poetics as an outgrowth of 
modernism—not its decline and fall.  Close-reading Pope (three years before “New Year 
Letter”), he recognized the origins of literary modernism:  “[t]here is no vagueness here.  
There are the images of contemporary life.  This poetry, not Wordsworth’s, is the 
ancestor of ‘the patient etherized on the table,’ of Beaudelair [sic]” and Flaubert and 
Mallarmé.134  “New Year Letter” bears witness to that genealogy.  It articulates an ethics 
of writing that recalls Ezra Pound’s injunctions (in the 1917 polemic “A Retrospect”) 
against vagueness.  Verbal ornament serves the Devil’s purposes: 
To say two different things at once, 
To wage offensives on two fronts, 
And yet to show complete conviction, 
Requires the purpler kinds of diction, 
And none appreciate as he 
Polysyllabic oratory. 
All vague idealistic art 
That coddles the uneasy heart 
Is up his alley, and his pigeon 
The woozier species of religion, 
Even a novel, play or song, 
                                                
132 Jarrell, 314. 
133 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity:  Henry James’s 
The Art of the Novel,” reprinted in Gay Shame, 49-62. 
134 Auden, “Pope,” in From Anne to Victoria:  Essays by Various Hands, ed. Bonamy Dobrée 
(London:  Cassell and Company Limited, 1937), 104, 102. 
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If loud, lugubrious, and long; 
He knows the bored will not unmask him 
But that he’s lost if someone ask him 
To come the hell in off the links 
And say exactly what he thinks. 
To win support of any kind 
He has to hold before the mind 
Amorphous shadows it can hate [.]  (DM 35) 
 
Social justice demands linguistic precision.  A mini Guide to Kulchur (1938), the passage 
draws a subtle but crucial line between demagoguery and “double focus” while the 
poem’s neo-Augustan style upsets the difference between purple and direct.  “New Year 
Letter” may not be the “austere” poetry that Pound expected “to see written during the 
next decade or so,” but it shares his distaste for “perdamnable rhetoric.”135 
 Indeed, “New Year Letter” mounts an attack on the perdamnable rhetoric of 
liberal humanism that works somewhat like Pound’s Hugh Selwyn Mauberley and T. S. 
Eliot’s “Gerontion.”  Vincent Sherry has read the formal experimentation of Anglo-
American modernist writers as a critique of the rationalist, meliorist language used to 
justify the Great War.  The poetry of Pound and Eliot contorts syntax and logic to 
deconstruct the “speech and episteme” of English liberalism.136  “New Year Letter” 
employs a different technique in service of a similar principle:  at the start of World War 
II, Auden’s loose, ironic hudibrastics expose the failure of liberal reason to prevent a 
Hitler.   
The poem’s insistence on “double focus” could easily explain the technique:  as a 
note on “the great error” of the Romantics puts it, “[t]he answer to those who do noble 
actions from base motives is not […] to try to do base actions from noble motives, nor is 
                                                
135 The Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ed. T. S. Eliot (New York:  New Directions, 1968), 12, 11. 
136 Vincent Sherry, The Great War and the Language of Modernism (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 160. 
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a parody of order unmasked by a deliberate chaos” (DM 134-135).  In addition, I see a 
connection between the neo-Augustan aesthetic of “New Year Letter” and the poem’s 
shameless embrace of shame—its treatment of stigma as a prophetic gift.  We can 
understand the verse form as a “radical act of public misappropriation,” to borrow Judith 
Butler’s name for the “decontextualizing and recontextualizing” of hate speech so “that 
the conventional relation between word and wound might become tenuous and even 
broken over time.”137  Like the term “queer” itself, Auden’s hudibrastics are Janus-faced, 
looking backward to England’s organicist “history of injury” as they look forward to the 
“urgent and expanding political purposes” of a cosmopolitan America.138 
                                                
137 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech:  A Politics of the Performative (New York:  Routledge, 1997), 
100. 
138 I quote here from Judith Butler’s article “Critically Queer” in Bodies That Matter:  On the 
Discursive Limits of Sex (New York:  Routledge, 1993), 228. 
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So far I have made a case for reading Auden’s post-conversion oeuvre as a queer, 
theologically-driven dismantling of the Christian, Kantian, and Cold War suspicions of 
friendship (chapter one).  And I have argued that, inasmuch as his poetry emphasizes his 
shameful status as an expatriate and a gay man, it gives a shamelessly defiant edge to his 
theo-ethical apologies for friendship (chapter two).  A theme throughout my recovery of 
the queer politics driving Auden’s Christian poetry has been that Auden depicts the 
coterie as a queer church where civic renewal begins.  But I do not mean to imply that 
Auden found queer community at church.  On the contrary, he often kept his queer circle 
and his Christian circle separate.1  Nor do I want to suggest that Auden’s depiction of 
queer networks looks like a de-gayed, asexual church social.2   
Rather, I argue that Auden propounds an erotics of coterie.  That is, his poetry 
conceives of the coterie as (1) a reformulated erotic practice with (2) incarnational 
prophetic implications.  Turning to friendship as a corrected erotic practice, Auden (3) 
anticipates a tradition of gay male writers who mine the history of friendship as a 
                                                
1 As, for example, when he was a visiting professor of English at the University of Michigan in 
Ann Arbor from 1941-1942.  See Charles Miller, Auden: An American Friendship (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1983), 81, 84; as well as Robert L. Chapman, “Auden in Ann Arbor,” Michigan Quarterly 
Review 17.4 (Fall 1978): 519. 
2 Not that calling something “church” means it lacks erotic content.  As the gay artist Daniel 
Goldstein remembers in David Weissman’s and Bill Weber’s documentary We Were Here: The AIDS Years 
in San Francisco (2011), when he used to frequent San Francisco’s bathhouses, he and his friends called it 
“going to church.” 
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resource for inventing forms of relationality that make life less lonely for older queers 
who no longer participate in the dating scene:  Allan Bloom, Alan Bray, Michel Foucault, 
Andrew Sullivan, and Mark Vernon, among others.  Reading Auden’s later poetry 
alongside the tradition that it anticipates can (a) help us see more clearly exactly how it 
treats friendship as a reformulated erotic practice and (b) help us better understand the 
mechanism by which Auden’s erotics of coterie generates a subversive ethic. 
When I say, “a resource for inventing forms of relationality that make life less 
lonely for older queers,” it might sound to the reader as if I am talking about sublimation, 
that “pseudoscientific” and “semi-miraculous faculty” for turning bodily desires into 
intellectual, artistic, and spiritual desires, as Allan Bloom describes it.3  It thus might also 
sound as if I mean to suggest that the erotics of friendship always rests fundamentally on 
a desire for genital sex.  On the contrary, I want to distance my discussion of Auden’s 
erotics of coterie, and the tradition of gay men writing about friendship that it anticipates, 
from both of those assumptions.  That is, I want to insist on a capacious understanding of 
the erotics of friendship:  it can involve affects as seemingly disparate as grief, or a crush, 
or the wish to insert oneself into the happiness of family life.  As Pausanias says in 
Plato’s Symposium, eros is complicated (183d). 
Alan Bray, for example, movingly describes his study of premodern Anglican 
burial monuments shared by friends as a way of maintaining a relationship with his own 
friends who had died of AIDS:  “I think I was seeking among the tombs of the dead those 
lost friends; I would not let them go:  and, with the guiding hand of scholarship and the 
eye of a historian, against all expectations I found such friendship there in those 
                                                
3 Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 411. 
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monuments.”4  (As we will see in the next chapter, Auden makes a not dissimilar 
pilgrimage to the grave of a dead friend whom he never personally knew:  his patron 
saint, Henry James.)  And the pop-philosopher Mark Vernon, a former priest in the 
Church of England, describes his “passionate” friendship with the sculptor Guy Reid in 
terms of Plato’s account of erotic love as “shared understanding,” i.e., the joint pursuit of 
wisdom (a notion that, as we will see, inflects both Auden’s and Allan Bloom’s 
understanding of the erotics of male friendship).5 
Auden provides yet another example of a slightly different kind of friendship qua 
corrected erotic practice.  As he explained to his straight friends, when Chester Kallman 
broke off their romance, and their relationship changed into that of “parent and child,” 
friendship became Auden’s way of inserting himself into the happiness of married life.6  
Recall the poignant letter that he wrote to Elizabeth Mayer (discussed in the previous 
chapter):   
Being anders wie [sic] die Andern [different from others] has its troubles.  
There are days when the knowledge that there will never be a place which 
I can call home, that there will never be a person with whom I shall be one 
flesh, seems more than I can bear, and if it wasn’t for you, and a few—
how few—like you, I don’t think I could.7   
 
Recall also the conclusion to “New Year Letter” (1941), where Auden thanks Elizabeth 
Mayer publicly for her friendship.  Her warm and revivifying Marian glow is a tonic for 
Auden’s loneliness (DM 70-71). 
The turn to friendship on the part of older gay men has incarnational prophetic 
implications, then, because these writers cannot simply inhabit given forms of 
                                                
4 Alan Bray The Friend (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 5.  
5 Mark Vernon, The Meaning of Friendship (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 65-66.  
6 Arthur Kirsch, Auden and Christianity (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2005), 26.  See also 
Humphrey Carpenter, W.H. Auden:  A Biography (London:  George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 307. 
7 ALS to Elizabeth Mayer, 20 February 1943, Berg.  
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relationality, like courting or marriage.  In a world hostile to gay love, they have to create 
new ways of sharing life together and supporting each other.  As Andrew Sullivan puts it, 
the trajectory of a homosexual life often places, in a way unique to itself, a 
focus on friendship that many heterosexuals, to their great loss, never 
quite attain.  In fact, I think the primary distinction between homosexuals 
and heterosexuals in our society is […] that homosexuals, by default as 
much as anything else, have managed to sustain a society of friendship 
that is, for the most part, unequaled by almost any other part of the 
society.8  
 
In particular, the social imperatives of the closet make friendship a crucial part of a gay 
person’s identity-formation, more crucial than family: 
For a gay child or adolescent doesn’t really have a friend in the true sense 
of the term until he has a friend who knows and accepts the fact that he is 
gay.  When he finds this friend, who is almost always gay himself, the 
relationship has a significance often far deeper than the first friend a 
heterosexual child discovers.  Because, in a way, it is only when the gay 
child finds this first true friend that he can really exist at all.  […] 
So the first true friendship, for the homosexual child, is often a 
revelation.  It is simultaneous with the establishment of identity.  Whereas 
most heterosexual children become themselves most transparently in the 
context of their family, gay children, more often than not, only truly 
become themselves in the context of their first, true, friends.9 
 
                                                
8 Andrew Sullivan, Love Undetectable: Notes on Friendship, Sex, and Survival (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1998), 230-231.  
9 Sullivan, 231-232.  To my mind, though, Sullivan’s treatment of friendship and the closet here 
places a cruel onus on the gay person.  To quote Michael Warner in The Trouble with Normal: Sex, 
Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Sullivan 
perpetuates the  
 
[c]ommon mythology [that] understands the closet as an individual’s lie about him- or 
herself.  Yet queers understand, at some level, that the closet was built around them, 
willy-nilly, by dominant assumptions about what goes without saying, what can be said 
without a breach of decorum, who shares the onus of disclosure, and who will bear the 
consequences of speech and silence—by all of what Erving Goffman, in Stigma, calls 
“the careful work of disattention.”  Speech is everywhere regulated unequally.  This is 
experienced by lesbians and gay men as a private, individual problem of shame and 
closeting.  But it is produced by the assumptions of everyday talk.  (180) 
 
See also David M. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 34-38; and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwich, The Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley, CA: The 
University of California Press, 2008). 
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Gay friends create new ways of life and systems of support (like the reformulated erotic 
practice of the coterie), then, in part because their families have alienated them.  But if 
gay culture is a society of friendship, it benefits straight people inasmuch as it expands 
their relational possibilities, too.  According to Sullivan, it can open straight life “to the 
possibilities of intimacy and support that friendship offers” and even perhaps revive 
“friendship as a social institution,” an idea that Foucault brings up again and again in his 
late essays and interviews.10  Thus (for Auden, at any rate) the queer periphery constitutes 
a place not just for critiquing but also for remaking the social center (as we saw in the 
previous two chapters). 
In this chapter, I will unpack all three of the claims I have just made—that Auden 
conceives of the coterie as (1) a reformulated erotic practice with (2) incarnational 
prophetic implications, and that his conception of the coterie (3) anticipates a later 
tradition of older gay men who turn to the history of friendship as a resource for 
imagining new forms of eros besides dating and marriage—by discussing Foucault as 
well as Allan Bloom, professor of philosophy and author of the best-selling jeremiad The 
Closing of the American Mind (1987), alongside Auden’s Pulitzer Prize-winning long 
poem The Age of Anxiety (1947).11   
Politically and philosophically speaking, Bloom and Foucault differ wildly:  
whereas Bloom remained completely silent about his gayness in all of his printed works, 
Foucault’s work more or less catalyzed the discipline of queer theory.12  Moreover, 
Bloom’s writing treats eros as the key to a person, while Foucault’s work problematizes 
                                                
10 Sullivan, 233-234; Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. I: Ethics. 
Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York:  The New Press, 1997), 136-137, 153, 160; and 
Vernon, 154. 
11 The Age of Anxiety won the Pulitzer Prize for poetry in 1948 (Age xli). 
12 See Halperin, Saint Foucault. 
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the conflation of desire and identity.13  But their thought converges in a profound way:  
they talk at great length about intergenerational male friendship, investing it with 
enormous political value.  I should perhaps place “talk” in quotes, for in addition to 
Foucault’s late interviews and Bloom’s Love and Friendship (1993), a book that he 
dictated as he was dying of AIDS, I here rely on Ravelstein (2000), Saul Bellow’s roman 
à clef about Bloom, which puts the arguments of Love and Friendship in the context of 
(a) Bloom’s attraction to men and (b) what Bloom understood to be his real calling, 
teaching philosophy. 
Because of the oddity of my channeling a thinker’s ideas through a memoir 
masquerading as a novel, I will say a few words by way of explanation before I continue 
the argument of this chapter.  Ravelstein is universally acknowledged as a not-at-all 
disguised portrait of Allan Bloom.  Indeed, because the novel outs Bloom, it caused a stir 
when it was published.14  (That is not to say that Bloom led a closeted life—in fact, he 
was out among his colleagues, students, and friends.  He simply never wrote about his 
sexuality, nor mentioned it in any public lecture.)  A recurrent theme in the novel-memoir 
is that Bloom asked—nay, obliged—Bellow to write a book about him after his death, a 
book that would not stint on any details, especially the sexual ones.  “I’m laying this on 
you as an obligation,” Abe Ravelstein (i.e., Allan Bloom) says to Chick (i.e., Saul 
                                                
13 In a discussion of Diotima’s discourse, Bloom rebukes modern students for their unwillingness 
“to justify their sexual tastes or practices.”  For him, the Symposium presents a better model for talking 
about sexuality than his students’ declaration of a “de facto equality among all preferences and practices,” 
for the Symposium, he says, forces one to think about the relationship between desire and character:  
Socrates et al. “are making their confessions and, unawares, showing whether they are serious or frivolous 
persons.  It is impossible in reading the Symposium not to judge men’s quality by their erotic practices and 
the way they celebrate them,” 434.  By contrast, Foucault says in “Love and Friendship” that we ought to 
“distrust […] the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the problem of “Who am I?” and 
“What is the secret of my desire?,” 135.  These discrepant philosophical moves, we will see, drive their 
corresponding interest in the political value of friendship. 
14 See Christopher Hitchens, “The Egg-Head’s Egger-On,” London Review of Books 22.9 (2000): 
21-23. 
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Bellow).15  “I want you to show me as you see me, without softeners or sweeteners.”16  
As if to clarify the scope of “as you see me,” Ravelstein (Bloom) corrects Chick’s 
(Bellow’s) portrait of a mutual friend:  “Ravelstein, after he had read my sketch of 
Kogon, said that I should have commented on his sex life—a major omission, he 
believed.  He told me authoritatively, ‘You’ve missed it—Kogon is attracted to men.’”17  
For Bloom, as I mentioned a moment ago, people’s erotic longings constitute the key to 
their character.18 
But that is not to say that Bloom, for whom the Symposium was a kind of bible, 
conflates erotic and sexual longing.  As I rely on Bellow’s memoir qua novel about 
Bloom, I am mindful of a problem:  if de-gaying a gay writer presents a critical 
temptation and danger, so, too, does sexualizing everything having to do with loving and 
longing.19  In his own writing, Bloom painstakingly teases out the fine distinctions 
between the erotic and the sexual.  For him, there is, in addition to an “eros of bodies,” an 
“eros of souls”20—i.e., “an irresistible attraction,” “a passionate, exclusive attachment 
that stems entirely from a supra-physical involvement of two consciousnesses.”21  Note 
that Bloom calls the “eros of souls” not a non-physical but a supra-physical relationship.  
In other words, it involves, not a condemnation or a transformation of sexual desires, as 
in sublimation, but an altogether different kind of bodily feeling that, according to 
Bloom, need not necessarily originate in sexual desire.  (In this respect Bloom’s “eros of 
souls” looks forward to Charles Taylor’s discussion of incarnation and excarnation, to 
                                                
15 Saul Bellow, Ravelstein (New York: Penguin, 2000), 129. 
16 Bellow, 133. 
17 Bellow, 133-134.  
18 Bellow, 140. 
19 Moreover, consider D. A. Miller’s point that outing a writer after his death can resemble “police 
entrapment,” Bringing Out Roland Barthes (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1992), 18.  
20 Allan Bloom, 411.  
21 Allan Bloom, 410. 
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which I will turn in chapter five.)  Not only does Bloom find Freud’s notion of 
sublimation preposterous (as I mentioned earlier), but he also finds it damaging, for it 
reinforces people’s disbelief in passionate friendship.22   
Bellow’s novel is relevant for my purposes, then, not because it titillates the 
reader with secrets, but because it puts the ideas I have just outlined in the context of 
Bloom’s life as a teacher who loved men.23  (Still, Bellow’s novel is an admittedly 
problematic resource:  we get a gay man’s thoughts about eros via a straight man who 
exhibits a relentless genteel homophobia—not unlike that of the queer philosopher-
teacher about whom he writes.)24 
To return to the argument of this chapter, Auden’s construction of 
intergenerational male friendship as a reformulated erotic practice in The Age of Anxiety 
anticipates Bloom and Foucault;25 reading The Age of Anxiety alongside these later 
thinkers brings out the subversiveness of the sociality pictured in this least-read of all of 
Auden’s major works.26  The Age of Anxiety concerns four strangers who befriend each 
other one night at a bar on Third Avenue in Manhattan during World War II (Age 9, 19):  
                                                
22 Allan Bloom, 411. 
23 In fact, Bellow’s novel deftly avoids any temptation to titillate the reader by refusing to 
psychologize Ravelstein.  We never get Chick’s musings on Ravelstein’s psychical interiority.  We never 
even hear Chick speculating on such things:  “we aren’t doing psychobiography here,” the novel asserts 
(17).  What we get is a hilarious portrait of the external—which is by no means to say superficial—details:  
the passion and intensity that Bloom brought to his interactions with people; his candor; his ornate, 
expensive Chicago apartment; his penthouse luxury suite in Paris; his endless telephone conversations with 
politically powerful former students; his love of gossip; etc.  Moreover, the novel lays bare the social 
fragility of friendship that has been a recurring theme throughout Queering the City of God.  “There are no 
acceptable modern terms for the discussion of friendship,” Chick complains (94). 
24 One quick example:  “There were very few indications in his private quarters of Ravelstein’s 
sexual preferences.  One had no reason, in any respect, to suspect him of irregularities of the commoner 
sort—the outlandish seductive behaviors of old-fashioned gay men.  He couldn’t bear the fluttering of 
effeminate men” (99). 
25 It must be said, though, that neither thinker names Auden as an influence, a fact that only lends 
urgency to the project of recovering Auden’s rightful place in modernist literary histories of “citizen 
queer.”  
26 See Age xi-xii, xl. 
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Quant, a shipping clerk; Malin, a medical intelligence officer in the Canadian Airforce; 
Rosetta, a buyer for a department store; and Emble, who has recently enlisted in the U.S. 
Navy.  Though Auden sets the poem during World War II, the apocalyptic anxiety of the 
Cold War haunts its pages.  Heading home after the four new friends have parted ways, 
Malin thinks to himself,   
Both professor and prophet depress, 
For vision and longer view 
Agree in predicting a day 
Of convulsion and vast evil, 
When the Cold Societies clash 
Or the mosses are set in motion 
To overrun the earth, 
And the great brain which began 
With lucid dialectics 
Ends in horrid madness.  (Age 104-105)27 
 
During the night, the four new friends find humble but creative ways to disrupt that 
militarist apocalypticism.  Thus barroom companionship, I argue, serves as an adaptation 
of the lofty coterie for Everyman.  My reading will focus mostly on Quant and Malin, 
two aging queers who find a balm for their loneliness in the companionship of their new 
friends.28 
                                                
27 Incidentally, the first use of “the Cold War” in reference to the conflict between the U.S. / 
NATO and the Soviet Union that the OED cites is from March 1946.  
28 The text gives ample evidence that Malin and Quant are aging.  When the four temporarily split 
up, the narrator reports that “[t]hey divide thus, youth with youth and age with age.  To the left go ROSETTA 
and EMBLE, to the right, QUANT and MALIN” (Age 53).  As we will see, Malin is evidently old enough to be 
Emble’s father (Age 68-69).  And Quant makes frequent references to his declining body, describing 
himself as “with grizzled chin, / Sans youth or use” (Age 73).   
Malin is the more straightforwardly gay of the two characters (forgive the pun):  he explicitly 
expresses sexual desire for Emble.  But I am not alone in reading Quant as gay:  Gerald Nelson notices that 
he is “an aging homosexual widower” in Changes of Heart: A Study of the Poetry of W. H. Auden 
(Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1969), 81.  It appears that Quant spent his marriage 
wishing his wife were dead (Age 71).  Quant, we will see, prefers the company of men to women; 
moreover, he has a predilection for rough trade and a penchant for camp phrases.  Susannah Gottlieb 
describes Quant’s desires as “hilariously disordered and deliciously varied” in Regions of Sorrow: Anxiety 
and Messianism in Hannah Arendt and W. H. Auden (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 117. 
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But before I proceed with my discussion of Auden’s queer ecclesial “suburb[s] of 
dissent” as a reformulated erotic practice, I need to comment on a feature that somewhat 
distinguishes the transnational, intergenerational, mixed-orientation collective depicted in 
the Age of Anxiety from a coterie. 
 
 
I.  GROUP FRIENDSHIP   
For the most part, the community at the center of The Age of Anxiety more nearly 
approximates David Caron’s notion of “group friendship” than it fits the bill of a coterie.  
In My Father & I: The Marais and the Queerness of Community (2009), Caron defines 
“group friendship” as “bonds […] created by the external and temporary circumstances 
that brought these people together, not by decisions made by individual members of the 
groups and not by a preexisting common trait, be it an essence or any other form of 
identity defined by sameness.”  Classmates, teammates, and army buddies are examples 
of group friendship; Caron calls them “copains,” or, etymologically speaking, people 
who happen to share bread together, companions.  The coterie, on the other hand, consists 
of “amis,” or, etymologically speaking, people who love each other—who, like the “we” 
of “New Year Letter” (1941) or “We, too, had known golden hours” (1950) or “In Praise 
of Limestone” (1948), are drawn to each other, to the kind of passionate exchange they 
can enjoy by virtue of who they are together.29  Hence, in what is perhaps the most 
famous essay about friendship, Montaigne explains his love for La Boëtie not by giving a 
                                                
29 Here I am mapping the “we, the inconstant ones” of “In Praise of Limestone” onto the speaker 
and his “dear” (SP 189, 191) as well as the tight-knit group of gay exiles on Ischia that, in the context of 
Auden’s other poem about the island, “Ischia” (1948), becomes a clearer referent of the poem.  See chapter 
one.  
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sketch of what they talked about or the things they did together but by saying, simply, 
“parce que c’était lui, parce que c’était moi” [“because it was him, because it was 
me”].30  “That’s the whole difference,” Caron explains:  “whereas amis must love each 
other, copains need only love bread, or whatever it is that they share in lieu of bread.”31  I 
would add that the label “coterie” (my term, not Caron’s) usually identifies the amis as 
artists or intellectuals by profession.  The bar-copains of The Age of Anxiety, though, 
have much less highbrow occupations than the coterie-amis of “Out on the lawn I lie in 
bed” (1933) or “New Year Letter” or “We, too, had known golden hours.”  And, I might 
also add, the three men in The Age of Anxiety do (or have done) military work (Quant 
used to serve in the army [Age 73]).  Unlike the defiant artists of the texts that I discussed 
in the previous chapters, these men participate directly in the violent apparatus of the 
state.  
The bar-copains all happen to be “displaced” people (Age 3):  Rosetta hails from 
England; Malin, from Cananda; Quant, from Ireland; and Emble, from the Midwest (Age 
4-5).  Rosetta is Jewish (Age 98-102).  Quant and Malin, as I have already indicated, are 
queer.  What brings the four together, though, is not their shared status as exiles, but their 
need to flee for a moment from “the universal disorder of the world outside” and to 
retreat into “an unprejudiced space in which nothing particular ever happens” (Age 3), 
that is, their need for a drink:  the text describes them as “fugitives,” “in flight” from “the 
world” (Age 78); a night at the bar gives them an escape from the “bright clear day” of 
“work” and “war” (Age 106).  They talk (for 108 pages, in Anglo-Saxon alliterative 
                                                
30 Montaigne, Essais choisis:  A Dual-Language Book, trans. Stanley Applebaum (Mineola, NY: 
Dover: 2007), 106.  But NB:  the translations I provide here are my own. 
31 David Caron, My Father & I: The Marais and the Queerness of Community (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), 197. 
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verse) until dawn.  Whether the group will ever reconstitute itself again seems unlikely:  
by the morning, the timorously bisexual Emble has passed out on Rosetta’s bed (although 
the group puts on a wedding masque, Emble and Rosetta never consummate their 
“casual” crush [Age 88]); and Quant and Malin, the two aging queers, have “parted and 
immediately forgotten each other’s existence” (Age 98, 103).  In this respect, these four 
bar-copains resemble Caron’s characterization of “group friendship” as transitory, 
concerned with “sharing rather than transmission,” lacking a future or a purpose beyond 
itself.32  (The one exception to this is the relationship between Malin and Emble, which, 
as will we see shortly, does concern itself with sharing and transmission, at least from 
Malin’s perspective, and thus more nearly approximates the amitié of coterie.)  And thus 
the idle divagations of the bar-copains also differ from Auden’s “New Year Letter” to his 
coterie-amie Elizabeth Mayer:  whereas the bar-copains enjoy drinks together with no 
thought for recording and disseminating their conversations for posterity, Auden writes 
his letter to Mayer “under Flying Seal to all / Who wish to read it anywhere” (DM 25) so 
that anyone might use the letter as a resource for thinking about how to do community 
more justly (as we saw in chapter two). 
Still, in the course of a discussion about Auden’s construction of the ethical value 
of coterie-amitié, it makes sense to bring up the group of bar-copains depicted in The Age 
of Anxiety, for at least five reasons.  (a) Their “common hope” and “common goal” may 
simply be to get drunk, take a night walk through the city, and make it safely back to 
Rosetta’s apartment (Age 52, 57), but they have extraordinary conversations along the 
way. For example, they lament the sort of person that industrial capitalist societies create, 
namely, “the new barbarian,” “bred” by “factories” and schooled by “[c]orporate 
                                                
32 Caron, My Father & I, 203.  
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companies” (Age 16) so that he develops a “market-made” subjectivity (Age 34).  Such 
societies, the four know, have allowed the devil to become all too real, a totalitarian 
dictator: 
Lord of this life.  He looks natural, 
He smiles well, he smells of the future, 
Odorless ages, an ordered world 
Of planned pleasures and passport-control, 
Sentry-go, sedatives, soft drinks and  
Managed money, a moral planet 
Tamed by terror:  his telegram sets 
Grey masses moving as the mud dries. 
Many have perished:  more will.  (Age 14) 
 
In addition, the four bar-copains share their personal histories (Age 23-42) and try to 
imagine a better world—variously figured as “some / Nameless Eden” (Age 38),33 “the 
Good Place” (Age 39), “the Quiet Kingdom” (Age 46), and “a green world” (Age 49)—a 
society free from “press-applauded public untruth” (Age 35) and the “vile civilities 
vouched for by / Statisticians” (Age 35-36).  Like Auden’s tonier “suburb[s] of dissent,” 
then, the bar-copains are concerned with resisting what “In Praise of Limestone” calls 
“the Great Powers” (SP 191), the demagogues who, as “We, too, had known golden 
hours” puts it, “befuddle the crowd” with “spells” that reduce language to “a horrid 
mechanical screech” (Nones 7).   
Moreover, (b) the bar-copains interpret their time together, however brief, as a 
countercultural practice.  With the tongue-in-cheek dead seriousness of camp, Quant 
silences the barroom radio and announces that the four new friends have formed a social 
organization to discuss heady matters like “HOMO ABYSSUS OCCIDENTALIS” (i.e., 
                                                
33 As we saw in chapter one, Auden sometimes uses the moniker “Eden” to indicate nostalgia.  
Here, though, Malin “pines for some / Nameless Eden where he never was” (Age 38).  
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Western man, a creature of the abyss).  Quant gives the organization several queer-
themed names: 
   Listen, Box, 
And keep quiet.  Listen courteously to us 
Four reformers who have founded—why not?— 
The Gung-ho Group, the Ganymede Club 
For homesick young angels, the Arctic League 
Of Tropical Fish, the Tomboy Fund 
For Blushing Brides and the Bide-a-wees 
Of Sans-Souci, assembled again 
For a Think-Fest [.]  (Age 21) 
 
A “Gung-Ho” collective of carefree “Bide-a-wees” (a Scots phrase meaning “stay 
awhile”), the four new friends are serious about their pleasure.  The geographical and 
sexual displacement respectively signified by “the Arctic League / Of Tropical Fish” and 
“the Tomboy Fund / For Blushing Brides” indicates the countercultural ethos of their 
“Think-Fest.”  But the queerest and campiest of the names that Quant comes up with is 
“The Ganymede Club / for homesick young angels.”  According to the Greek myth, since 
Ganymede was the most beautiful of all boys, Zeus, disguised as an eagle, abducted him 
to serve as cupbearer on Mount Olympus.  All of the gods liked Ganymede except Hera, 
Zeus’s wife, who jealously saw Ganymede as a rival for her husband’s affections.  Plato 
comments on the paederastic angle of the myth in the Laws (636d) and in the Phaedrus 
(255c).  (The shipping clerk’s knowledge of Greek myth is explained by the fact that “he 
had spent many hours one winter in the Public Library reading for the most part—he 
could not have told you why—books on Mythology” [Age 4].)  It is interesting that an 
image evocative of intergenerational gay male affection should occur to Quant as a way 
to capture the ethos of the group, for, as we will see, the much older Malin develops a 
(mostly unreciprocated) sexual interest in the much younger Emble.  (The narrator tells 
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us that Emble is a college sophomore, so he must be somewhere between 18 and 20 [Age 
vii, 5].) 
 And there is yet another queer clue in the text that lends weight to reason (b) for 
bringing up the bar-copains in a discussion of Auden’s construction of the ethical value 
of coterie-amitié:  (c) a quote from Ronald Firbank’s comic novel The Flower Beneath 
the Foot (1924) provides the epigraph to the fifth section of The Age of Anxiety, in which 
the group spontaneously stages a wedding between Rosetta and Emble.  The epigraph 
reads, “‘Oh, Heaven help me,’ she prayed, ‘to be decorative and to do right’” (Age 87).  
The prayer more or less sums up the takeaway message of Firbank’s campy, mannered 
novel:  the cosmopolitan culture in a flower-shop staffed by gay Muslim teen migrant 
workers functions as an ethical corrective to the damaging classism of Pisuerga, an 
imaginary southern European hereditary monarchy.34  To be decorative, then, is to do 
right.   
Auden originally wanted to use the Firbank quote as the epigraph to the whole 
poem, but he feared that readers would misunderstand it.  “I think it [the Firbank 
epigraph] very serious,” he told a friend, “but no one else will unless I write an essay to 
explain why.”35  Fourteen years after the publication of The Age of Anxiety, Auden 
delivered the explanatory essay in the form of a radio talk.  “Ronald Firbank and an 
Amateur World” (1961) characterizes Firbank’s vision of “the earthly paradise” as a 
place where the most serious things—religion and sex—become lighthearted amateur 
games (Prose iv 336).  Auden unpacks that characterization by distinguishing between 
professional activities, on the one hand, which involve “ambition and conscience” and 
                                                
34 For a wonderful close-reading of the novel, see Robert L. Caserio, “Artifice and Empire in 
Ronald Firbank’s Novels,” Western Humanities Review 51 (1997): 227-235. 
35 Quoted in Age xxxiii. 
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“care” (Prose iv 336); and amateur games, on the other, where “[t]here is no obligation, 
natural or moral, to play, and there is an absence of care” (Prose iv 335).  Professional 
activities are marked by “necessity”:  “[f]ailure” at them “causes physical and mental 
suffering” (Prose iv 336).  Amateur games are marked by gratuity (Prose iv 335). 
So how does the epigraph from The Flower Beneath the Foot relate to the four 
bar-copains in The Age of Anxiety?  Having shared their personal stories and gotten 
seriously drunk, they find themselves in the middle of a Firbankian game, playing their 
way toward his earthly paradise of amateur merriment:  they are the “Bide-a-wees / Of 
Sans-Souci” (Age 21).  The omniscient narrator who occasionally punctuates their verse-
chat to offer clarifying details tells us that 
So it was now as they sought that state of prehistoric happiness which, by 
human beings, can only be imagined in terms of a landscape bearing a 
symbolic resemblance to the human body.  The more completely these 
four forgot their surroundings and lost their sense of time, the more 
sensitively aware of each other they became, until they achieved in their 
dream that rare community which is otherwise only attained in states of 
extreme wakefulness.  (Age 46) 
 
The four share a dream-vision based on the Zohar, or The Book of Splendor, a thirteenth-
century Kabbalistic text that links the ten sefirot, or attributes of God, to parts of the 
human body (part three).  (Unlike in the Zohar, where the ninth sefirah corresponds to 
the phallus, the body in Auden’s adaptation has breasts but no genitals.  And Auden maps 
not the sefirot but various countercultural communities onto parts of the human body:  a 
monastery set apart from “armed cities” corresponds to the breasts [Age 49]; an inn that 
serves as a bolt-hole for cross-class alliances between “detectives” and “thieves” 
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corresponds to the hands [Age 52].)36  “For amusement’s sake,” the four bar-copains “run 
a race” down a street lined by yew trees (Age 64).  Then they take a cab to Rosetta’s 
apartment (part four), where they stage a make-believe wedding between Rosetta and 
Emble (part five).  After all of this, the narrator reports that 
Alcohol, lust, fatigue, and the longing to be good, had by now induced in 
them all a euphoric state in which it seemed as if it were only some trifling 
and easily rectifiable error, improper diet, inadequate schooling, or an 
outmoded moral code which was keeping mankind from the millennial 
Earthly Paradise.  Just a little more effort, perhaps merely the discovery of 
the right terms in which to describe it, and surely absolute pleasure must 
immediately descend upon the astonished armies of this world and abolish 
for ever all their hate and suffering.  (Age 93) 
 
Through their silliness, they accomplish the serious work of escaping (in however 
momentary and however illusory a way) the tyranny of “the armies of this world”; that is, 
they resist “the Great Powers” (SP 191).37   
Auden underlines the point by assigning a serious ritual significance to their  
wedding game:  “[i]n times of war even the crudest kind of positive affection between 
persons seems extraordinarily beautiful, a noble symbol of the peace and forgiveness of 
which the whole world stands so desperately in need” (Age 88).  Furthermore, by 
couching their Firbankian game in Anglo-Saxon alliterative verse (rather than, say, realist 
drama), Auden mimics the preciousness of Firbank’s writing.  And Auden originally 
extended that preciousness to the bibliographic code of his poem:  he “took a close 
interest in the appearance of the book,” Humprey Carpenter tells us, and “chose a small, 
                                                
36 See Pinchas Giller, Reading the Zohar: The Sacred Text of the Kabbalah (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 65, 77, 107, 117, 123; Mendelson, Later Auden (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1999), 251; and Age 131. 
37 See Caron, My Father & I, 204-205. 
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elegant, Victorian typeface.”38  The Age of Anxiety thus upsets the links among 
earnestness, authenticity / sincerity, and ethical significance.  Instead, the poem attaches 
ethical significance to style, make-believe, and frivolity (a point that I will revisit in the 
concluding chapter when I consider Auden’s turn away from psychoanalysis as a tool for 
describing subjectivity). 
From (b) the group’s interpretation of their time together as in some sense 
countercultural and (c) Auden’s construction of the world of the bar-copains as a 
Firbankian game, we can conclude that (d) The Age of Anxiety opens up the coterie as a 
countercultural practice for people who travel in less rarefied circles and to less exotic 
places.  In other words, the poem gestures towards a way that ordinary folk—shipping 
clerks as opposed to Pulitzer Prize-winning poets—might take up the queer relational 
practices of the coterie.  Not only that, but it gestures towards a way that people who are 
directly caught up in the violence of the nation-state might practice small acts of creative 
resistance.  Quant (the former U.S. soldier), Emble (the recent enlistee in the U.S. Navy), 
and Malin (the medical intelligence officer for the Canadian air force) defy the 
Enlightenment Western secular democratic dictates about male friendship.  According to 
these heteronormative imperatives, male friendship should only happen in childhood, the 
army, and prison.  As David Caron puts it, “the public sphere is supposed to be the only 
legitimate site of the [grown-up] male collective.”39  That is because private male 
friendship is viewed as a threat to the procreative domain of straight marriage.  But 
Quant, Malin, and Emble never swap army stories, and instead play a paradisiacal 
                                                
38 Humphrey Carpenter, 347.  Unfortunately, Alan Jacob’s recent scholarly edition of the poem 
was unable to reproduce the typeface, though it does include a facsimile page from the first edition (Age 
xlix-l). 
39 Caron, My Father & I, 205.  
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Firbankian game in which the military has no place (though, as we will see, Quant and 
Malin put more heart into the game than Emble). 
Thus The Age of Anxiety finds a solution to one of the main problems posed by 
Auden’s depiction of the coterie in “New Year Letter” (1941):  how can the coterie speak 
to Middletown?  That is, how can a text about elites, written in the polyglot idiom of 
elites, kindle a queer angle of view in its ordinary readers? 
Recall that “New Year Letter” calls Mayer’s coterie “our privileged community” 
(DM 43).  In the manuscript Auden originally wrote “[o]ur fortunate community.”  But he 
penciled a Flaubert quote (from Francis Steegmuller’s biography Flaubert and Madame 
Bovary) in the margin of his notebook in reproach:  “Don’t let’s pity ourselves.”40  The 
revision (of “fortunate” to “privileged”) alludes to an expanded version of the rebuke, 
included in the annotations to “New Year Letter” in The Double Man:  “We are the 
privileged.  Our minds are lit by gas.  There are so many people who are shivering in 
attics without even candles” (DM 117).  Even without the allusion to Flaubert, the 
revision of “fortunate” to “privileged” underlines Auden’s continuing discomfort with 
coteries—as well as his lack of a clean conscience about his own privilege.  “Fortunate” 
(from the Latin fortuna, a personification of luck as a goddess) denominates chance the 
agent of one’s happiness.  (Auden was quite fond of the personification of fortune, 
referring frequently to “Dame Kind” in his poetry, his personal notebooks, and his 
correspondence.)  By contrast, “privileged” (from the Middle French privilegier, “to 
grant indulgences”) implicates a whole system of injustice in one’s happiness.  In the 
previous chapter I argued that one way in which “New Year Letter” addresses this 
problem is through the pedagogical design of the poem’s annotations.   
                                                
40 Holograph notebook, Berg. 
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While The Age of Anxiety is a very difficult poem to make sense of,41 it arguably 
comes up with a more satisfactory answer than “New Year Letter” to the elitist 
exclusivity of the coterie by portraying the bar scene as a queer collectivity.  For the same 
reason, The Age of Anxiety reworks an even earlier text by Auden.  Alan Jacobs and 
Edward Mendelson both notice that The Age of Anxiety revisits the scenario of the early 
lyric that I discussed in chapter one:  “Out on the lawn I lie in bed” (1933), a text that 
worries about the privileged complacency of coteries.  Instead of the earlier lyric’s four 
“equal,” “[l]ucky” scholars enjoying a mystical union in “the sexy airs of summer” (SP 
30), The Age of Anxiety portrays four strangers getting drunk together on the night of All 
Souls (Age 6, 46, 93), i.e., the 2 November Christian festival marking the “universal 
democracy of sinners under judgment” (Age xxxi), as one of Auden’s favorite historians 
puts it.42  
And now, to return to my claims that (1) the queer collectives in Auden’s later 
poetry constitute a reformulated erotic practice and that (2) this reformulated erotic 
practice anticipates a tradition of older gay men who mine the history of friendship for 
inspiration as they seek to invent post-dating and non-marital relational forms. 
 
 
II.  TINKLEBELL, THE TEACHER, & THE NAVY BOY 
Alluding to a phrase made famous by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Susannah Gottlieb 
rightly notices that “the entire erotic dynamic” of The Age of Anxiety “exists as an affair 
                                                
41 Presumably one of the main reasons why it is the least read of all of his major works.  Edward 
Mendelson writes that parts of the poem have “baffled even Auden’s most sympathetic readers,” Later 
Auden, 250. 
42 See Age viii; and Mendelson, Later Auden, 248.  The historian is Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. 
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‘between men.’”43  True, the four celebrate a pretend cross-gender wedding between 
Rosetta and Emble.  But throughout the poem Emble evinces a mix of sexual malaise and 
coquettishness toward men and women alike.  “So, fully conscious of the attraction of his 
[Navy] uniform to both sexes,” the narrator tells us at the beginning of the poem, “he 
looked round him, slightly contemptuous when he caught an admiring glance, and 
slightly piqued when he did not” (Age 6).  Later, Malin gets the impression that Emble 
enjoys Malin’s desire for him.  Malin says of Emble:  “Girlishly glad that my glance is 
not chaste, / He wants me to want what he would refuse” (Age 69).  And finally, after his 
mock wedding to Rosetta, Emble passes out, “[t]oo aloof to love.”  Rosetta wonders 
aloud to Emble’s snoring body, “Did you lose your nerve / And cloud your conscience 
because I wasn’t / Your dish really?” (Age 98)  In fact, Rosetta is nobody’s dish:  Malin, 
as we know, fancies Emble.  And Quant decidedly prefers the company of the other 
men.44  Like Malin, Quant seems to fancy Emble, but the text is less explicit about 
Quant’s interest in the young man.45  At any rate, as Gottlieb puts it, Rosetta is sexually 
                                                
43 Gottlieb, 118.  
44 When the four of them split up temporarily (for the second time) during their Zohar-like dream-
vision (so that they can all explore the terrain of their vision more fully), they “cast lots” to determine “who 
shall accompany whom.”  They resort to casting lots because they know they would never be able to come 
to an agreement about the pairings.  Quant is “disappointed” that he gets paired with Rosetta, “thinking of 
another” (Emble, perhaps?) and muttering to himself, “This bodes badly” (Age 67).  When the four then 
split into pairs and Quant is alone with Rosetta, he reflects that their “needs belong to / Separate systems 
that make no sense to each other: / She is not my sister and I am not her friend” (Age 69). 
45 The crucial moment signifying this possibility occurs when the four of them pair off (for the 
first time) during their Zohar dream-vision journey, and each of them reacts to the arrangement of couples.  
During this first temporary parting, Rosetta and Emble form one of the pairs (“youth with youth”) and 
Malin and Quant the other (“age with age”).  Quant’s reaction:  “I know what will happen, / Am sincerely 
sorry” (Age 53).  He can’t be sorry to have lost an opportunity to get closer to Rosetta, for the next time the 
group splits into pairs, he expresses disappointment at getting paired with her (Age 67).  A more plausible 
explanation for his being “sincerely sorry,” then, is that he predicts that Rosetta and Emble will come to 
(sort of) fancy each other, and he’s sorry because he envies the opportunity she has to get closer to Emble.  
The plausibility of this reading is strengthened by a parallel that the text sets up between Quant and Ovid’s 
Orpheus, a detail that I will unpack in a moment.  (It could simply be the case that he just doesn’t want to 
hang out with Rosetta alone, though.) 
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“out of place” in the group, dominated as it is by Quant’s and Malin’s same-sex 
affections.46   
Group friendship, I have suggested, provides a balm for the loneliness of these 
two aging queers:  each in his different way treats friendship as an erotic practice.  For 
Quant—who has a vividly queer sexual imagination, as we began to see from the names 
he comes up with for the group—a night at the bar provides an opportunity to vent his 
desires by sharing raunchy personal anecdotes.  For Malin, spending time with Emble 
provides an opportunity to mold the younger man intellectually and spiritually—that is, it 
provides an occasion for a pedagogical eros that Malin understands in terms of the 
pederastic erotics of male friendship in Plato’s Symposium and the Phaedrus.47  I will 
examine each character in turn, first Quant, then Malin. 
Quant has a predilection for rough trade, a penchant for camp phrases (as I hinted 
at earlier in the notes), and a passion for raunchy stories.  Toward the beginning of the 
poem, he tells his new bar-copains a story about “the long / Visitor’s voyage” he once 
made to “Venus Island” (Age 28), a place with “cupids on stilts, / Their beautiful bottoms 
breaking wind” and “[g]entlewomen […] morosely stitching / Red flannel scivvies for 
heroic herms,” i.e., statues of Hermes with erect phalli (Age 29).  He was “[e]lated” there.  
Quant remembers 
a brick bath-house where burghers mixed 
With light-fingered ladies and louche trade, 
Dancing in serpents and daisy chains 
                                                
46 Gottlieb, 118.  
47 Note that the Plato-inspired pedagogical / philosophical dimension of Malin’s self-described 
unchaste attraction to Emble is not representative of ancient Greek pederasty (Age 69):  “paedagogy was 
not, even among the honorable members of that beau monde, the essence of paederasty.  Despite modern 
appearance-saving claims to the contrary, the erotic excitement and bittersweet longing aroused in 
Athenian men (whether low- or high-minded) by attractive boys do not seem to have been primarily of a 
philosophic nature and, when frustrated, obviously required something other than a purely Platonic means 
of expression,” Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality, 92.  
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To mad music.  (Age 29) 
 
Similarly, Quant recounts a time when, working as a busboy, he envisioned one of the 
patrons in the restaurant as “a siren with six breasts” (Age 26).  In addition to recounting 
his own sexual adventures and fantasies, Quant interprets his experiences through the 
lens of homoerotic Greek myths:  a widower, he sees a reflection of himself in Ovid’s 
“[k]ind Orpheus,” who “sinned against kind” (Age 37).48  In Ovid’s version of the myth, 
Orpheus forswears women after the death of his wife Eurydice, “start[ing] the practice 
among the Thracian / tribes of turning for love to immature males and of plucking / the 
flower of a boy’s brief spring before he has come to his manhood” (10.83-85).49  
Moreover, Ovid’s Metamorphoses feature a song by Orpheus about none other than the 
aforementioned Ganymede (10.155-161), one of Quant’s stock myths.50 
The parallel between Quant and Orpheus reveals Quant’s regaling the bar-copains 
with Greek myths and sexual escapades as a reformulated erotic practice.  A typescript 
draft of Quant’s last speech underlines the parallel between the two queer widowers.  
After Quant and Malin have parted ways at dawn, Quant trips onto his doorstep, crying 
out to himself as he almost falls: 
Why, Miss ME, what’s the matter? Must you go woolgathering? 
At least you might look as if you liked what I sing to you. 
One would think you would be thankful, but all you think of is  
woodge-woodge 
With the other hacks …  After all I’ve forgiven you. 
Once I was your wonder.  How short-winded you’ve gotten. 
Come, Tinklebell, trot.  Let’s pretend you’re a thoroughbred. 
Over the hill now into Abraham’s Bosom.  (Age 141) 
                                                
48 Note that here the kind / kind homograph destabilizes the category of the natural.  Indeed, like 
Virgil and Ovid, Quant envisions a decapitated Orpheus continuing to sing, “[d]inning the doom into a deaf 
Nature / Of her loose chaos” (Age 37). We will look at Auden’s treatment of the natural as a problematic 
ethical category in detail in chapter five. 
49 See Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. David Raeburn (London: Penguin, 2004), 386.  
50 Raeburn, 389. 
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(“Woolgathering” means daydreaming; “woodge-woodge” refers to sexual activity;51 
“hack” is a slang word for a sex worker.)  For the final published version, Auden 
cancelled lines 2-4 from the passage.  The typescript draft thus establishes the sexual 
content of Quant’s daydreaming a bit more clearly.  But the especially significant word 
for our purposes is “sing.”  Like the widower Orpheus singing about the beautiful boy 
Ganymede, Quant actually sings many of his riffs on the Greek myths and his sexual 
anecdotes (Age 41, 88, 96, 103-105).  In the presence of his bar-copains, the “tired old 
widower” so painfully self-conscious about his physical decrepitude (Age 4, 44, 69, 73) 
improvises a jukebox tune and several ballads, making up songs based on his lonely 
woolgathering to entertain his bar-copains. 
If the company of the bar-copains also provides a balm for Malin’s loneliness, it 
does so in a way that differs significantly from Quant’s experience.  That is because the 
night at the bar becomes a reformulated erotic practice for Malin chiefly through his 
interactions with Emble.  And, as I mentioned briefly above, Malin’s interactions with 
Emble more nearly approximate coterie-amitié than bar-companionship.  That is to say, 
Malin understands his interactions with Emble as being about transmission as well as 
sharing.  Malin understands his time with Emble as having a larger purpose than time 
alone with a cute boy.  Malin pays close attention to the boy—you could say that he peers 
into the boy’s soul.  And he wants to mold that soul. An even more accurate vocabulary 
to describe Malin’s feelings for Emble than the French copain / ami distinction, then, 
would be the classical Greek eros / philia distinction:  philia depends on equality and 
reciprocity,52 but an aging lover’s eros for a boy (we will see) feeds the aging lover 
                                                
51 See Jacobs’s note, Age 141-142. 
52 Sullivan, 193.  
 144 
spiritually and ethically, and becomes an opportunity to transmit wisdom and virtue, 
whether or not the boy reciprocates. 
Like Bloom, Foucault, Sullivan, and Vernon, Malin turns to the history of 
friendship to guide his interactions with Emble.  Malin takes inspiration from the ancient 
Greek culture of male friendship.  Cycling alone with Emble during the group’s Zohar-
like dream-journey through various countercultural communities (part three), Malin 
begins to interpret his interactions with Emble through the lens of Plato’s Symposium (an 
example of the ancient Greek quasi-institution of the all-male party that I mentioned in 
chapter one)53:   
As we cycle silent through a serious land 
For hens and horses, my hunger for a live 
Person to father impassions my sense 
Of this boy’s beauty in battle with time. 
 
These old-world hamlets and haphazard lanes 
Are perilous places; how plausible here 
All arcadian cult of carnal perfection, 
How intoxicating the platonic [sic] myth.  (Age 68) 
 
Moments later Malin adds that 
The aim of eros is to create a soul, 
The start of its magic is stolen flesh.  (Age 68) 
 
And then: 
Girlishly glad that my glance is not chaste, 
He wants me to want what he would refuse: 
For sons have this desire for a slave also.  (Age 69) 
 
The “platonic myth” that exhilarates Malin in this scene comes from Socrates’ 
presentation of Diotima’s discourse on love as soul-pregnancy, or what I will call soul-
fathering (206b-206e, 208e-210e); the discussion of pederasty by Pausanias (181c, 184c-
                                                
53 For the discussion that follows, I rely on Alexander Nehamus and Paul Woodruff’s translation 
of the Symposium (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989). 
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184e, 185c); and Alcibiades’ tale of unrequited love for Socrates (218c-218d, 219d, 
222a). 
Diotima’s discourse centers on the ladder of “loving boys correctly” that lovers 
must climb in order eventually to behold “the Beautiful itself,” i.e., the changeless, 
transcendent form or idea of beauty (211c, 211e).  During the stages of this mystical 
ascent to love, the lovers “are pregnant in soul” and give birth to ideas rather than 
children:  poetry as well as insights about politics, justice, and virtue (209a-209e).  The 
ladder of love has a pedagogical dimension inasmuch as the soul-pregnant and idea-siring 
lover seeks “to educate” his beloved (209c).  To the pedagogical dimension of Diotima’s 
notion of soul-pregnancy, the speeches of Pausanias and Alcibiades add a pederastic 
dimension.  Put differently, Pausanias’ and Alcibiades’ discussions of pederasty bring out 
the quality of soul-fathering inherent in soul-pregnancy.  Which is to say, according to 
them, the older lover should father the soul of his younger beloved, helping him to 
become a wise and virtuous citizen.54 
From the Diotima-like logic that Malin applies to his self-described unchaste 
feelings for Emble, we can infer that, in the scene from The Age of Anxiety quoted in the 
previous paragraph, the “arcadian cult of carnal perfection” refers to the “platonic myth” 
of the ladder of loving boys correctly.  Malin’s “hunger for a live / Person to father” 
infuses his feelings about “this boy’s beauty” with passion.  Like Diotima’s picture of a 
soul-pregnant and idea-siring lover, Malin wants to “create a soul.”  And he does manage 
to engage in a bit of soul-fathering (albeit in a campy, Firbankian way) over the course of 
the night.  Witness his two father-of-the-groom-like speeches at the wedding masque:  (1) 
                                                
54 “Love’s value to the city as a whole and to the citizens is immeasurable,” says Pausanias, “for 
he compels the lover and his loved one alike to make virtue their central concern” (185c).  
 146 
a cautionary character sketch of Emble for Rosetta, the sagacity of which suggests that 
Malin has indeed peered into Emble’s soul (Age 92); and (2) hilariously graphic sex 
advice for Emble, the tone of which indicates that Malin predicts unhappy sex for the 
couple (Age 93).55 
In addition, like the sentiments of the wisdom- and virtue-seeking lovers 
described by Pausanias, Malin’s feelings for Emble do not amount to a disembodied 
intellectual and aesthetic ecstasy.  Rather, what Malin imagines himself having with 
Emble is a corrected erotic practice of “carnal perfection” (Age 68); even if the friendship 
excludes sex, it is still sexual, for Malin’s “glance is not chaste” (Age 69), and his “groin 
groans” for Emble (Age 71).  As I have insisted a couple of times thus far, and as I will 
have cause to mention again, this is not to say that the desire (however remote or 
misunderstood or self-condemned) to have sex must always accompany the erotic.  But 
sexual attraction—albeit without the intention to have sex—forms part of the dynamic 
between Malin and Emble and hence part of Malin’s reformulated erotic practice of 
friendship. 
The horses that Malin spots while cycling with Emble evoke another Platonic 
gloss on Malin’s feelings.  Perhaps the horses trigger Malin’s thought of the Greek 
philosopher, for in the Phaedrus Socrates describes the human soul as a charioteer (i.e., 
the intelligence that perceives the changeless, transcendent forms of, e.g., justice and 
beauty) steering two horses, one obedient and one unruly (Phaedrus 246a-b, 247d).56  In 
                                                
55 Malin uses the adjectives “stiffly” and “staid” to describe Emble’s participation in sex with 
Rosetta.  The emphasis on the lack of an adventurous, easygoing spirit here underlines the poem’s earlier 
hints at Emble’s timorous bisexuality. 
56 All citations of the Phaedrus refer to Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff’s translation 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995). 
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any case, it is worth recapping the whole allegory, for it sheds light on Malin’s corrected 
erotic practice of friendship with Emble. 
According to the cosmology of the allegory, the human soul qua charioteer needs 
to grow sturdy wings in order to fly back to the heaven from which it has fallen 
(Phaedrus 248e).  Beauty nourishes the soul’s wings; ugliness shrinks them (246e).  
Some souls are better able than others to recollect the heavenly reality of the forms.  For 
such a soul, encountering a beautiful boy triggers a memory of the forms, shocking them 
into a kind of madness (249d).  Gazing on the beautiful boy “waters the growth of his 
wings” (251b).  In the absence of the boy, though, the wings wither to stumps; scabs form 
where the wings are supposed to sprout (251d).  The aforementioned obedient and unruly 
horses pull the soul of the lover this way and that as he wants, and yet resists the desire, 
to have sex with the boy—until the lover beats the unruly horse into submission, and the 
unruly horse dies of fright at the sight of the beautiful boy (253d-254e).  At this point the 
boy, impressed by what the man can teach him about beauty and truth and the gods, “lets 
the man spend time with him” (255b).  But he feels no eros for the lover.  This is the 
classical pattern of eros:  the beautiful beloved does not reciprocate the aging lover’s 
feelings.  The “backlove” that the boy develops for the lover in the Phaedrus is 
unexpected (255e).57 
True to the classical pattern of eros, it hardly matters to Malin that Emble does not 
reciprocate his longing—that Emble merely thinks of Malin as a “companion,” a bread-
sharing copain (Age 68).  It is enough that Emble likes spending time alone with Malin; it 
                                                
57 On a related note, in the Symposium, Pausanias indicates that in the erotics of male friendship in 
ancient Greece, “yield[ing] too quickly” to a lover’s “suits” is considered “shameful” (184a).  That the 
younger beloved is, according to custom, not supposed to chase the older lover makes for part of the humor 
of the cute boy Alcibiades’ speech in The Symposium, where he recounts Socrates’ many refusals of his 
erotic advances (see especially 217a-217d). 
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is more than enough that Emble seems happy to be the object of Malin’s eros.  Malin can 
still enjoy his corrected erotic practice of soul-fathering.  That is to say, like the lover 
whom Diotima describes, he has made “contact with someone beautiful,” and so “he 
conceives and gives birth to what he has been carrying inside him for ages.  And whether 
they are together or apart, he remembers that beauty” (209c).  Hence—like one of the 
“little monks” in a “green world,” who “[g]et up in the dark” to translate a “vision into / 
The vulgar lingo / Of armed cities” (Age 49)—the beautiful boy-loving Malin stands at 
dawn atop a Christianized version of Diotima’s ladder, enjoying an eschatological vision 
of God’s “World to come” (Age 108). 
Perhaps, then, it is the spiritual dissimilarity of the reformulated erotic practice of 
soul-fathering, on the one hand, and that of woolgathering, on the other, that explains 
why Quant seems by comparison so much sadder when he crashes into his doorstep in the 
morning:  the happiness of turning sexy woolgathering into funny songs lasts only while 
your audience is there to listen and laugh (bar-copain sharing); by contrast, soul-fathering 
fortifies one for the lonely trials ahead (coterie-ami transmission). 
Malin’s Plato-inspired soul-fathering of Emble fits the pattern of Auden’s 
relationship with Chester Kallman after Kallman ended their romance (toward the end of 
the summer of 1941).58  “Canzone” (1942)—part of “the published record of l’affaire 
C”59—alludes to the allegory of the chariot in the Phaedrus, placing Auden in the role of 
the lover-pedagogue:  “[t]he hot rampageous horses of my will, / Catching the scent of 
                                                
58 And not just Auden’s relationship with Kallman—apparently there were other younger men in 
Auden’s life with whom he enjoyed a sort of father-son friendship, e.g., Keith Callaghan.  See Dorothy J. 
Farnan, Auden in Love (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 157-158. 
59 ALS to Alan Ansen, 27 August 1947, Berg.  The list does not include anything from The Age of 
Anxiety, which was published in July 1947, a month before Auden sent his list to Ansen.  See Humphrey 
Carpenter, 347. 
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Heaven, whinny” (CP 329).  Indeed, as Arthur Kirsch puts it, “the relationship” between 
Auden and Kallman was “more that of parent and child” after the summer of 1941.60  
And as Auden’s own Christmas Day epistolary prose poem to Kallman puts it (1941), 
Auden regarded Kallman, who was 14 years younger than Auden, as “intellectually a 
son”—albeit also “emotionally a mother” and “physically a father,” so that Auden came 
to understand “the Holy Family” through his chosen family with Kallman.61  The 
Christmas Day letter captures a key part of Auden’s erotics of coterie:  through the 
reformulated erotic practice of friendship, queers without legal or biological means to 
enjoy the support of kinship structures can choose family. 
Moreover—and this is one of the most crucial (and critically neglected) theo-
ethical commitments of Auden’s later poetry, the point to which each of the previous 
chapters leads in a different way—these chosen families expand the relational 
possibilities for straight people, too.62  As we saw in the previous chapter, Auden’s 
introduction to The Portable Greek Reader (1948) supports Diotima’s exclusion of 
straight love from the stages of the soul’s growth on the grounds that body-pregnancy has 
less “social and political value” than soul-fathering.  In other words, the biological 
sterility of gay love makes it more spiritually fecund than straight love.  Gay lovers have 
time to acquire the wisdom and virtue needed in order “to teach human beings procreated 
in the normal way how to become a good society” (Prose ii 370).  A text like The Age of 
Anxiety adds to Diotima’s discourse the caveat that childless queers overflow with better 
ideas—and what Foucault will call “richer, more interesting and creative” relational 
                                                
60 Kirsch, Auden and Christianity, 26. 
61 For the full text of Auden’s Christmas Day, 1941 letter, see Mendelson, Later Auden, 182-183.  
62 See Kath Weston, Families We Choose:  Lesbians, Gays, Kinship (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
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practices—because of the need to survive outside of “the protected forms of family 
life.”63  
By finishing a sentence about Auden’s erotics of coterie with a quote from 
Foucault, I want to suggest that, in addition to having a place in a history of the literary 
modernist “citizen queer,” Auden’s oeuvre also belongs in a story about later twentieth-
century developments in queer theory and philosophy.  I will quickly unpack that claim 
here by putting Allan Bloom’s and Michel Foucault’s treatment of friendship in 
conversation with Auden’s.  (Chapter five will add to the line of inquiry in a couple of 
ways.  I will build on the insights with which I end this chapter—more on that below.  
And I also will show how, by relying on the work of R. G. Collingwood, a twentieth-
century British philosopher, Auden’s poetry provides answers to a constellation of major 
philosophical and theological problems, namely, the construction of nature and its 
relationship to grace as well as to ethical deliberation and hermeneutical reflection.) 
As I mentioned above, Bloom and Foucault invest intergenerational male 
friendship with political value, albeit each through a different philosophical and 
vocational move.  Guided by his study of Plato and his quasi-religious belief that eros 
explains a person, Bloom formed deep friendships with his students, successfully training 
them for positions of political power (e.g., advisor on U.S. national security and defense 
policy).64  By contrast, Foucault’s late essays and interviews argue that dismantling the 
psychologistic notion of a gay essence frees us to elaborate a gay style, an ethics or art of 
living centered on friendship.65  In particular, the question of contemporary 
                                                
63 Foucault, Ethics, 172.  
64 I am speaking here of Paul Wolfowitz, who under the pseudonym Philip Gorman makes thinly 
disguised appearances throughout Ravelstein. 
65 Foucault, Ethics, 135-136, 146.  
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intergenerational male friendship, a relationship without conventions, provides an 
opportunity for reflecting on the poverty of western modernity’s “relational world” in 
contrast to antiquity.66  In the next section I will treat each thinker in turn, first (and more 
extensively) Bloom, the votary of Diotima’s ladder; then (briefly) Foucault, who 
spotlights the urgency of understanding the history of friendship. 
 
 
III.  EROS OF SOULS 
 
“… nos âmes s’entretiennent.” 
—Montaigne67 
 
In the 1940s, Auden created a delightfully irreverent parlor game called 
“Purgatory Mates.”  The object was to choose a pair of living (or dead) authors who 
hated (or surely would have hated) each other, and whose purgatorial punishment would 
be each other’s company.  Proceeding to paradise would require their learning to love 
each other.  Examples of Auden’s own pairings include Tolstoy and Oscar Wilde; T. S. 
Eliot and Walt Whitman.68 
The lives of W. H. Auden and Allan Bloom inspire a modification of Auden’s 
parlor game.  I like to imagine the two of them walking the glassy, gold streets of the City 
of God together, chain-smoking, refining their ideas about the beautiful and the good.  If 
                                                
66 Foucault, Ethics, 136, 158. 
67 “Our souls converse.”  Montaigne, 106.  
68 See Tony Sharpe, “Final Beliefs: Stevens and Auden,” Literature & Theology 25.1 (March 
2011): 64.  
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memoirs, pseudo-memoirs, and biographies are to be trusted, Auden and Bloom were 
both larger than life, full of charming idiosyncrasies:  Auden lectured in carpet slippers, 
for example, and Bloom trembled with intensity when he spoke.  They both liked to 
organize what they knew into comprehensive systems:  Auden, as we have seen, had a 
penchant for making taxonomies and charts; Bloom kept in daily telephone contact with 
some of his more politically powerful former students, partly to advise them, partly to 
“update and maintain” his massive reserves of “historical and political information,” i.e., 
“to fit up-to-the-minute decisions in the Gulf War” into a political history stretching back 
“to Plato and Thucydides.”69  More significantly, Auden and Bloom were alike drawn to 
conservative thought:  Auden, to theological orthodoxy; Bloom, to political and cultural 
conservatism.  They both lived in exile from their given families:  Auden, from the 
stifling “family” atmosphere of the patria that reviled his queerness and his faith;70 
Bloom, from a father whom he despised, “a toy ogre, a huffy little man, and a neurotic 
disciplinarian.”71  They both lived with a younger gay man in a chosen family of father 
and son.72  Both rejected the politics of gay pride.73  They shared a commitment to loving 
what they called the polis of their friends.74  And while Auden depicted soul-fathering in 
The Age of Anxiety, Bloom treated soul-fathering as a calling and a lifestyle.75 
Love and Friendship lays out the ideas behind Bloom’s lifestyle of soul-fathering.  
As I have said before, the book laments modernity’s deficient and overwhelmingly 
                                                
69 Bellow, 60. 
70 Humphrey Carpenter, 243.  Though as I explained in chapter one, Auden gave no serious 
thought to Christianity until after immigrating to America. 
71 Bellow, 60-61. 
72 Bellow, 69, 177, 140-141.  
73 Humphrey Carpenter, 433; Bellow, 160. 
74 DM 48; Bellow, 52.  
75 “He never presented himself as a philosopher,” Bellow writes.  “[P]rofessors of philosophy were 
not philosophers.  He had had a philosophical training and had learned how a philosophical life should be 
lived.  That was what philosophy was about, and this was why one read Plato” (173).  
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psychological vocabulary of love, a lexicon that effectively eliminates the relational 
category of passionate friendship.  Bloom wants to recover an erotics of thought, the 
pleasure of communal philosophical inquiry that older lexicons once made possible.76  In 
the treatment of Diotima’s mystical ladder of love that concludes the book, Bloom 
happily declares, “There is no Greek word for sex, that late-nineteenth-century invention 
of sterile and timid imitations of science.”77  Such an erotics of thought demands a queer 
lifestyle.  This is because, according to Bloom, who makes a queer hero out of Plato,78 
“[p]arents and families distort a child’s eroticism by directing it toward the kind of 
spouses and offspring that are suitable to their projects.  The family in principle prefers 
age to wisdom, and surrounds itself with all kinds of sacred terrors.  Both intellectual and 
political freedom seem to depend upon some kind of break with it.”79  (Recall Auden’s 
exile from England:  if he wanted to grow as a poet, he had to escape the ideological 
expectations that his home country placed on him.)  The biological family, inimical to 
wisdom and virtue, has no place in Bloom’s philosophy. 
Indeed, as Ravelstein shows, biological families have no place in the actual world 
of friendship that Ravelstein (Bloom) builds out of his philosophy.80  Bellow’s novel 
describes the practice of soul-fathering through which Bloom built his “set,” his 
“disciples,” his “close group” of former “students” who gave him “frequent reports” over 
the telephone on matters of political intrigue and national security.81  Bloom referred to 
                                                
76 Bloom, 432.  
77 Bloom, 435.  
78 Bloom writes that “the Republic really destroys the family.  The unqualified authority of the 
ancestral is abolished in this city.  Fathers and mothers hardly exist, and they can be ruled by their wise 
children,” 440.  
79 Bloom, 441.  
80 From now on, I will simply say “Bloom” in my commentary for ease of reading, though I will 
continue to use “Ravelstein” in direct quotations from the novel. 
81 Bellow, 10. 
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the unconventional pedagogy through which he built his circle as “the binding of souls.”  
He thought it irresponsible to try to separate teaching from eros, so his process of soul-
binding placed “unusual emphasis ‘on the affects’—on love, not to beat around the 
bush.”82  The first lesson for the men?  To rid themselves of their parents.  “He hated his 
own family and never tired of weaning his gifted students from their families.”83  He tried 
to rescue his students from the “disastrous misconceptions” they had inherited from their 
“mindless parents.”84  Bellow tells us that Bloom’s “role” for his students “became, bit by 
bit, that of a father.”85  Gradually he acquired a Socrates-like reputation for corrupting the 
youth; some fathers cautioned their sons to stay away.86 
Thus “driven by longing,” “in real earnest” about the Platonic “quest” for the 
mystical insights that eros could yield,87 Bloom the self-described “bugger-familias” 
created a philosophical and political coterie.  Bellow drives the point home by comparing 
Bloom’s “band” to the famous (and homophonous) Bloomsbury Group: 
It was as natural that Ravelstein should need to know what went on in 
Downing or the Kremlin as it had been for Virginia Woolf to read 
Keynes’s private report on German reparations.  Possibly Ravelstein’s 
views or opinions sometimes worked their way into policy decisions, but 
that wasn’t what mattered.  What mattered was that he should remain in 
charge somehow of the ongoing political education of his old boys.88 
 
To be cut off from his informants in Washington and Paris, from his 
students, the people he had trained, the band of brothers, the initiates, the 
happy few made him extremely uncomfortable.89 
 
                                                
82 Bellow, 82.  
83 Bellow, 50. 
84 Bellow, 50.  
85 Bellow, 27.  
86 Bellow, 58.  
87 Bellow, 82.  
88 Bellow, 103, 12.  And this after writing just a couple of pages earlier that “Ravelstein didn’t 
think well of the Bloomsbury intellectuals.  He disliked their high camp, he disapproved of queer antics and 
of what he called ‘faggot behavior’,” 8. 
89 Bellow, 103.  
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After the queer alienation of his childhood, Bloom develops a longing for eros, a 
passionate calling to soul-fathering, a commitment to the quest for the beautiful and the 
good.  (Though Bloom educated women, he could not think of them as potential 
philosophers, Bellow tells us.  And some of his pedagogical friendships with men 
included sex.)90  Like Auden, Bloom organizes a polis around that erotic commitment, a 
recoding of kinship based on the eros of souls rather than blood.  And for Auden and 
Bloom alike, the reformulated erotic practice of the polis provides not just spiritual and 
intellectual but also emotional support:  “something like relatives,” as Bellow puts it.91 
Finally, because Bloom’s coterie trades in politics, journalism, and philosophy—
whereas Auden’s trades in poetry and opera—Bellow’s representation of it makes more 
strikingly apparent a mission that Auden’s portrayal of queer networks also shares:  to 
open the eyes, or awaken the verbürgerlichten souls, of Middletown’s empiric economic 
men (DM 57, 127-128, see also my discussion of “Middletown” and “Empiric Economic 
Man” in the previous chapter).  Bellow’s literary sketch of Ravelstein’s “band” of 
“initiates,” with its (thinly disguised) Paul Wolfowitzes and Francis Fukuyamas, makes 
public the political significance of Bloom’s semi-private, quasi-institutional erotics of 
coterie.  And yet in this respect there is something much more radical about Auden, the 
soul-father forerunner.  Auden (literally) publicizes the political significance of his quasi-
institutional erotics of coterie by writing about his friends and dedicating his theo-ethical 
apologies for friendship to his friends—by, that is, loving his alien and alienated friends 
                                                
90 Bellow, 140, 12.  
91 Bellow, 158.  
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in public,92 and thus poetically spitting in the faces of the Anthony Powells and the 
George Steiners of the world.93 
Inasmuch as Auden’s later poetry publicly names forms of sociality that exist 
outside the modern institutions of kinship—e.g., “The Ganymede Club for homesick 
young angels” (Age 21), with its campy, Firbankian barroom games and countercultural 
dream-visions and Platonic soul-fathering—Auden looks forward to Foucault’s 
absorption, in his late essays and interviews, with what he calls “the problem of 
friendship.”94  Because gay relationships lack legal protection and social recognition, a 
main feature of gay life is the ongoing project of inventing new relational supports.  For 
Foucault, a quick glance at the history of friendship shows how “impoverished” the 
modern “relational world” is.95  He thus argues that instead of trying to acquire the legal 
benefits of marriage by fighting for a right to marry, queers ought to “imagine and 
consider a new relational right that permits all possible types of relations to exist.” Such a 
relational right would not inhibit the ongoing invention of other, newer relational forms.96  
What’s more, it would “enrich” the relational lives of straight people, too, allowing them 
to create “their own schema of relations.”97  It sounds like a riff on Auden’s reading of 
Diotima’s discourse:  marginalized queers resourcefully invent new modes of living 
together, and offer a gift to straight people in the process. 
 
                                                
92 For example:  “If now, two aliens in New York, / We meet, Elizabeth, and talk / Of friends who 
suffer in the torn / Old Europe where we both were born” (DM 50). 
93 As I mention in a note in the previous chapter, Anthony Powell reacted to Auden’s death by 
saying to Kingsley Amis, “I’m delighted that shit has gone.  It should have happened years ago … scuttling 
off to America in 1939 with his boyfriend,” Richard Davenport-Hines, Auden (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 
180.  See chapter one for my account of George Steiner’s coterie-phobia. 
94 Foucault, Ethics, 170.  
95 Foucault, Ethics, 158. 
96 Foucault, Ethics, 163. 
97 Foucault, Ethics, 160. 
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IV.  FEELING BACKWARD 
Foucault’s late essays and interviews tell queers to ask, not, “Who am I, given my 
desires?,” but rather, “How should I live?”98  Foucault asks us to replace the scientistic 
project of looking for the etiology of homosexuality with the ethical project of becoming 
gay.  The sociological and political picture of gay subjectivity that emerges from 
Foucault’s discussion of friendship resists pathologizing, psychological explanations of 
homosexuality:  instead of abnormal desires, gay subjectivity involves creative, practical 
responses to abjection.  Yet at the same time, Foucault’s model of gay subjectivity 
acknowledges both the vulnerability and the glory of queer life.  In fact, according to this 
model, vulnerability is part of the glory of queer life, for it creates “the possibility for 
creative life,” as Foucault puts it.99   
Auden’s later poetry, I submit, constructs gay subjectivity in a similar way.  
Which is to say, the story of Auden’s coterie poetry is also a story about queer affects:  
prophetic, redemptive socialities emerge from the bad feelings of shame (as we saw in 
our reading of “New Year Letter” in the previous chapter) and loneliness (as we have just 
seen in our discussion of The Age of Anxiety) that sometimes characterize queer life.  
Auden does not gloss over these feelings; rather, his erotics of coterie addresses them 
directly.  Negative affects like grief and alienation as well as shame and loneliness form 
the bedrock of his coteries.  Such feelings are a queer variant of the “morphon full of 
guilt / Whence all community is built,” as “New Year Letter” calls it.100  For Auden, only 
“sensibility,” “style,” and “love”—i.e., practices of “responsibility”— can turn this 
                                                
98 Foucault, Ethics, 136. 
99 Foucault, Ethics, 160. 
100 Cf. Caron, My Father & I, 159; and Warner, The Trouble with Normal, 35.  A “morphon” is a 
morphologically distinct biological creature.  
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“cryptozöon with two backs” away from violence (DM 59-60).  And the practices of 
“sensibility,” “style,” and “love” constitutive of Auden’s coteries—or hominterns, bar-
copains, suburbs of dissent, green worlds and, as we will see in the next interlude-
chapter, great good places—do not ignore but rather incorporate bad feelings:  falling 
down in the dance, mourning, exile, alienation, lonely woolgathering, discomfort with 
messy bodies and smelly sex.  As we will soon see, this is what makes Auden’s later 
poetry so vital to contemporary discussions in queer theory and theology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR | INTERLUDE:  





So far in Queering the City of God we have considered Auden’s ethics of coterie 
by looking at the various communities organized on the principle of friendship that 
populate his later oeuvre—suburbs of dissent, green worlds, islands and bars.  But what 
about friendship with the dead you never personally knew?  I began the previous chapter 
by alluding to Alan Bray, the historian of friendship who writes movingly of undertaking 
the history of friendship in medieval and early modern England as a way of mourning 
friends he had lost to AIDS.  “In retrospect,” he writes, “I think I was seeking among the 
tombs of the dead those lost friends; I would not let them go.”  Bray’s book examines 
(among other things) shared burial monuments in English churches that celebrate 
(mostly) same-gender friends (from the eleventh to the nineteenth century).  His thesis is 
that through such institutions as Eucharistically-sealed, sworn friendships and shared 
burial monuments, friendship played a publicly significant role in settling conflicts 
between families and within the church.  Bray “found such friendship” as the ones he 
personally mourned “there in those monuments.”1  Indeed, he describes monuments that 
seek the prayers of the living faithful who behold them; such inscriptions establish 
                                                
1 Alan Bray, The Friend (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2003), 5. 
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friendship between the living and the dead and hold up the friendship of the dead as a 
model for the kinds of relationships that ought to subsist among the living.2 
The monuments that Bray describes perform the Christian belief in the 
communion of saints that links the living to the faithful departed.  Such a belief prepared 
Auden for the idea of friendship with the dead.  And such ghostly friendship, primarily in 
the form of a kind of spiritual mentorship, haunts Auden’s post-conversion poetry.  One 
famous example is “New Year Letter” (1941), where Auden sits in judgment before a 
tribunal of his poetic elders (Blake, Dryden, Catullus, Tennyson, Baudelaire, Hardy, 
Rilke, Kipling [DM 21-22]).  Turning from the coterie to the communion of saints, then, I 
want to focus briefly in the present interlude, before I turn to matters theoretical and 
theological, on just one of Auden’s ghostly friendships, namely, his relationship with his 
queer precursor, Henry James.  It is this relationship that the title of the interlude signals, 
with James as the “bachelor,” and Auden “as the strange young man.”  The significance 
of these names will soon become clear.   
Auden’s older queer double, likewise an expatriate but in the opposite 
transatlantic direction, is named “the bachelor” in an early journal version of Auden’s 
famous wartime elegy, “At the Grave of Henry James” (1941).  There is an erotic charge 
to the scene.  Like a nervous suitor, Auden approaches James’s grave “awkwardly” (SP 
128).3  Recognizing the tombstone, Auden feels “a flushed assault.”  Seeing him is the 
one beautiful thing, the one “donnée” (a Jamesianism) in this “doubtful hour” of war.  
The nervous suitor asks, “dear addicted artist, / Assent to my soil and flower.”  The 
                                                
2 Bray, 271.  
3 But see my discussion below about the multiple versions of this poem.  
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phrase “[a]ddicted artist” connotes James’s passionate and exclusive commitment to his 
craft.  
Auden qualifies the potentially damning phrase by (rather queerly) likening James 
to a nun:    
your heart, fastidious as  
A delicate nun, remained true to the rare noblesse  
Of your lucid gift and, for its own sake, ignored the 
Resentful muttering Mass.  (SP 131)   
 
The sketch of James as a nun looks forward to the picture of James that Auden produces 
in “Henry James and the Dedicated” (1944).  In that essay, Auden derives an anti-
marriage ethic from James’s life and works.  James divides humanity into the elect, who 
make vows to a calling; and the philistines, who are obsessed with marriage, “dedicated 
to the prestige of the immediate selfish moment” (Prose ii 243).  The moral teaching of 
all of James’s writing is, according to Auden, that if one has an intellectual or artistic gift, 
one must stay true to it by remaining “single and, if possible, celibate” (Prose ii 244).  
Hence “At the Grave of Henry James” pictures James’s creative gift as his androgynous 
lover:  “you […] / Who opened such passionate arms to your Bon when It ran / Towards 
you with Its overwhelming reasons pleading / All beautifully in Its breast?” (SP 140).  
Such a gift, James believes, demands an aesthetic version of the monastic vow.     
In the essay, Auden flatly declares, “I agree with him” (Prose ii 244).  But in the 
earlier pilgrimage to James’s grave, the awkward suitor seems to be seeking reassurance 
about his vows from the “dear addicted artist”: 
Perhaps the honor of a great house, perhaps its 
Cradles and tombs may persuade the bravado of 
 The bachelor mind to doubt 
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The dishonest path …4 
 
Perhaps the familial and financial privileges of married life—represented by the “great 
house” with its “[c]radles and tombs”—have sometimes caused James to regret his 
vocation?  The suitor is self-consciously “vexed with / My little inferior questions” (SP 
130).  But he continues, making plain his need for reassurance from James, especially 
now in this wartime climate where a writer’s professional misstep—e.g., writing a piece 
of demagoguery instead of poetry (as Auden thought he had done with “Spain” (1937)—
could cost lives: 
Now more than ever when torches and snare-drum 
Excite the squat women of the saurian brain 
 Till a milling mob of fears 
Break in insultingly on anywhere, when in our dreams 
Pigs play on the organs and the blue sky runs shrieking 
 As the Crack of Doom appears, 
 
Are the good ghosts needed with the white magic 
Of their subtle loves.  War has no ambiguities 
Like a marriage; the result 
Required of its affaire fatale is simple and sad, 
The physical removal of all human objects 
That conceal the difficult.  (SP 130) 
 
It’s a terribly euphemistic way of putting it, but the point is clear:  if Auden hadn’t made 
a queer vow to art, there wouldn’t be the danger of his inciting the masses for what would 
later be revealed as the wrong reasons.  Marriage is at least ambiguous, the queer suitor 
declares:  it is not altogether evil, like war.  He asks James to preside over his writing, to 
be the “the disciplinary image” that will “preserve” him from the “vague incitement” of 
the “muttering Mass.”  In other words, he asks James to prevent him from ever again 
writing a poem like “Spain” (1937). 
                                                
4 “At the Grave of Henry James,” Horizon III.18 (June 1941): 381.  These lines were cut from all 
book versions of the poem. 
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One of the most striking features of the queer ghostly friendship between the 
bachelor (James) and the suitor (Auden) is the way that it recodes models of literary 
influence.  Auden canonizes James in both the literary and the spiritual senses of the 
word,5 but in a much richer, more complicated way than straight male Freudian models of 
authorial influence.6  At once supplicant and seducer, the poet invites James into a 
spiritual collaboration that mimics the queer Christic friendships in James’s short fiction.7  
The collaboration places James in a Christ-like—or, even better, a Holy Spirit-like role:  
“O dwell, ironic at my living centre,” Auden asks.  That would seem to elevate James 
into a father-like role, something that could be reconciled with the standard straight male 
models of literary influence.  But in the very next line, Auden says, “Half ancestor, half 
child” (SP 129).  Thus the entire supplication reads, “O dwell, ironic at my living centre, / 
Half ancestor, half child.”  It truly is a friendship-based, communion-of-saints model of 
literary influence that the poem suggests, for it involves conversation, exchange, 
reciprocity, mutual influence.  To put it in the language of the previous chapter, it is as if 
the bachelor and the suitor are collaboratively soul-pregnant; or at any rate, the suitor 
wants them to be.  He wants them to soul-father each other.  The text of “At the Grave of 
Henry James” thus becomes a kind of soul-child, sired by the bachelor and birthed by the 
suitor. 
                                                
5 Auden canonizes James in the literary sense of the word, inasmuch as James’s reputation 
dwindled in the early decades of the twentieth century.  Because of his ornate prose and his Anglophilia, he 
had virtually no reputation until Auden and other literary modernists created something of a Jamesian 
renascence, starting in the 1930s with T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound.  See David Garrett Izzo, “The Henry 
James Revival of the 1930s,” in Henry James Against the Aesthetic Movement, ed. David Garrett Izzo and 
Daniel T. O’Hara (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006): 13-34 
6 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).  
7 Especially “The Great Good Place” (1900) and “The Beast in the Jungle” (1903), texts to which 
“At the Grave of Henry James” refers.  
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In this way, Auden extends his ecclesial coterie to the dead, and expands his 
vocabulary of the culture of friendship to include James’s “Great Good Place,” a parable 
depicting the life to come as a Grand Chartreuse-like monastery populated only by men 
who call each other brothers.  The suitor closes the poem by asking for intercessory 
prayer from James, “because there is no end to the vanity of our calling” (SP 132).  The 
suitor does not appear to have received the reassurance he sought regarding celibacy and 
dedication; that will have to wait for a later poem in which Henry James makes a cameo 
appearance, “Caliban to the Audience,” the third chapter of The Sea and the Mirror 
(1944), Auden’s reply to Shakespeare’s The Tempest.  James makes a cameo appearance 
inasmuch as Caliban, in James’s florid style, ventriloquizes a message from Shakespeare 
about the ethics to, among others, the “strange young man,” i.e., would-be young artists.  
Caliban’s speech pictures the lonely, ambitious life of the “strange young man”:  “Lying 
awake at night in your single bed, you are conscious of a power by which you will 
survive the wallpaper of your boardinghouse or the expensive bourgeois horrors of your 
home” (Sea 36).  The monologue lists the sacrifices, the sexual frustrations, and the 
anxieties that characterize the life of the dedicated artist, and holds alongside these an 
imaginary alternative life history in which the artist indulges them:  “Such genuine 
escapes, though, might have […] even involved” the strange young man “with the 
police.”  Here is the bachelor James’s comfort for the queer suitor, the strange young 
man:  art constitutes a means to queer self-fashioning without getting involved with the 
place. 
Auden has an extensive amount of material devoted to Henry James.  To begin, 
Henry James’s writing about America makes a veritable sub-theme of “New Year 
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Letter,” and James pops up repeatedly in the annotations to the poem in The Double Man 
(1941).  The two other poetic treatments of James include the aforementioned “At the 
Grave of Henry James” (1941)—which will make the main subject of this brief 
meditation on queer influence and ghostly friendship—and “Caliban to the Audience” 
(1944).  Auden devoted several essays and lectures to James:  in addition to “Henry 
James and the Dedicated” (1944), which I discussed in chapter two; an introduction to 
James’s American Scene (1946); and an “Address on Henry James” (1946).  
There are many, many books that discuss James’s writing along queer or 
homoerotic or gay lines.8  None of the critical writing about Auden as a gay poet 
investigates Henry James’s influence.9  Moreover, none of the scholarship that does 
explore the relationship between Auden and James thinks to explore the question of queer 
influence.10  Rachel Wetzsteon’s recent study of Auden’s literary influences, Influential 
Ghosts, discusses “At the Grave of Henry James” at length but never once mentions 
James’s and Auden’s shared status as queer outsiders.  Neither does her study explore 
how queer influence might be operating in Auden’s extensive writing about James.11  
Perhaps we can attribute the critical silence about the queer affinities between Auden and 
                                                
8 John R. Bradley, Henry James’s Permanent Adolescence (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Henry 
James and Homoerotic Desire, ed. John R. Bradley (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Eric Haralson, 
Henry James and Queer Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Hugh Stevens, Henry 
James and Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Wendy Graham, Henry James’s 
Thwarted Love (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Leland S. Person, Henry James and the 
Suspense of Masculinity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
9 Even Richard Bozorth’s seminal study on homosexuality in Auden’s lyric poetry never once 
brings Henry James up. 
10 See, for example, Adam Parkes, “Collaborations:  Henry James and the Poet Critics,” The 
Henry James Review 23.3 (Fall 2002): 283-293. 
11 Rachel Wetzsteon, Influential Ghosts: A Study of Auden’s Sources (New York: Routledge, 
2007). 
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James to Nadia Herman Colburn’s comment that “sometimes” Auden simply “falls 
through the cracks—neither fully English nor American, modernist nor postmodernist.”12   
In any case, the relationship between Henry James and W. H. Auden is a queer 
ghostly alliance that, I submit, becomes especially clear when one reads the first version 
of “At the Grave of Henry James” that Auden printed in two different magazines—one an 
American journal; the other, British—in the summer of 1941.13  I have here offered a 
small gesture by way of rectifying that critical silence, in the form of a brief meditation 
on the version of the poem that appeared in Cyril Connolly’s Horizon.14 
                                                
12 Nadia Herman Colburn, “Bibliographic Essay and Review of Auden Studies,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to W.H. Auden, ed. Stan Smith (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
241. 
13 “At the Grave of Henry James” was first published in England in Horizon III.18 (June 1941): 
379-383; and soon after published in America in the Partisan Review VIII.4 (July / August 1941): 266-270.  
The initial publication of the poem thus constitutes a performance of post-national collaboration:  Auden, a 
British expat in the U.S., writes a prayer to James, an American expat in the U.K., and each writer’s chosen 
and home countries publish the poem.  In addition, Edward Mendelson notes that part of the original social 
meaning of the poem was a larger battle that was taking place at the time in the Partisan Review about the 
canonization of American literature as a precursor to English and European literary modernism, Later 
Auden (New York:  Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1999), 165.  Auden almost included “At the Grave of 
Henry James” in The Double Man—which came out a few months before these journal publications:  see 
John Fuller, W. H. Auden: A Commentary, (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1998), 397.  Auden 
in fact didn’t include the poem in a book until CP45, at which point he cut out four stanzas and stripped it 
of some of its queer details (which I will discuss below).  Auden then stripped it down even more, cutting 
an additional 14 stanzas.  The extensive omissions from CP45 to CSP remove (a) the wartime context of 
the poem, (b) all of the stanzas that characterize Auden’s approach to the grave as that of a supplicant who 
wants help thinking through the thorny ethical task of writing poetry that meditates non-propagandistically 
on justice, (c) many of the stanzas that characterize Auden’s approach to James’s Grave as that of a queer 
suitor, (d) all of the stanzas that portray James as a kind of queer saint or queer Christ, (e) and thus much of 
the religious content of the poem.  The most interesting editorial takeaway here is that, as Auden makes 
vast cuts over several decades, “At the Grave of Henry James” gets both less Christian and less queer.  The 
CP45 version has been reprinted in SP (128-132); the CSP version has been reprinted in CP (308-310). 
14 The publication of “At the Grave of Henry James” in Cyril Connolly’s magazine points to 
another material coterie story to tell in addition to the spiritual coterie story that the poem tells about James 
and Auden:  namely, the story of the culture of friendship that characterized Cyril Connolly’s editing of 
Horizon.  (Auden’s friend Stephen Spender, for example, was the magazine’s unofficial associate editor.)  
Michael Shelden has told that story in Friends of Promise: Cyril Connolly and the World of Horizon 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989). 
 
 167 






So far we have reread Auden’s post-conversion work against the grain of 
scholars, critics, and poets who divide his oeuvre into an early queer Auden and a later 
unqueer Christian.  In the introduction I argued that Auden’s Christian poetry constructs 
gay subjectivity as a spiritual faculty, a theo-ethical guide, a prophetic call.  Each of the 
three previous body chapters took up a key moment in Auden’s conceptualization of a 
calling that aligns the charism of same-sex eros with anti-imperialist prophetic critique:  
chapter one interpreted Auden’s account of queerness and queer community in Nones 
(1951) as an affirmative rewrite of standard attacks on gay networks (the conspiracy 
narratives of “gay freemasonry” and “gay espionage”); building on the insight from the 
first chapter that Auden’s poetry tends to couch queer community in ecclesial language, 
chapter two looked at how “New Year Letter” (1941) uses the syncretic ecclesiology of 
the lay Anglican poet and novelist Charles Williams to depict a small Long Island group 
of European exiles and sexual outlaws as exemplars of democracy; chapter three 
examined Auden’s “erotics of coterie”; and chapter four reflected briefly on the queer 
ghostly friendship between Auden and Henry James.  The story I have told so far is more 
or less a cumulative one, and in order fully to appreciate the theological arguments to 
which I now turn, the reader will need to have read the previous chapters. 
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As I will argue in this chapter, complicating the received view of later Auden 
turns out to aid the tasks of queer theory and theology.  What’s more, it can help post-
Stonewall readers imagine a via media between poles of the American culture wars.  To 
show the theo-ethical utility of reading against the grain of Auden scholarship, I will use 
highlights from Auden’s later poetry to arbitrate two unlikely conversation partners:  Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, a feminist political theorist appointed by George W. Bush to the 
President’s Council on Bioethics, on the one hand; and the anti-redemptive, antisocial 
turn in queer theory, as exemplified by Lee Edelman and Heather Love, on the other. 
In Sovereignty:  God, State, and Self (2008), Jean Bethke Elshtain propounds “the 
responsible self” (incarnational, loving, and dialogic) as a more ethical alternative to “the 
sovereign self” (Gnostic, voluntaristic, and asocial).1  Through close readings of two 
lyrics from Auden’s sequence “Thanksgiving for a Habitat” (1965)—a paean to the 
farmhouse in Kirchstetten where he summered for fifteen years with his lifelong 
companion and erstwhile lover, Chester Kallman—I will construct a queer theology of 
“the responsible self.”  Such an elaboration of Elshtain’s work accomplishes at least two 
things:  (1) it offsets queer theory’s propensity for “self-sovereignty,” but (2) it also 
critiques Elshtain’s heterosexist bias. 
Complicating the received view of later Auden, it turns out, can also help with the 
trans project of uncoupling gender presentation from chromosomal / morphological (i.e., 
medically assigned) sex.  I will use For the Time Being (1944)—Auden’s modern-day 
retelling of the infancy narratives from the Gospels of Matthew and Luke—to moderate 
another unlikely dialogue among Elshtain and two contrasting affirmations of gender 
                                                




variance:  the body theology of Justin Tanis, a transgender Christian pastor, and the 
gender theory of Kate Bornstein, a playwright, performance artist, and self-styled 
“sublebrity in the pantheon of America’s queer and postmodern subcultures.”2   
Rereading Auden to throw light on body theology and gender theory shows why 
Christians need to do ethics “incarnationally”—i.e., why Christians need a sacramental, 
relational, tradition- and revelation-based approach to ethical deliberation.  Simply put, I 
will build on Elshtain’s ideas to construct a gender-variance-affirming queer theology of 
the responsible self, but I will depart from her methodology, arguing that it conflicts with 
her ethics.  On the one hand, Elshtain cautions against abstracting ideas from the 
practices, habits, and character of the communities that espouse them; but on the other, 
her heterosexist picture of responsibility depends on the very sort of move she cautions 
against:  Elshtain treats “nature” and the “natural” as self-evident and universal norms for 
ethical reflection.  By contrast, as I will show, For the Time Being adumbrates a more 
theo-ethically coherent methodology. 
 
 
I.  QUEER THEORY’S ANTISOCIAL TURN  
 Lee Edelman’s No Future (2004) epitomizes the antisocial turn in queer theory.  
For Edelman, queerness has ethical value only insofar as it resists the “secular theology” 
of “reproductive futurism” on which civil society depends—a theology that takes the 
                                                
2 Kate Bornstein, A Queer and Pleasant Danger (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), xv.  To clarify the 
way I use a few key terms:  as Evin Taylor puts it in a contribution to Kate Bornstein’s anthology Gender 
Outlaws: The Next Generation, the term “transgender” refers to “individuals who change, cross, or live 
beyond gender,” while the term “cisgender” refers to “those whose gender identity, role, or expression is 
considered to match their assigned gender by societal standards” (Seal Press: Berkeley CA, 2010), 268.  
“Transsexuality,” as the historian Joanne Meyerowitz explains, refers to “the quest to transform the bodily 
characteristics of sex via hormones and surgery,” How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the 
United States (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 5. 
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form of “poptimism” in America, i.e., secular hymns like Whitney Houston’s mawkish 
refrain, “I believe the children are our future.”3  Engaging a breathtaking variety of 
interlocutors (Hitchcock, Dickens, George Eliot, Plato, Augustine, Kant, Lacan, John 
Paul II, and Cornel West, among others), Edelman shows the duplicitous ways that 
straight culture exploits the figure of the innocent, vulnerable child to disenfranchise 
queer people who will (so the political right says) corrupt that innocence.  
Heteronormative procreativity and the future-oriented political narratives that it 
underwrites pretend to selflessness disingenuously, for childbearing offers a parent 
“universal confirmation of” her “standing as an adult and […] accrual of social capital in 
the only future’s market [sic] that ever really counts,” i.e., children.4  Through her 
offspring, a parent stakes a claim in the future.  She reproduces herself.   
Edelman counsels that, in view of the “all-pervasive, self-congratulatory, and 
strategically misrecognized” narcissism inherent in pronatalism, queer people should 
embrace the “wholesale rupturing of the social fabric” that conservative thinkers attach to 
the sterility of queerness.5  To do otherwise—by, say, taking up Larry Kramer’s call to 
desexualize gay identity; or by, like Dan Savage, constantly extolling the virtues of 
parenting—empties queerness of its power to challenge “compulsory reproduction” and 
the fascistic rhetoric of compassion for the child.6  
 Heather Love builds on Edelman’s work.  In Feeling Backward:  Loss and the 
Politics of Queer History (2007), Love “traces a tradition of backwardness in queer 
representation and experience,” focusing on “disconnection, loss, and the refusal of 
                                                
3 Lee Edelman, No Future:  Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC:  Duke University 
Press, 2004), 12, 2-3, 47, 143. 
4 Edelman, 156-157n. 
5 Edelman, 13, 14. 
6 Edelman, 40, 47, 75, 157n. 
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community” in queer Anglo-American modernist literature (Walter Pater, Willa Cather, 
Radclyffe Hall, and Sylvia Townsend Warner).7  She does so because, she argues, 
“histories in queer representation” and “writing about queer politics” have not 
“adequately addressed” such “bad,” backward feelings.8  Love concludes the book by 
propounding a politics of queer negativity based on the closeted, antisocial, lonely, 
grieving “figures” of “damaged or refused agency” she has read.  Where Edelman wants 
no future, Love wants a backward future.  “I am interested,” she writes, “in trying to 
imagine a future apart from the reproductive imperative, optimism, and the promise of 
redemption.”9  Love wants a politics roomy enough—a future backward enough—for 
people wary of progress who refuse to ignore or make good on feelings like “rage, self-
hatred, shame, despair, and apathy.”10   
In an earlier version of her chapter on queer historiography—presented at a 
landmark conference on gay shame at the University of Michigan in 2003—Love 
explains that she avoids the impulse to rewrite the queer past in positive terms because, 
by overlooking the ways that figures from the past resist our rescue, such revisions 
collude in the shaming of gay shame.  In other words, the shame of having a shameful 
lineage forms part of a larger range of bad feelings that, according to the bluster of gay 
pride, queers should not feel; but bad feelings make us want social change, so we ought 
to pay attention to them.11 
 
                                                
7 Heather Love, Feeling Backward:  Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 2007), 146. 
8 Love, 160. 
9 Love, 147. 
10 Love, 151.  See also 163.  
11 Heather Love, “Emotional Rescue,” in Gay Shame, ed. David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 256-258, 263.  
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II.  QUEER THEORY & SELF-SOVEREIGNTY 
Edelman’s and Love’s compelling arguments against liberal humanist conformity 
notwithstanding, their work exemplifies the problems of what Jean Bethke Elshtain calls 
“radical self-sovereignty.”12  To reveal the self-sovereignty of queer theory’s antisocial 
turn, I will first present, without commentary, Elshtain’s account of self-sovereignty.  (It 
is not my purpose here to assess, for example, whether or not her claims about the soft 
self-sovereignty of feminist theology hold.)  I will then show (a) how Elshtain provides a 
helpful vocabulary for critiquing queer theory, but (b) how that vocabulary needs 
reworking if queer theorists and their allies are to use it profitably. 
 
The Sovereign Self (Excarnation) 
Elshtain defines “self-sovereignty” in relation to divine- and state-sovereignty.  
Just as the sovereign God is singular and voluntaristic (in contrast to the plural, dialogic, 
loving God of the trinity); and just as the sovereign state is characterized by complete 
self-determination; so, too, the sovereign self is independent and voluntaristic.13  A 
sovereign self is a mini-sovereign state clashing with other mini-states, a demi-god for 
whom “the sovereign God stands as a provocation:  man must himself become a God 
against the Creator God in order to strip himself of any indebtedness, whether to Creator 
or other persons.”14  Sovereign selves eschew vulnerability and reciprocity.15  (The 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum, currently Elshtain’s colleague in the Divinity School at 
the University of Chicago, famously takes up a similar theme.  In two books on the role 
                                                
12 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 219. 
13 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 159. 
14 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 160. 
15 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 162, 164. 
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of disgust in legal judgments, Nussbaum argues that misogyny and homophobia rely on 
macho constructions of the straight male body as impermeable and not subject to 
influence or reciprocity.)16 
For Elshtain, examples of the push for self-sovereignty in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries include eugenicist policies that aim to eradicate vulnerability.  In 
addition to the obvious example of Nazi bio-politics, Elshtain points to the more recent 
examples of (1) Peter Singer, who supports infanticide and euthanasia of persons with 
disabilities; and (2) arguments for abortion based on “value theory,” which impute value 
to life using the “cost-benefit calculus” of “neoclassical market economics” and thus have 
“implications […] concerning the ill and the infirm.”17  Beyond eradicating bodily 
weakness, self-sovereignty also eradicates the vulnerability of relationship—to the past, 
refusing “to acknowledge our indebtedness” and breaking “the links between 
generations”;18 to the present, ignoring our dependence on others, “family, friends, and, 
yes, strangers”;19 and to the future, not taking “generations to come” into account.20 
Self-sovereignty usually involves a rationalist move that Charles Taylor calls 
“excarnation.”21  In A Secular Age (2007), Taylor deems “excarnational” any theory or 
practice that de-centers the role of the body in knowing “something higher” (e.g., God) or 
                                                
16 See Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004); and From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  See also Nussbaum’s earlier treatment of the Phaedrus, where Plato promotes the 
mania and risk of eros as a crucial source of insight for philosophers, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and 
Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 200-233. 
17 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 215. 
18 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 224, 225. 
19 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 166. 
20 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 224. 
21 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 174, 232. 
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in making ethical choices.22  Taylor sees excarnation as the central feature of “[m]odern 
enlightened culture”: 
We tend to live in our heads, trusting our disengaged understandings:  of 
experience, of beauty (we can’t really accept that it’s telling us anything, 
unless about our own feelings); even the ethical:  we think that the only 
valid form of ethical self-direction is through rational maxims or 
understanding.  We can’t accept that part of being good is opening 
ourselves to certain feelings; either the horror at infanticide, or agape as a 
gut feeling.23 
 
Embodied feeling is no longer a medium in which we relate to what we 
recognize as rightly bearing an aura of the higher; either we do recognize 
something like this, and we see reason as our unique access to it; or we 
tend to reject this kind of higher [sic] altogether, reducing it through 
naturalistic explanation.24 
 
Sovereign selves often employ just such a disembodying anthropology, privileging pure 
thought over love and pure self over relationship.25  Taylor identifies the embodied 
spiritual practices of yoga, cenobitic life, and art as ways of resisting excarnation (more 
on the last item later).26   
Elshtain divides self-sovereignty into two types—hard and soft—that she 
illustrates with examples from feminism.  On the one hand, Elshtain decries the 
nineteenth-century American Suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the twentieth-
century existentialist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir as hard self-sovereigns.  Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton held the classist, racialist belief that women manual laborers and the 
“unlettered and unwashed” should remain disenfranchised.27  She took an excarnational 
view of personhood, viewing family relationships as “incidental,” not fundamental to a 
                                                
22 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2007), 288. 
23 Taylor, 555. 
24 Taylor, 288. 
25 Elshtain, 174. 
26 Taylor, 613. 
27 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 183. 
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definition of the self.28  An even more excarnational thinker than Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
Simone de Beauvoir regarded the female body as lacking the “integrity” and 
“significance” of the male body.  She therefore argued that women ought to try to free 
themselves from the “tyranny” of their biology by, for example, having their breasts 
removed.29  Elshtain reads Stanton as a hard self-sovereign insofar as Stanton 
“disenthrall[s]” and “disencumber[s]” the self from the claims that other people (family, 
friends) might make on its freedom.  Elshtain reads Beauvoir as a hard self-sovereign 
because Beauvoir reaches for autonomy by erasing biological femaleness.   
On the other hand, Elshtain criticizes the soft self-sovereignty of feminist 
theology.  According to her reading, feminist theology replaces the reductionist view of 
God as male with an equally reductionist view of God as female.  Instead of finding God 
“in the concreteness of [the] traditional Christian story that starts with a baby, a male 
baby, born in a manger,”30 feminist theologians find God “at the altar of the self,” since 
“God as ‘she’ is a direct mapping of the self onto God.”31  Elshtain also takes feminist 
theology to task for rejecting Christian askesis on the grounds that it oppresses women, 
who have “historically” been “forced to self-relinquishment.”32  Elshtain considers 
feminist theology an example of soft self-sovereignty because—again, according to her 
reading—it exalts the self not by reaching for autonomy but by divinizing a humanity 
stripped of the presence of threatening differences.33  And in doing so, it discourages 
men’s performance of masculinity in one of two ways.  Either it “sees the female as 
                                                
28 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 184. 
29 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 187. 
30 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 219. 
31 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 218. 
32 Elsthain, Sovereignty, 219.  
33 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 218. 
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eventually triumphing.”  Or it “calls for resocializing away from gendered categories,”34 
embracing a utopian androgyny.  Note how Elshtain’s taxonomy of self-sovereignty 
invokes a stereotypically binary view of masculinity and feminity:  Beauvoir’s 
masculinizing self-sovereignty is hard; feminist theology’s de-masculinizing self-
sovereignty is soft. 
 
The Responsible Self (Incarnation) 
As an alternative to the sovereign self, Elshtain propounds “the responsible self,” 
variously called “sovereignty with limits” or “sovereignty as responsibility.”35  Unlike the 
sovereign self, the responsible self grows in the context of affective bonds.36  The 
responsible self prioritizes love over pure Cartesian thought.37  Reciprocity and 
vulnerability, rather than independence and voluntarism, characterize “sovereignty as 
responsibility.”  A responsible self aspires neither to the autonomy of hard self-
sovereignty nor to soft self-sovereignty’s subsuming of people into a fascistic stew of 
sameness.38  Responsible selves eschew abstraction.  They listen to history;39 they worry 
about futurity;40 and they honor the irreducibility of the human person.41 
Elshtain’s alternative to hard and soft self-sovereignty—to “pridefulness” and 
triumphalism, on the one hand, and “inappropriate self-loss” and abjection, on the 
other—accounts poignantly for the most vulnerable people among us:  a polity that 
equates selfhood with sovereignty makes no room for “persons who cannot reason 
                                                
34 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 219.  
35 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 228. 
36 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 229. 
37 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 230. 
38 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 236. 
39 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 224. 
40 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 226. 
41 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 237. 
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because of inborn mental incapacities.”42  But her proposal of freedom with limits 
overlooks the plight of neurotypical people for whom sovereignty remains legally 
precarious (e.g., women and minorities).  The ethical ideal of the responsible self 
becomes possible only when a legal guarantee of sovereignty exists. 
 
A Useful Vocabulary for Critiquing Queer Theory 
So long as we qualify Elshtain’s insights about “self-sovereignty,” “the 
responsible self,” and “excarnation” with the caveat that an ethical ideal of responsibility 
depends on a legal guarantee of sovereignty, they provide a helpful vocabulary for sorting 
out the problems with queer theory’s antisocial, anti-future, anti-redemptive turn.  To put 
the matter briefly, Lee Edelman and Heather Love promote a collectivist “politics of 
refusal,”43 an embrace of negativity and death that exhibits the telltale signs of soft self-
sovereignty:  ressentiment, the expressivist primacy of feeling, triumph through abjection 
rather than positive transformation.44  Their work contains many admirable features.  For 
example, as we saw above, they offer powerful critiques of the conformist pieties of gay 
pride.  Yet for all that Edelman and Love offer to admire, they insist on a very narrow 
range of possibilities for critiquing heterosexism:  unless queers abdicate responsibility to 
the body politic—with its reproductive imperative and its demand for good feelings and 
narratives of rescue—queer resistance can do no better than perpetuate 
heteronormativity’s terms.  
Hence Lee Edelman’s slogan, No Future.  Provocatively celebrating queerness as 
a refusal to aspire to a future, let alone believe in a redemptive one, Edelman deliberately 
                                                
42 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 227, 230. 
43 Love, 146. 
44 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 172-173, 204-205, 218. 
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and programmatically makes what Elshtain would call an “abject surrender” to the death 
drive.45  Nowhere does Edelman’s defiant embrace of negativity become clearer than in 
the sharply divergent ways that Edelman (2004) and Elshtain (2008) read a text that they 
both happen to cite:  P. D. James’s dystopian novel Children of Men (1992), a depiction 
of mass infertility. 
Edelman calls attention to the novel’s sexual polemic.  No child has been born for 
26 years.  The protagonist laments that “sex totally divorced from procreation has 
become almost meaninglessly acrobatic.”  Edelman rejects this “pro-procreative 
ideology” as self-absorbed and “sentimental.”46  According to Edelman, civil society 
fetishizes children, the emblem of futurity, because they give meaning to social reality.  
The fetishization of children takes heterosexist form insofar as “the biological fact of 
heterosexual procreation bestows the imprimatur of meaning-production on heterogenital 
relations.”47  Queer sex destroys meaning and undoes “social organization, collective 
reality, and, inevitably, life itself.”  (If the reader finds Edelman’s views of the potential 
of queer sex to break with meaning-production somewhat romanticized, Edelman has a 
response:  queerness has come to mean nothing for the political left—“nothing,” that is, 
“more than a sexual practice in need of demystification.”)48  Why do children—and, by 
extension, procreative sexuality—give meaning to social reality?  In light of what 
Elshtain has to say about sovereignty and responsibility, Edelman’s answer looks 
counterintuitive.  We fetishize children, he says, because they hold “the promise of a 
                                                
45 Elshtain, 236. 
46 Edelman, 12, 113.  
47 Edelman, 13. 
48 Edelman, 28.  
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natural transcendence of the limits of nature itself.”49  We bypass our own mortality 
through our children.  It is as if Edelman proleptically turns Elshtain’s notion of radical 
self-sovereignty on its head:  not technologies that free us from the tyranny of our 
biology, but rather good old-fashioned vanilla childbearing itself represents the real 
dream of self-transcendence.   
Elshtain reads the novel less critically, saying nothing about its depiction of sex 
but calling attention to the disintegration of interpersonal relationships: 
People are despondent, chagrined, violent […]  People disown 
commitments and responsibilities to, and for, one another except for 
whatever serves some immediate purpose—what I want—by contrast to 
anything that is given.  […]  religion, except for a cult of state worship, is 
forbidden.  People thought they had eliminated evil […] and all the 
churches in the 1990s moved from “a theology of sin and redemption” to a 
“sentimental humanism.”  In the name of compassion, the elderly, no 
longer needed or wanted, are conducted to a state-sponsored ceremony of 
group suicide called the Quietus.  [The protagonist] concludes that we are 
diminished, we humans, if we live without knowledge of the past and 
without hope for the future.  The old prayer, that I may see my children’s 
children and peace upon Israel, is no more, and without the possibility of 
that prayer and the delicate entanglement of our lives with such fructifying 
possibilities, the world ceases to be.50 
 
Notice that Elshtain, like Edelman, uses the word “sentimental”—only for her, the lack of 
futurity’s “fructifying possibilities” leads to sentimentalism.  And if we reread Edelman’s 
take on Children of Men through the lens of Elshtain’s, what he labels narcissism starts to 
look more like charity.  We need “hope for the future” not because it produces copies of 
us (children) but because, without a story larger than ourselves (call it a “secular 
theology”),51 we become self-serving.   
                                                
49 Edelman, 12.  
50 Elshtain, 225-226. 
51 Edelman, 12. 
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Edelman rejects James’s heterosexism with good reason (an issue I will take up in 
Elshtain momentarily).  But, as Leo Bersani puts it in a blurb on the back of Edelman’s 
book, “we could perhaps reproach him […] for not spelling out the mode in which we 
might survive our necessary assent to his argument.”  Or, to recast Bersani’s tongue-in-
cheek jibe in a serious way, Edelman refuses to imagine a future-oriented queer politics 
that transforms the social without merely reproducing “the familiar forms of a durable 
liberal humanism.”52  He refuses to imagine life-affirming queer critiques like Auden’s 
“New Year Letter,” where, as we saw in chapter two, the periphery remakes the center 
rather than blending into it.53 
Heather Love’s “politics of the past” seems to make more hopeful and 
constructive moves than Edelman’s uncompromising negativity, giving “the politics of 
gay pride” a much-needed corrective.54  Love examines the bad feelings in nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century queer self-representations—“nostalgia,” “regret,” and 
“bitterness”55 as well as “shyness,” “heartbreak,” “despair,” and “shame.”56  Stories of 
past queer suffering offer “relief” from the pressures of pride-rhetoric, according to 
which gays and lesbians “have no excuse for feeling bad.”57  Such stories also equip us to 
see the persistence of homophobic structures in the present, preventing criticism and 
politics from devolving into unwarranted optimism.  And by refusing to tame the sad 
queer past into conformity with our own notions of progress, we allow it to challenge the 
ways that mainstream gay politics excludes people.  Love thus establishes a connection 
                                                
52 Edelman, 105-106. 
53 For an excellent reading of Edelman along these lines, see R. Benjamin Bateman, “The Future 
of Queer Theory,” Minnesota Review 65/66 (Fall 2006): 171-175. 
54 Love, 21, 147. 
55 Love, 4.  
56 Love, 146.  
57 Love, 146.  
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between our willingness to let the past say something to us on its own terms and our 
ability to see “the call of gay normalization” as a call to break ties with “the most 
vulnerable” and “the least presentable,”58 i.e., “the nonwhite and the nonmonogamous, 
the poor and the genderdeviant, the fat, the disabled, the unemployed, the infected, and a 
host of unmentionable others.”59  Listening to the past helps us resist that call. 
Yet Feeling Backward ultimately downplays the idea that queers need to pay 
attention to our shame because it reveals the gap between what we hope for and what we 
actually have.  Instead, the book calls the very practice of hope, the very goal of 
transformation, into question.  Love argues that, just as the politics of gay pride pressures 
people to ignore their bad feelings, so queer studies pressures scholars “to make use of 
bad feelings.”60  But putting bad feelings to good political use—even if we define “good” 
as “antihomophobic” rather than, say, “anti-shame”—worries Love for a couple of 
reasons:  (1) it forces us to ignore or distort the past, and (2) it pathologizes people with 
an attachment to solitary queer pleasure, i.e., those who refuse queer togetherness, and 
who, consequently, never see their subjectivity adequately accounted for in queer 
politics.61  Not unlike Edelman, then, Heather Love surrenders abjectly as she advocates a 
“collective movement” of “isolates”—like the self-hating, antisocial, closeted, grieving 
queer writers on whom she centers her book—who refuse to make something positive out 
of queer pain.62   
                                                
58 Love, 30.  
59 Love, 10.  
60 Love, 151.  See also 18. 
61 Love, 19, 147.  
62 Love, 147. 
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I do not mean to rule out abjection as a possible starting-point for any ethic of 
responsibility.  On the contrary, there exist many exquisitely ethical accounts of 
abjection, like David Halperin’s reading of Jean Genet: 
It is less a matter of triumphing over your adversaries than a process of 
making yourself unfindable by those who would destroy you—through 
discovering in the very act of surrender and abasement the erotic and 
spiritual means of your own transformation and transfiguration. 
 That is how abjection works, or how it is imagined to work, 
according to Genet.  That is how it produces in social pariahs an inverse 
saintliness.63 
 
Halperin’s account treats abjection as a visible aesthetic practice that people devise in 
response to social trauma, rather than an invisible psychological symptom that inheres in 
an individual.  In other words, rather than a state of damage or wounding or ruin, 
abjection is a creative resistance to straight culture’s  
unshakeable faith in the efficacy of its own power to persecute, its 
conviction that its victims really are destroyed when it tries to destroy 
them, and that our occasional ability to slip through the web of those 
inflictions—by finding a source of exaltation and personal transfiguration 
in an oblique relation to the very suffering that they would cause us—is 
not a creative response to social violence, is not a testimony to the power 
of queer fantasy, is not a possible basis for queer solidarity, but just 
another sign that there is something deeply wrong with us.64 
 
Abjection qua creative resistance could provide another way of summarizing my readings 
of W. H. Auden so far:  in “Atlantis” (1941), the closet becomes a place of prophetic 
revelation when, having to pass among straight people, a gay seeker acquires the ability 
to inhabit other people’s subject positions, thus learning how to think more clearly about 
what a just society might look like (see the introductory chapter above).  And the 
construction of homosexuality as an enabling disability in “New Year Letter” (1941) 
                                                
63 David M. Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want? An Essay on Sex, Risk, and Subjectivity (Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2007), 76. 
64 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 78. 
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subverts the Freudian diagnosis of homosexuality as narcissism, emphasizing the 
intellectual, spiritual, and artistic fecundity of gay relationships; moreover, the poem 
depicts sexual outlaws as escaping the bourgeois-ification of affect that happens to most 
people under liberalism (see chapter two above).   
Auden’s later poetry emphatically does not shy away from the darker aspects, the 
drearier affects, of queer life:  shame (as we saw in chapter two), loneliness (as we saw in 
chapter three).  His poems insist neither on papering over nor on removing those affects.  
But his later oeuvre does insist that the loneliness and shame of queer life provide exactly 
the right circumstance in which to take up the ever-urgent, endless project of remaking 
“soiled productive cities” into “the Just City” (CP 541, DM 65).  Which is to say, Auden 
takes up that project neither by transmuting shame into pride, nor by eradicating 
loneliness, but by loving the polis of his alien and alienated friends in public (DM 48, 
50).  In other words, Auden takes up the project of remaking the social center by writing 
about the kinds of prophetic, redemptive socialities that, for him, the bad feelings of life 
on the periphery produce: coteries, Hominterns, bar-copains, suburbs of dissent, green 
worlds and great good places.  
But Love’s account of abjection—which focuses on “damaged” and “ruined” 
subjectivity and demurs at the “alchemizing” of “queer suffering” that words like 
“exaltation” and “transfiguration” imply—comes across as little more than quietism by a 
fancier name.65  She never imagines a backward-feeling albeit forward-thinking queer 
politics without liberal-humanist conformity, maintaining instead a vision as narrow as 
Edelman’s:  activism that “consists in evasion, latency, refusal, and in turning [the 
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Marxist critic Wendy] Brown’s injunction [to hope for a better future] back on itself.”66  
Love’s commitment to self-sovereignty via self-loss—coming from an American literary 
critic at a time when gay marriage remains illegal in most of the United States and 
homophobic bullying continues to drive American teenagers to suicide—looks as 
irresponsible as Elshtain’s waxing about responsibility when female autonomy remains 
precarious.   
 
A Framework with a Heterosexist Bias 
 We have just seen how Elshtain’s work on the sovereign self provides a helpful 
vocabulary for thinking through the problems with queer theory’s rejection of political 
narratives of futurity and redemption.  A careful reading of Elshtain, though, shows that 
her critique of hard and soft self-sovereignty comes at too great a cost for queer scholars 
and their allies:  she takes a complementarian view of gender; she makes a 
heteronormative link between sexuality and procreativity; and she prizes received 
relational forms above the invention of new ones.  Destabilizing gender, de-linking 
sexuality and procreativity, and inventing new relational forms are, for her, excarnational 
practices. 
 That Elshtain takes a complementarian view of gender becomes clear in her 
discussion of soft self-sovereignty.  A complementarian view of gender regards the 
division between male and female roles as important; it may or may not take an 
essentialist view of maleness and femaleness.67  While Elshtain does not subscribe to 
                                                
66 Love, 152. 
67 By which I mean that some versions of complementarianism try to pin down essential biological 
differences between men and women, while others do not. 
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draconian gender essentialism,68 she does maintain the importance of gender division.  
She attacks projects that erase “the basic difference […] between males and females” or 
that “resocializ[e] away from gendered categories.”  For her, such projects represent “the 
temptations of self-sovereignty.”69  Elshtain thus disregards a key contribution to queer 
thought:  namely, the politics of gender performativity, i.e., the insight that acts of 
masculinity and femininity constitute rather than express gender, so Elshtain is wrong to 
treat these categories as naturally given.70 
 That Elshtain makes a heteronormative link between sexuality and procreativity—
rejecting theories and practices that “eliminat[e] any biological need for sex to be 
associated with procreation”71—poses a problem for queer sexualities and queer families.  
Elshtain calls the possibility of one woman’s artificially inseminating another “a dream of 
radical self-transcendence.”  The possibility bothers Elsthain because, citing the feminist 
theorist Alison Jaggar, she imagines women using such technology “to increase [their] 
control over their bodies, and thus over their lives.”72  As I suggested above, though, an 
ethical ideal of reciprocity depends on a legal guarantee of autonomy.  Calling Jaggar’s 
vision “a dream of radical self-transcendence” comes across as irresponsible when such a 
legal guarantee for women remains precarious.  At any rate, Elshtain neglects the 
pertinent, real-world example of lesbian couples who choose artificial insemination as a 
                                                
68 Elshtain dismisses “the silliness about men being from Mars and women from Venus,” 
Sovereignty, 253n. 
69 Elshtain, 219. 
70 Cf. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble:  Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York:  
Routledge, 1990); and Bodies That Matter:  On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York:  Routledge, 
1993).  In other words, a stable, coherent male or female identity does not lie beneath a given person’s 
aggregate of masculine or feminine performances.   Rather, gender is culturally constructed through the 
repetition of performances that, by virtue of the citationality of gender discourse, come to signify a 
seemingly essential, ontologically coherent identity category. 
71 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 219. 
72 Quoted in Elshtain, Sovereignty, 213. 
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way of expressing their love in new life.  A queer Christian account of such families 
would see artificial insemination and sperm donation as gifts of grace.  It would see such 
open, creative love as a reflection of the Creator God.  It would point to the many babies 
in the bible whom the world said should not exist, whose lives required supernatural 
intervention:  Moses, John the Baptist, and Jesus, to name a few.73 
Elshtain’s elision of gay parenting smacks of a heterosexist bias when we 
consider it in light of the fact that she prizes received relational forms above the invention 
of new ones.  For Elshtain, pace Augustine, family life—a given institution, i.e., a form 
of relationship that we inhabit rather than invent—contributes to the right functioning of 
society.  Intimate bonds undergird society as a whole:  “there is a flow between the 
concrete beginnings of the household and that more vast arena, the mundus or world.  
Each layer of relational identity contributes to the ordering or disordering of the whole.” 
Elshtain asserts that given bonds do so better than chosen ones when she goes on to 
define “concrete”:  “This is more than a sentiment or an abstraction about something.  
Concrete means embodiment in some institutional or relational form that has some 
sturdiness and capacity for perdurance.”74  Elshtain thus discredits the ethical value of 
queerness, which (as we have seen in the previous chapters) seeks to canonize or ritualize 
new forms of relationality, i.e., to make relationships outside of existing institutions and 
find new ways of formalizing them.75 
                                                
73 I am indebted to Casey Pick, the Programs Director of the Log Cabin Republicans, for these 
insights about artificial insemination. 
74 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 240. 
75 See two key interviews with Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life” and “The Social 
Triumph of the Sexual Will,” in The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. I: Ethics. Subjectivity 
and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York:  The New Press, 1997), 135-140, 157-162. 
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 Must we conclude, then, that Elshtain’s framework necessarily condemns all 
queer projects as excarnational?  Or could we use her framework to construct an 
incarnational queer theory?  Elshtain cites Dietrich Bonhoeffer as an example of what 
navigating the Scylla and Charybis of hard and soft sovereign selves looks like:  rejecting 
Nazi bio-politics, which based its “dream” of bodily “perfection” on the “Urwille” of the 
German “Volk,” “Bonhoeffer steers a course between radical transcendence over the 
‘natural’ and complete submission within a collective view of nature—the two routes 
traveled by sovereign selves.”76  What might such a middle road look like for self-
identified queers? 
The related question of what such a middle road might look like for women also 
deserves careful thought, since Elshtain finds examples of hard and soft self-sovereignty 
in feminism.  Elshtain concedes that feminist theology’s grounds for rejecting Christian 
askesis have some truth; otherwise feminist theology “would lack any evocative power 
whatsoever.  The problem appears when this view is magnified and absolutized out of 
proportion.”77  But her concession raises the question of what a proportionate, non-
magnified, non-absolutized critique of female oppression would look like.  The last 
chapter of her earlier book Public Man, Private Woman (1981) gives an indication of 
what Elshtain thinks a middle road for feminist political theory might look like.  In short, 
it would recognize the crucial role of family life in producing responsible, ethically 
engaged citizens; at the same time, it would call received ideas about what constitutes 
family (e.g., that the husband must be the primary wage-earner) into question.78  The 
                                                
76 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 220, 221, 222. 
77 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 219. 
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problem for our purposes is that, for Elshtain, some received ideas about family remain 
immune to critique:  namely, that two people of the same gender ought not parent a 
family together.   
Elshtain merely implies her opposition to same-sex parenting in Sovereignty (as 
the above example of two women conceiving a child together suggests).  Elsewhere she 
explicitly opposes it.  In her short polemic “Against Gay Marriage” (1991), Elshtain 
argues that the intergenerational sociality of heterosexual family life is more valuable to 
the body politic than “homosexual unions.”  For her, the latter are “by definition 
childless,”79 and trying to make them otherwise through reproductive technology “is 
antiregenerative, linked as it is to a refusal to accept any natural limits.”80  More recently, 
Elshtain co-edited a volume of essays opposing the legalization of gay marriage (2006).81  
Given the promise that Elshtain’s work shows for clarifying the problems of the 
anti-redemptive, anti-future, antisocial trends in queer theory, but given also the 
heterosexist bias in Elshtain’s critique of projects that rely on some version of a hard or 
soft sovereign self, I will now turn my attention to exploring what an incarnational queer 
theory of the responsible self could look like.  And just as Elshtain finds modern 
incarnationality in “[o]ur incarnational writers,” e.g., “the poet Czeslaw Milosz and the 
                                                
79 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Against Gay Marriage,” in Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con, ed. 
Andrew Sullivan (Westminster, MD: Knopf, 2004), 59.  The piece originally appeared in the 22 October 
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novelist Marilynne Robinson,”82 so, too, I will locate the kernel of a queer 
incarnationality in the later poetry of W. H. Auden. 
 
 
III.  A RESPONSIBLE QUEER 
“A responsible queer” sounds like an oxymoron, a capitulation to liberal norms 
dressed in drag.  After all, “responsibility” is a grown-up word, evoking things that 
generally fall outside of queer life:  marriage, family, childrearing.  As Judith Halberstam 
suggests, queerness means “the refusal of adulthood.”83  Nevertheless, Auden’s post-
emigration, post-conversion oeuvre provides an especially helpful place to begin thinking 
about what queer responsibility might mean, for from 1939 on the key question that 
preoccupied Auden was how to make meaningful community in a post-roots world—in 
other words, how to navigate the treacherous ethical waters of industrial modernity 
without careening into the Scylla and Charybdis of hard and soft self-sovereignty.  
During his conversion and his first years as a Christian, Auden gravitated toward 
the work of Kierkegaard and Tillich, Protestant Christian existentialists who conceive of 
the person as a soul utterly alone before God.  And Auden’s book reviews and lectures 
from the late 1930s and early 1940s repeatedly emphasize the fundamental aloneness of 
the modern subject.  In a cosmopolitan world without class traditions, he writes, “[t]he 
individual who desires maturity must go on alone,” defining maturity for himself (Prose 
                                                
82 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 234. 
83 Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place:  Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New 
York:  New York University Press, 2005), 147.  Similarly, David Caron describes queer group friendship 
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they serve no purpose other than themselves and go nowhere in particular,” My Father & I: The Marais 
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ii 19).  Auden goes so far as to say that democracy depends on each citizen’s recognition 
of her aloneness.  He illustrates the point with a rather dehumanizing analogy from 
Kierkegaard:  “So many people try to forget their aloneness, and break their heads and 
hearts against it.  To use a simile of Kierkegaard’s, ‘Only those who accept their 
aloneness can be substantives or verbs:  those who reject it remain merely adjectives, 
conjunctions, adverbs’” (Prose ii 70-71).  The implication is that relational selves, like 
attributive or connective words, lack the subjective agency of verb-like sovereign selves.  
Auden gives poetic form to the point in “New Year Letter” (1941), where he writes that 
“[a]loneness is man’s real condition, / […] each must travel forth alone / In search of the 
Essential Stone” (DM 65-66).  Auden even chides the theology of the Protestant Christian 
pragmatist Reinhold Niebuhr for failing to give a person “the sense[,] as Kierkegaard puts 
it, of always being out alone over seventy thousand fathoms” (Prose ii 109).  Which is 
not to say that Auden espoused self-sovereignty, plainly and simply.  Rather, as we saw 
in chapter two, “New Year Letter” laments the birth of the self-interested “Empiric 
Economic Man” (DM 55), holding up the queer coterie as a resource for an alternative 
model of the self, one that balances autonomy and reciprocity. 
When he first made his way back to the church, Auden also subscribed to a 
dualistic view of the body—which is to say that his anthropology divided the person into 
mind and body (or flesh and spirit), holding the mind (or spirit) in higher regard.  In his 
writing he frequently committed what “In Sickness and in Health” (1941) calls “[t]hat sin 
of the high-minded, sublimation” (SP 122).  Auden’s dualistic anthropology is evident in 
the very title of his first American book:  The Double Man (1941).  It is even clearer in 
The Prolific and the Devourer (1939)—a posthumously published, Pensées-like notebook 
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of spiritual musings that Auden assembled just before beginning to write “New Year 
Letter”—where Auden writes that “if we have a toothache, we seem to be two people, the 
suffering ‘I’ and the hostile outer world of the tooth.  His penis never fully belongs to a 
man” (Prose ii 411).  Accordingly, Auden looked for salvation in grand abstract theories 
rather than in the body or embodied relationships.  Such body-repudiating dualism is, as 
Elshtain has shown, endemic to modern hard self-sovereignty.  Arthur Kirsch attributes 
Auden’s dualistic take on embodiment to his discomfort with his own clumsy, short-
sighted, grubby body.84 
But a few years after Auden returned to the church, his views on aloneness and 
embodiment changed decisively.  From 1943-1949, references to “neighbor” and 
neighbor-love begin to appear in Auden’s prose with frequency (Prose ii 186, 230, 263, 
302, 314, 359, 379); references to the subject’s fundamental aloneness disappear.  Auden 
came to regard the existentialist philosophy exemplified by Kierkegaard as “a danger” 
because, as he reflected in an interview near the end of his life, “it’s a form of 
Gnosticism.  It doesn’t pay proper attention to the body.”85  Auden began to see salvation 
in the body and in sacrament.  His poetic discussions of the body became more positive, 
framed explicitly in terms of Christian orthodoxy’s body-affirming doctrines of 
incarnation and resurrection:  For the Time Being (1944) proclaims that because Jesus 
incarnates God and unites “Word” and “Flesh” (CP 389), we find God in, and worship 
God by loving, “the World of the Flesh” (CP 400);86 “In Praise of Limestone” (1948) 
                                                
84 Arthur Kirsch, Auden and Christianity (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 2005), 29. 
85 Quoted in Edward Mendelson, Later Auden (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), 277. 
86 In other words, sexual love is a way of worshipping God. 
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associates faith in the resurrection of the body with the anti-imperialist culture of 
unabashed physical pleasure on the island of Ischia.87 
To imagine the shape that an incarnational queer account of sovereignty with 
limits might take, I will look at two lyrics in Auden’s later oeuvre that resist excarnation:  
“Tonight at Seven-Thirty” (1963) and “For Friends Only (1964), two sections of the 
sequence “Thanksgiving for a Habitat” (1965), a paean to the farmhouse in Kirchstetten 
where Auden summered with his erstwhile lover Chester Kallman from 1958 until 
Auden’s death in 1973.  The construction of friendship as flexible and porous in both 
lyrics challenges the heterosexist bias in Elshtain’s account of the responsible self. 
“Tonight at Seven-Thirty” (an ode to dinner parties) and “For Friends Only” (an 
ode to the guest bedroom of Auden’s farmhouse) explain why prioritizing friendship 
constitutes a queer way of life.  Where spouses and family members dwell in relational 
forms that precede individual choice, friendships necessarily take place outside the 
obligations that structure heterosexuality.  The elective nature of friendship makes it 
fragile; at the same time, Auden suggests, working at elective friendship equips people to 
resist stagnant ideas (e.g., tribalism, nationalism) in a way that the institutions of 
marriage and family (almost by definition) cannot.   
As we learned in the previous chapters, the mode of extra-institutional 
relationship that most interested Auden was the coterie, or a close-knit circle of artistic 
and intellectual exchange.  Lytle Shaw has shown that, for Frank O’Hara, a New York 
School disciple of Auden, “coterie” afforded a way “to recode kinship structures.”88  The 
                                                
87 For more on the body-affirming Christian orthodoxy of “In Praise of Limestone,” see chapter 
one above. 




“appropriated, superimposed, chosen, and contingent principles” of “coterie” as a form of 
cultural transmission subvert the hereditary and heteronormative principles of “the 
organic family.”89  It follows, then, that “[c]oterie […] is as much an idea about the social 
possibilities of affinity as it is a concrete sociological fact.”90  The coterie provided a 
similar oppositional tool for Auden.  Many of his most significant poems wrestle with or 
extol “coterie” as a queer way of life:  “A Summer Night” (1933) worries that the 
contented complacency of coteries restricts social change; The Age of Anxiety (1947) 
rewrites “A Summer Night” to affirm the oppositional possibilities of friendship even 
among virtual strangers in a bar; in “New Year Letter” (1941), a small Long Island group 
of European exiles and sexual outlaws embodies a prophetic critique of fascism and 
nationalism; and the erotically-charged pilgrimage “At the Grave of Henry James” (1941) 
imagines a trans-historical coterie, a queer communion of saints. 
“Thanksgiving for a Habitat” might seem an unlikely place to find an account of 
friendship as queer or of coteries as oppositional.  For one thing, early readers of the 
sequence saw its clearest coterie signal—the personal dedications that Auden affixed to 
each section—as merely exclusionary.91  For another, the sequence teems with dogmatic 
pronouncements about etiquette:  e.g., “to ‘borrow’ stamps / Is a mark of ill-breeding” 
(SP 279) and “[w]e may not be obliged—though it is mannerly—to bless / the Trinity” 
(SP 285).  But gallantry constitutes one queer mode of self-fashioning.92  Moreover, 
                                                
89 Shaw, 37. 
90 Shaw, 6. 
91 For example, John Updike complained that “what with the Kennedys, the Glasses, the Sinatra 
Clan, the friends of Norman Podhoretz, and the Pop-Camp-Hip crowd, there seem enough in-groups in the 
western world without a formal roll-call of Auden's acquaintanceship,” “Untitled Review,” in W.H. Auden:  
The Critical Heritage, ed. John Haffenden (London:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 425. 
92 The relationship between refinement and queerness goes at least as far back as the Decadent 
literary movement in fin-de-siècle England and France.  Some scholars trace it back even further, 
unpacking the homoeroticism of medieval chivalry codes.  See, for example, Richard E. Zeikowitz, 
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almost all of the sequence’s pronouncements about etiquette occur in “Tonight at Seven-
Thirty,” which places limits on the expression of romance and family love precisely 
because it holds friendship in higher regard.  And whether or not the reader knows the 
dedicatees, the dedication of “For Friends Only” to two people with the same last name 
and differently gendered first names gives bite to the poem’s argument about the fragility 
of friendship in a heteronormative world. 
Like much of Auden’s coterie poetry (cf. especially “New Year Letter”), “Tonight 
At Seven-Thirty” celebrates coteries in ecclesial terms:  Auden deems “Christ’s cenacle” 
too big for a modern dinner party (SP 281).  The word “cenacle” can mean either the 
room in which the Last Supper took place or a literary clique; in the context of “Tonight 
at Seven-Thirty,” its two meanings collapse into one aesthetic, spiritual, and queer social 
form.  The embodied, sacramental intimacy of a shared meal teaches the friends to look 
beyond their table, outside their circle: 
For authentic 
    comity the gathering should be small 
and unpublic: 
at mass banquets where flosculent speeches are made 
in some hired hall 
we think of ourselves or nothing. 
 
The word “comity,” though, relates the “unpublic” coterie to the public work of 
internationalism:  “comity” most often appears as part of the diplomatic concept of “the 
comity of nations,” i.e., mutual recognition and mutual benefit.  Auden’s argument 
proceeds concretely and incarnationally:  physical particularity—this house, these 
friends—teaches recognition, courtesy, and cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                            
Homoeroticism and Chivalry:  Discourses of Male Same-sex Desire in the Fourteenth Century (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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“Tonight at Seven-Thirty,” then, shares Elshtain’s Augustinian view of the “flow” 
between household and world, albeit with a crucial difference.  Elshtain (as I have said) 
argues that “[e]ach layer of relational identity contributes to the ordering or disordering 
of the whole” only if the “beginnings” participate in “some institutional or relational form 
that has some sturdiness and capacity for perdurance.”93  Only certain affective bonds 
(“beginnings”) have enough history behind them (“institutional”) to produce good 
citizens (“ordering of the whole”).  With her criteria of “sturdiness” and “capacity for 
perdurance,” Elshtain all but names married life, family life, and monastic life.  Auden, 
by contrast, sees extra- or quasi-institutional relationships as a better conduit for the 
ethical flow between household and world than institutional relationships.  The intimacy 
of the coterie may be elective but it is not exclusive; friendship offers better instruction in 
“comity” than family does, teaching one to enjoy the company of people different from 
oneself.  Hence the poem’s dinner-party etiquette: 
           […] But a dinner party, 
however select, 
is a worldly rite that nicknames or endearments 
or family 
diminutives would profane:  two doters who wish 
to tiddle and curmurr between the soup and fish 
belong in restaurants, all children should be fed 
        earlier and be safely in bed.  (SP 282) 
 
Precisely because it transcends the animal partialities of family life, the coterie will admit 
outsiders:  “pack-hunters do / dine en famille, it is true, / with protocol and placement, but 
none of them play host / to a stranger whom they help first” (SP 281).  Friendship 
enlarges what “For Friends Only” calls “the circle of our affection” (SP 280).  Romance 
and family life shrink it. 
                                                
93 Elshtain, 240. 
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Like “Tonight at Seven-Thirty,” an early manuscript draft of “For Friends Only” 
treats friendship as ethically superior to romance or family love.  Auden included the 
draft on the back of a letter to Thekla Clark, an American expatriate whom he befriended 
while summering in Ischia and to whom he publicly dedicated the poem (along with her 
husband John).  The poem makes its argument through an extended metaphor:    
Though beginners find it easy, the language 
Of friendship is in fact  
Very difficult to speak well, a tongue 
With no cognate resemblance whatever 
To the galimatias of nursery and bedroom, 
Court rhyme or rustic prose. 
 
Its idioms, if used correctly, 
Express as no others could 
What matters, a care for the humane, 
A concern for one another, 
Absent or present, from breakfast meeting until 
We part for the night.94 
 
The conceit of the demanding language of friendship suggests that the cultural models for 
philia are fewer, poorer, less accessible, less accepted than the scripts for eros or official 
panegyric.  But because friendship cannot rely on the scripts that support heterosexual 
life, mastering it goes much farther in equipping the friends to practice neighbor-love (or 
love of the Other) than the experiences of romance or family can.95   
The published version of “For Friends Only” changes the second stanza entirely, 
to much more sober effect: 
                                                
94 Quoted in Thekla Clark, Wystan and Chester:  A Personal Memoir of W. H. Auden and Chester 
Kallman (London:  Faber & Faber, 1995), 105-106. 
95 In her memoir, Thekla Clark remembers a night in Ischia when Auden confessed that he found 
the commandment to “Love thy neighbour” the most difficult one to obey.  “This started a lengthy 
discussion involving tradition, literary sources, and history until I asked, ‘Wystan, just who is your 
neighbour?’  Everyone had an answer to that question, and we had arrived at ‘all humanity’ when Wystan 
answered, ‘Anyone who needs you’” (37).  Cf. Auden’s poem “Like a Vocation” (1939)—titled “Please 
Make Yourself at Home” in CP45—which ends with the image of “[t]he one who needs you,” whose 
“weeping climbs toward your life like a vocation” (CP 255). 
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And, unless often spoken, soon goes rusty. 
Distance and duties divide us, 
But absence will not seem an evil 
If it make our re-meeting  
A real occasion.  Come when you can: 
Your room will be ready.  (SP 280) 
 
The revision makes no overt claims about friendship’s ethical superiority to romantic or 
family love.  Instead of calling attention to what makes friendship special, the gay poet—
who, in a later section of “Thanksgiving for a Habitat,” describes himself as an 
“unwilling celibat[e]” (SP 284)—points out the fragility of friendship to a married 
heterosexual couple.  In the letter to Thekla Clark containing the earlier version of “For 
Friends Only,” Auden writes, “I want your joint permission to dedicate it to you and 
John.”  Asking one member of a straight married couple for their joint permission 
acknowledges the “duties” that “divide” friends.96   
The conditionals of the revised second stanza (“[i]f,” “when you can”) betray an 
attitude of resignation toward the fragility of friendship.  Even the poem’s defiant title 
takes on a quality of pathos in the context of the published version:  a visiting family 
member might just as easily occupy a guest bedroom.  As it rewrites the private gift, the 
publication of “For Friends Only” re-deploys the argument about friendship versus 
family in “Tonight at Seven-Thirty.”  The very “duties” that buoy family life (note the 
accusatory sound of the plosive alliteration) keep Thekla and John away from Wystan 
and Chester, who (so the last two lines of the second stanza imply) can host them at any 
time.  The contrast that the poem makes—between the insularity of Thekla’s and John’s 
marriage and the openness of Wystan’s and Chester’s queer friendship—poses a 
challenge to Elshtain’s equation of sturdy, perdurable, given forms of intimate 
                                                
96 Quoted in Clark, 104.   
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relationship with civic order (not because marriage isn’t perdurable, but because 
insularity isn’t civic). 
 
 
IV.  THE RESPONSIBLE SELF & TRANSGENDER BODY THEOLOGY 
Rereading Auden to flesh out the queer commitments of his Christian poetry not 
only calls Elsthain’s ideas about sexuality and intimacy into question.  It also facilitates 
the construction of a gender-variance-affirming theology of the responsible self—what I 
will call a “trans theology” for short, since my argument focuses on transitioning (i.e., 
changing one’s gender presentation) through hormone replacement and / or sexual 
reassignment surgery.  The body theology of Justin Tanis shows that one can indeed 
reconcile transitioning with Elshtain’s distinction between responsible and sovereign 
modifications of the body.  But, as we will see, such reconciling requires the 
pathologizing of gender variance.  Kate Bornstein’s account of transitioning as an act of 
invention rather than completion avoids the pathologizing of transsexuality, yet, as I will 
show, it remains vulnerable to an Elshtain-like charge of self-sovereignty.   
Auden can help us out of this impasse.  After I explore in detail the ramifications 
of Tanis’s and Bornstein’s quite different accounts of transsexuality for a theological 
ethic of responsibility, I will turn to Auden’s retelling of the New Testament infancy 
narratives.  For the Time Being (1944) facilitates the construction of a trans theology of 
the responsible self by calling into question the reliance of Christian ethics on discourses 
of nature.  The poem suggests that God’s loving act of creation, not our abstractions 
about nature, should ground Christian ethics.  In place of a pathologizing vocabulary of 
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the natural and the unnatural, then, the salient criterion for ethical deliberation becomes 
the Creator / creature distinction.  Auden helps us replace an ethics of so-called natural 
law with an ethics of creation without nature. 
 
Trans/formation 1:  Congruity & Healing 
In her historical study of transsexuality in twentieth-century America, Joanne 
Meyerowitz cautions against treating transsexuals as “symbols of something larger than 
their own everyday selves.”97  In particular, Meyerowitz wants “to avoid investing 
transsexuals of the past—a diverse group of people with a wide array of political views—
with transhistorical symbolic weight.”98  Scholars and activists have turned transsexuals 
into positive and negative symbols alike:  some regard transsexuals as “symbols of 
transgression” and “emblems of liberatory potential”;99 for others, transsexuals merely 
“reinscribe the conservative stereotypes of male and female.”100  But to lump all 
transsexuals and trans-spectrum people together into one symbol mistakenly detaches 
them from their various social contexts—from “the language and cultural forms available 
to them,” through which “they articulated their senses of self.”101  Therefore a trans 
theology of the responsible self should begin by listening to the testimonies of 
transgender people themselves.  Note that such an approach is consistent with Elshtain’s 
desire for a feminist political theory “that incorporate[s] the self-understanding of the 
female subject as an essential feature of its overall logic of explanation.”102   
                                                
97 Meyerowitz,11. 
98 Meyerowitz, 12. 
99 Meyerowitz, 12. 
100 Meyerowitz, 11. 
101 Meyerowitz, 12-13. 
102 Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman, 302. 
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Incorporating the self-understanding of transgender people, a trans theology of the 
responsible self will reject the assumption that transgender experiences necessarily 
involve a Gnostic rejection of the body.  “Rather than simply acting as if the body were 
not important,” writes Justin Tanis, a transgender Christian pastor, “we find our bodies 
and the meanings they convey deeply important.”103  Indeed, Tanis’s theology calls to 
mind Charles Taylor’s rejection of religious practices that downplay the centrality of the 
body to religious knowing:  “The only way we know God,” Tanis insists, “is as embodied 
people.  Through our bodies’ capacities for sight, sound, emotion, thought, intuition, and 
other senses, we are able to experience the divine.  The sacred comes to us through our 
bodies and within our bodies.”104  Unlike excarnational practices that “demean” the 
body,105 transitioning, according to Tanis, necessitates loving the body:  “congruity” of 
“body” and “spirit,” as he puts it, “can come through loving the body enough to change it 
and mold it.”106  Right away a person thinking along Elshtain’s lines might object that, 
even if such changing and molding flows from a loving acknowledgement of the 
importance of the body’s meaning, it nevertheless conflicts with an ethic of 
responsibility, for responsibility involves the surrender of the will.  But Tanis actually 
regards the pursuit of congruity of body and spirit on the part of trans-spectrum folk as a 
divinely mandated calling.  And, as I will show in more detail later, he couches that 
calling in the language of responsibility. 
                                                
103 Justin Tanis, Trans-Gendered:  Theology, Ministry, and Communities of Faith (Cleveland, OH:  
The Pilgrim Press, 2003), 163. 
104 Tanis, 164. 
105 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 210. 
106 Tanis, 163. 
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Tanis regards transgender as a vocation because trans people reveal different 
things about God than do cisgender people.107  Trans people teach others to look for 
“truth beyond what seems obvious and expected.”108  They call into question Manichean 
patterns of thinking, helping Christians “see beyond the dualisms, including the splits 
between life and death, female and male, spirit and body.”109  And by traversing the 
division of male and female, trans people provide a human gloss on the divine trinity.  
Sarah Coakley, an Anglican systematic theologian and philosopher of religion, has 
described the doctrine of the trinity as a threeness that divinely ambushes twoness:  in 
light of the trinity, gender becomes legible as plastic, not an immutable, oppressive 
binary.110  But we should consider that it also goes the other way around—that trans 
people reveal God’s creative love for a “dappled,” “brinded,” “pied” world, in the words 
of Gerard Manley Hopkins, Auden’s queer Catholic predecessor.111  For Tanis, trans 
people have a “calling” to witness to the diversity of God’s creation.112 
Still, as I indicated above, Elshtain frequently invokes the “natural” as an ethical 
criterion; a reader could use her work to argue that transitioning from male to female or 
vice versa through sexual reassignment surgery and hormone replacement amounts to “a 
dream of radical self-transcendence,” an attempt “to control nature.”113  But the word 
“nature” needs serious unpacking.  In her descriptions of self-sovereignty, Elshtain takes 
                                                
107 Tanis, 134, 164.  
108 Tanis, 166. 
109 Tanis, 169. 
110 Sarah Coakley, “Is There a Future for Gender and Theology?:  On Gender, Contemplation, and 
the Systematic Task,” Criterion 47.1 (Spring/Summer 2009): 10. 
111 Gerard Manley Hopkins, “Pied Beauty,” in Mortal Beauty, God’s Grace:  Major Poems and 
Spiritual Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. John F.  Thornton and Susan B.  Varenne (New York:  
Vintage Spiritual Classics, 2003), 25. For more on the homoeroticism of Hopkins’s devotional poetry, see 
Julia F. Saville’s A Queer Chivalry:  The Homoerotic Asceticism of Gerard Manley  (Charlottesville:  The 
University Press of Virginia, 2000) and Frederick S. Roden, Same-sex Desire in Victorian Religious 
Culture (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 82-122. 
112 Tanis, 147, 166. 
113 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 205.  
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“human nature,” “nature,” and the “natural” for granted, abstracting them from their 
places in specific theo-ethical traditions.114  She nowhere specifies or justifies any 
principles for positing or defining human nature.  (An odd move, since Elshtain writes 
that her “history of ideas” approach to political theory “means, among other things, that 
one cannot abstract ideas from the textures, the warp and woof, of history.”)115  At one 
point she defines “the body” as “nature,” an equivalence that gets us no closer to 
appreciating how the naturalness of the body functions as an ethical criterion.116  One 
quick, lone reference to “the moral or natural law” at the beginning of her treatment of 
self-sovereignty suggests that, for her, natural law theory (or the use of reason to deduce 
moral rules from the observation of human nature), not revelation, decides what counts as 
“natural” or violates “nature.”117  Yet here, too, Elshtain takes the persuasiveness of the 
natural law tradition in Christian ethics for granted. 
The problem becomes clearer if we look at Elshtain’s description of the 
responsible self.  “The self I have in mind,” she writes, “seeks meaning and dignity and 
finds a measure of both not in total liberation from nature, nor in some utopian 
attunement and at-oneness with nature but, rather, in growing to become a full person 
according to our human natures.”118  Elshtain earlier defines “full person” as someone 
who has grown to become a mature member of society.119  She tries to avoid an ablist 
definition of full personhood by rejecting “therapeutic paternalism” in favor of the model 
of Jean Vanier’s L’Arche communities, where the so-called “normal” live “in covenant,” 
                                                
114 See especially Elshtain, Sovereignty, 210, 214, 220-221, 243. 
115 Elshtain, Sovereignty, xvi.  
116 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 184. 
117 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 160.  
118 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 229. 
119 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 228. 
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as equals, with the so-called “mentally handicapped.”120  But what does “according to our 
human natures” mean?  Elshtain gestures towards an answer by describing the 
responsible self as a social self:  “[b]ecause that nature,” i.e., human nature, “is 
intrinsically social; because we are persons, not individuals; we must refrain from doing 
everything of which we are capable.  If we refuse to observe a limit, we are destroyers, 
we become death dealers.”121  Anything antisocial, then, is anti-human nature.  But how 
do we decide where the limits lie?  
For Elshtain, observing the limits of nature means working within the parameters 
of “what was given us at birth”: 
We experiment with our natures at our peril.  By experimenting with our 
natures, I do not mean “attempting to forestall terrible illness,” say, or 
healing injury and so on.  The reductionist argument often thrown in the 
face of one calling for limits is ridiculous stuff much of the time, to wit:  
“I see, well, because it means messing with our natures, I guess you would 
never have wanted pneumonia to be treated or a polio vaccine developed 
because that messes with nature.”  One sees how beside the point such a 
riposte is.  By assisting us in being as whole in body and spirit as we can 
be, given what was given us at birth, we are helping to complete our 
nature, not to alter it radically.122 
 
The stipulation of “given what was given us at birth” suffers from the same problem of 
vagueness as “nature,” “human nature,” and the “natural.”  What does that limit mean for 
trans people?  One could read Elshtain’s logic as prohibiting hormone replacement and 
sexual reassignment surgery if one saw transition not as wholeness and completion but as 
radical alteration.   
Nevertheless, Elshtain’s comments about wholeness and completion dovetail with 
what Tanis has to say about transitioning: 
                                                
120 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 247. 
121 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 230.  
122 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 231, emphasis added. 
 
 204 
Achieving a sense of congruity between body and spirit is, for many, the 
goal of exploring gender transition or various gender expressions.123 
 
I refused to consider surgery until I had worked through my discomfort 
with my own breasts.  I wanted to love them into another form, not hate 
them off my body.  I felt it important that this process was about love and 
care, not about dysphoria and revulsion.  I was subjecting my body—
me—to surgery; the transformation was about healing, not illness; about 
hope, not despair; and about joy, not dysphoria.  […]   
Honoring our bodies means listening closely to them and making 
choices that bring out the best in us.  We must choose with care and take 
responsibility for our actions.  Honoring our bodies means learning to love 
our embodied selves so much that we dress ourselves as we long to dress, 
we shape our bodies as we want them to be shaped, and we do it from a 
sense of well-being.124 
 
Rereading the passage from Elshtain in light of Tanis’s description of transitioning, 
Elshtain’s salient ethical criterion for telling the difference between what counts as 
“nature” and what violates “nature” seems to be “body-modification-as-power-grab” 
(eugenics or Simone de Beauvoir’s masculinized woman) versus “body-modification-as-
healing” (antibiotics).  In this paradigm, hormone replacement and sexual reassignment 
surgery are, for people who perceive a mismatch between their chromosomal / 
morphological sex and their gender identity, acts of healing and completion—not body-
repudiating, radically altering power-grabs. 
 In fact, Tanis’s conception of transitioning as a calling to witness to the diversity 
of God’s creation lines up almost perfectly with Elshtain’s affirmation of “growing to 
become a full person according to our human natures.”125  Tanis repeatedly invokes the 
language of nature, authenticity, true selfhood, and responsibility.  Since “[t]rans people 
commonly view gender variance within themselves as something that they cannot 
control,” something “permanent,” he concludes that being on the trans spectrum is 
                                                
123 Tanis, 169. 
124 Tanis, 174. 
125 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 229. 
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“natural.”  According to Tanis, then, the problem with discourses about nature is that 
“society” tends “to codify the natural into categories” that conflict with God’s diverse 
creation.  Thus Tanis simply broadens the scope of Elshtain’s category of the “natural.”  
Moreover, he posits a transgender “nature,” the “suppress[ion]” of which “causes great 
psychological and spiritual suffering.”126  The journey and calling of trans people centers 
on “reconciling the inner and out parts of our nature.”127  And for Tanis, the transgender 
experience amounts to the spiritual journey par excellence insofar as it involves “[t]he 
search for an authentic sense of self.”128  Likewise transitioning amounts to the spiritual 
vocation par excellence because it involves “a summons to be or do something that 
reflects our true selves.”129  In other words, the transgender vocation requires 
fundamentally a letting go of “masks” in order to move toward wholeness, congruity, 
purpose, and health.130  Tanis frames the requirement as a responsibility toward other 
people:  trans-spectrum folk have the “responsibility” to shed their masks and “explore 
fully” their God-given trans “nature” so that they “might live freely” and thus “serve 
God” and “others.”131  
 But this is just to put the matter in terms to which Elshtain could accede, instead 
of questioning the whole normative apparatus of the natural.  Using Tanis’s description of 
transitioning as letting go of masks, admitting one’s true nature, and pursuing healing—
                                                
126 Tanis, 145. 
127 Tanis, 170. 
128 Tanis, 24. 
129 Tanis, 150. 
130 Tanis, 151, 158, 175. 
131 Tanis, 149, 159-160.  Tanis’s explanation of how his trans experience helps him serve other 
people recalls the viewpoint of Edward Carpenter, an English socialist poet and early gay activist.  In The 
Intermediate Sex (1896), Carpenter describes gay people as the “reconcilers and interpreters” of men and 
women “to each other,” Sexology Uncensored: The Documents of Sexual Science, ed. Lucy Bland and 
Laura Doan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 51, 48.  Tanis writes of having “a sense” 
that he is “a more skilled pastor” because, having transitioned, he knows how congregations react 
differently to male and female pastors; moreover, his transition allows him to “empathize and understand 
experiences” from the perspectives of both men and women, 159-160. 
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along with Elshtain’s uncritical extraction of ethical norms from “nature”—to develop a 
trans theology of the responsible self would strike some people on the trans spectrum as 
problematic for two reasons.  (1) It medicalizes gender, which encourages transgender 
people to see themselves as “defect[s]” or “monster[s].”132  (2) And while medicalizing 
transsexuality might be a good move politically,133 it forces transsexuality to conform to 
the illusions of cissexuality:  (a) that we can discover a person’s essence, and (b) that this 
essence maps neatly onto either side of a natural gender dichotomy.  Instead of viewing 
transitioning through hormones and surgery as a matter of healing, some trans people 
would prefer to think of it as about giving up wholeness in order to call the illusions of 
cissexuality into question.  For example, a female-to-male transsexual might want phallic 
augmentation without seeking to have his vagina closed up.  As the transgender lawyer 
and activist Dean Spade reports, though, such FTMs have trouble finding sympathetic 
surgeons because “doctors […] only seek to produce genitals that fit into one of two 
narrowly defined options.”134   
(Certainly some transsexuals do experience their gender as mapping neatly onto 
either side of a gender binary.  And as the theologian Susannah Cornwall rightly remarks, 
transgender people “simply trying to get by” should not have to shoulder the burden of 
“solving” every fraught philosophical quandary about gender “on behalf of everyone 
else.”135  A model of transsexuality as giving up wholeness in order to call the illusions of 
                                                
132 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw (New York: Routledge, 1994), 8, 12.  
133 For example, medicalizing transsexuality gives more people access to surgery and hormone 
replacement, because insurance companies will sometimes cover the costs.  See Kate Bornstein, Gender 
Outlaw, 119. 
134 Quoted in Susannah Cornwall, “Apophasis and Ambiguity:  The ‘Unknowingness’ of 
Transgender,” in Trans/formations, ed. Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood (London: SCM Press, 
2009), 13. 
135 Cornwall, 29. 
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cissexuality into question thus carries the danger of disqualifying some trans people in 
favor of others, a point to which I will return shortly.) 
Trans/formation 2:  Sequins & Runways 
The seminal autobiographical writings of Kate Bornstein, a playwright and 
performance artist, typify the conception of transitioning as a process of deliberately 
giving up rather than pursuing wholeness.  Bornstein treats gender as a matter of “style” 
rather than a matter of essence or nature.136  She identifies herself as a “transsexual 
lesbian” on the first page of her first memoir, Gender Outlaw.137  Her gender identity gets 
more complicated from there.  In a world where doctors assign gender at birth and 
transsexuals need to prove that they have an illness in order to pursue gender 
reassignment surgery,138 Bornstein resists all the rules demanding people to identify 
strictly as female or male.  “I love playing with genders,” Bornstein writes.  “I love 
watching other people play with all the shades and flavors that gender can come in.”139  
According to Bornstein, equating gender variance with pathology naturalizes the male / 
female gender binary.  Thus it locks people into a class system that legitimizes cismale 
privilege.140  Self-consciously playing with gender, by contrast, destabilizes and 
denaturalizes the binary.  Ultimately, it could shatter “the power dynamic between men 
and women.”141  For Bornstein, then, transitioning is about invention, not completion.   
Bornstein maintains her conception of transitioning as playful invention 
throughout her oeuvre.  A biographical note at the end of Gender Outlaws:  The Next 
                                                
136 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 3, 72. 
137 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 3.  
138 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 22, 62. 
139 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 58. 
140 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 105-111, 113. 
141 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 107. 
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Generation, Bornstein’s anthology of emerging trans-spectrum writers, describes her 
playing with genders as “gender anarchy.”142  In her most recent memoir, A Queer and 
Pleasant Danger, Bornstein calls herself an “exquisite blend of boy and girl,” with an 
emphasis on “girl.”143  Furthermore, she differentiates the genders “boy” and “girl” from 
the genders “man” and “woman,” a distinction that reinforces Bornstein’s personal 
commitment to a playful, non-teleological style of gender that defies discourses of 
“nature” and the “natural.”144  
Fittingly, where Tanis uses medical metaphors for transitioning (healing, 
congruity, wholeness), Bornstein uses fashion metaphors (sewing, trying on, and 
modeling clothes).  Through the language of accessorizing, she reclaims her own agency 
in gender performance.  Bornstein refers to her first memoir as her “runway.”145  It marks 
“a time when we’ve […] begun sewing sequins into our cultural hand-me-downs.”146  It 
replaces the “romantic stuff”147—the old “tales of women trapped in the bodies of men or 
men pining away in the bodies of women”148—with “the hard part”:  questioning 
gender.149 
Because Bornstein conceptualizes transgender as a matter of invention rather than 
completion, one might ask why she includes corporeal transitioning in the queer 
enterprise of questioning gender:  why not just change the social meaning of gender 
rather than the body?  Bornstein admits that she originally opted for “genital surgery 
partially as a result of cultural pressure,” the idea that a so-called “real woman” must 
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145 Kate Bornstein, Gender Outlaw, 4. 
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have a vagina.  Even so, she would “do it again,” she says.  “Knowing what I know now, 
I’m real glad I had my surgery [...] just for the comfort I feel with a constructed vagina.  I 
like that thang!”150  What’s more, in her autobiographical play, Hidden: A Gender, 
Bornstein treats surgical and hormonal transitioning as a logical extension of the less 
physically demanding forms of gender construction that everyone participates in, cis and 
trans alike, “every waking moment.”151  The character Kate sees her vaginoplasty as an 
important part of her “fluidly gendered” self-construction.152  She thereby challenges the 
heteronormative sexual ethics and cisprivileging gender politics of Doc Grinder, a cross 
between a “twentieth-century talk show host” and a “nineteenth-century medicine side-
show barker.”153 
As I mentioned briefly above, Bornstein’s take on transgender and transitioning 
has yet another difficulty:  it carries the risk of disqualifying some trans people—namely, 
those who simply want to pass as men or women—in favor of others who, like Bornstein, 
see the gender binary as an illusion.154  In a literary study of transsexual body narratives, 
Jay Prosser takes issue with “queer’s arrogation of transgender” in, e.g., the work of Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick and Judith Butler.155  According to Prosser, when queer theory 
ascribes performativity to transgender—that is to say, when theory treats transgender as 
revelatory of the citational or imitative process by which “male” and “female” appear as 
identities156—it (a) devalues the distinct aspiration of many transsexuals “to be non-
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performative, to be constative”157 and (b) ignores “the materiality of the sexed body,” i.e., 
the “struggle” and the “desire” on the part of many transsexuals “for sexed embodiment 
as telos.”158  Julia Serano, a contributor to Kate Bornstein’s anthology of new trans-
spectrum voices, puts it more bluntly:  “[i]f one more person tells me that ‘all gender is 
performance,’ I think I am going to strangle them.”159  Serano suggests that, “[i]nstead of 
fictionalizing gender,” we “talk about the moments in life when gender feels all too real.  
Because gender doesn’t feel like drag when you’re a young trans child begging your 
parents not to cut your hair or not to force you to wear that dress.”160  Bornstein 
acknowledges that many transsexuals disagree with her work.161  She places more value 
on the general project of asking questions about gender than on her own perspective.162 
 Notwithstanding the two problems that I have just described, Bornstein’s 
approach to transitioning has much to offer a queer theology of the responsible self.  It 
could accomplish the work of Tanis’s body theology—elucidating the doctrine of the 
trinity, challenging Manichean dualisms—without pathologizing transgender people.  But 
her definition of gender variance as playful critique rather than painful disease might 
seem like the power-grab of a sovereign self.  Elshtain would almost certainly see Kate 
Bornstein as an example of soft self-sovereignty, the obverse of Simone de Beauvoir’s 
masculinized woman.  “I didn’t ‘lose’ my male privilege so much as I made a conscious 
decision to get rid of it,” Bornstein writes.  “It took my becoming a woman to discover 
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my ‘male behavior’—that is, exhibiting male privilege.”163  Note, though, that unlike soft 
sovereign selves, Bornstein is not calling for the triumph of women or the abolition of 
gender categories.  Rather, her “goal” is “a society free from the constraints of non-
consensual gender.”164  That is to say, she wants to create a third space outside the 
medicalized gender binary, where people (a) recognize gender as a performance, (b) 
choose their genders, and (c) play them fluidly and self-reflexively.   
Bornstein’s third space circumvents the two possibilities for changing “our 
nature” that Elshtain foresees:  transitioning amounts neither to healing (completing our 
nature) nor to power grabbing (radically altering our nature) but rather to an abnegation 
of both.  In other words, in Bornstein’s third space, transitioning neither corrects a 
physical or psychological defect, an incongruity of body and spirit (on the one hand); nor 
does it commit the “hubristic overreach” or “excesses” of a sovereign self by assuming 
power at the expense of someone else (on the other).  Instead, it challenges assumptions 
about what may count as “whole in body and spirit.” 165  And it does so in order to open 
up a responsible dialogue about gender and privilege. 
 
Creation without Nature 
So how would Bornstein’s approach to transitioning, which rejects the concept of 
nature altogether, fit a theology of the responsible self?  One could, pace Nietzsche, 
question the idea that people can only make sense of the good through ethical norms.  A 
Christian, though, must determine the good in light of the authority of the living God—a 
formidable ethical norm indeed.  But to do so does not necessarily commit a Christian 
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theo-ethical framework to a definition of the person as having “a nature,” i.e., an essence 
that imposes or implies a limit or norm.  After all, Christian theologians have come to 
agree that God has no nature:  like ontological proofs of God, talk of a divine nature 
treats God as a kind of being among the totality of beings in the world.  In other words, it 
reduces the Creator to a mere creature alongside us.166  Perhaps, then, human creatures 
specially image God by virtue of not having a nature.  In that case, the Creator / creature 
relationship would suffice for the ground of a theological ethic. 
For example, Kathryn Tanner, an Anglican theologian, has recently read the 
doctrine of the imago dei through the lens of early church fathers to argue that “it is just 
human nature not to have a nature.”167  Whereas other creatures (e.g., pigs and rocks) 
reveal God’s goodness in a limited way,168 humans image the illimitably good God 
through their “plastic powers,”169 their ability to form and transform themselves “with 
reference to a whole host of outside influences.”170  Grace refers, not to an extraneous 
addition to a nature that can subsist without it, but rather to the creator’s constant self-gift 
to the creature, a gift that the creature always already enjoys.171  Thus, while a Christian 
theo-ethical framework can dispense with a view of the person as having a nature, it must 
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hold onto a view of humans as created.  A queer theology of the responsible self will 
need to rethink creation by detaching it from the concept of nature.172 
For the Time Being (1944), Auden’s modern-day retelling of the infancy 
narratives from the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, presents one possible starting point for 
detaching creation from the concept of nature.  The characters’ encounters with God call 
their habits of reading nature into question.  For example, in the Narrator’s words, facing 
God’s wrath unmasks as unreal “the natural world where / The occupation of space is 
real and the final fact” (CP 351):	  
It’s as if 
We had left our house for five minutes to mail a letter, 
And during that time the living room had changed places 
With the room behind the mirror over the fireplace; 
It’s as if, waking up with a start, we discovered 
Ourselves stretched out flat on the floor, watching our shadow  
Sleepily stretching itself at the window.  I mean 
That the world of space where events re-occur is still there, 
Only now it’s no longer real; the real one is nowhere 
Where time never moves and nothing can ever happen. (CP 352) 
 
The natural world is there but unreal, suggesting that we must look elsewhere for 
information about how to live.  Moreover, in “The Annunciation” we learn that the fall of 
humanity damaged our epistemic faculties (CP 355, 359).  Hence the three wise men (a 
scientist, a historian, and a philosopher) give up empiricism and reason in favor of 
revelation in the form of the star of the nativity.  They give up their naturalism “[t]o 
discover how to be human now” (CP 370).  The scientist, who has “put Nature through / 
A thorough inquisition,” finds that “She” offers no coherent, honest “answers” about how 
to live.  “To discover how to be truthful now,” he needs the star (CP 369). 
                                                
172 For a concise overview of the history of “nature” in Western thought—from nature as justice in 
Greco-Roman antiquity, to nature as the will of God in Latin Christianity, to nature as necessity in Kant—
see Lorraine Daston, “The World in Order,” in Without Nature?, 19-30.   
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That For the Time Being cautions against extracting ethical norms from nature 
will become even clearer when I contrast Simeon’s religious epistemology with 
Elshtain’s approach to ethical deliberation.  First, though, I want to call attention to the 
fact that Simeon explicitly distinguishes between nature and creation in his meditation on 
the incarnation.  For Simeon, although “the Truth is indeed One,” “Nature” has no 
“public” meaning; rather, people “have […] many private illusions about” it (CP 390), as 
numerous as “the creatures in the very real and most exciting universe that God creates 
with and for His love” (CP 390).  Simeon attaches the word “illusion” to “Nature”; and 
“real,” to the “creatures” that God “creates.”  God’s loving act of creation grounds “the 
very real,” not our abstractions about nature. 
 
 
V.  DOING ETHICS INCARNATIONALLY 
 Applying Elshtain’s concept of radical self-sovereignty—as she has articulated 
it—to queer theory shows that she sees “human nature” as self-evident.  Elshtain chides 
“[g]enetic fundamentalism,” by which she presumably means genetic engineering, for 
holding its discussions “in a zone sanitized of any normative accounts of human 
nature.”173  Elshtain, though, never explicitly grounds her many appeals to “human 
nature” in any normative account.  She treats the categories “natural” and “unnatural” as 
normative for ethics, and as something that all people have immediate access to, outside 
the interpretive framework of different faith traditions.  In addition to treating the 
“natural” as self-evident and immediately accessible to people regardless of their faith 
tradition, Elshtain implicitly links defiance of the “natural” with excarnation.  Radical 
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self-sovereignty means, for Elshtain, refusing to stay within the “natural” limits that the 
body sets.  And refusing to stay within those limits means repudiating the body.174 
Using writers as diverse as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Primo Levi, Albert Camus, 
Czeslaw Milosz, and Marilynne Robinson, Elshtain makes clear her belief that, in the 
secular space of a liberal polity, people of different or no faith traditions can come to 
consensus about what violates the limits of responsible self-sovereignty.  One might think 
that Elshtain’s method of drawing on novels and poetry as well as theology to challenge 
excarnational philosophies and practices achieves a nice harmony of method and 
argument.  After all, Charles Taylor argues that “aesthetic experience” is “[o]ne of the 
most important sites of resistance” to excarnation.  Art remains one of the few places in 
modern culture “where embodied feeling can still be allowed to open us to something 
higher.”175  But Elshtain excarnates the art and theology on which she draws by, for 
example, quoting Bonhoeffer and Camus on the “natural” and “human nature” without 
unpacking what either of them means by “nature,” let alone examining how each writer’s 
use of the concept depends on the rest of his intellectual, spiritual, and social 
commitments.176  She is thus like the “vigilantes in the glades” whom Auden criticizes in 
“New Year Letter” (1941).  They hope to find the key to an infallible “codex gentium” 
there, but “the Lex Abscondita evades” them:  
Now here, now there, one leaps and cries  
‘I’ve got her and I claim the prize,’ 
But when the rest catch up, he stands 
With just a torn blouse in his hands. (DM 40) 
 
                                                
174 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 231. 
175 Taylor, 288.  
176 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 220, 243. 
 
 216 
In other words, Elshtain treats the “natural” as a universal ethic that can be abstracted 
from a specific community’s practices and the character and virtues that those practices 
form in the community’s members.  
Elshtain’s methodology, then, conflicts with her ethics.  Her argument for an 
incarnational ethic proceeds excarnationally:  insofar as Elsthain invokes the “natural” 
and the “unnatural” without unpacking “nature” or contextualizing it within the social 
practices of particular faith communities (like Catholic natural law theology),177 and 
insofar as these fraught, unspecified categories determine her view of what counts as 
incarnational or excarnational, her work suffers from methodological (indeed, 
theological) incoherence.  Elshtain writes that “authentic relationality” gives us “a sense 
of what is appropriate to, and achievable by, creatures like ourselves.”178  But she 
overlooks the crucial, incarnational questions of what constitutes “authentic relationality” 
and how that leads to consensus about propriety—or what creatures like us are really like.  
Developing a sense of “what is appropriate” requires something more specific than 
“authentic relationality,” whatever that means.  It requires a community of people who 
agree that distinguishing “the appropriate” from the “inappropriate” matters, and who 
recognize the authority of certain tools over others to help with the task.   
What, then, might it mean for a Christian thinker like Elshtain to reason 
incarnationally about bodily proprieties?  It might require that she apply the concept of 
“sovereignty within limits” by explicitly and reflexively using Christian revelation and 
ecclesial tradition as guides to reason.  And it might require her participation in what 
                                                
177 My point here is not to endorse Catholic natural law thinking:  indeed, it should be obvious 
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grounded her undefined claims about nature. 
178 Elshtain, Sovereignty, 232.  
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Charles Taylor calls “the network of agape,” where corporate worship of the living God 
trains feeling.  As Stanley Hauerwas puts it in With the Grain of the Universe, “the 
intellectual and moral transformation” that results from submitting our habits of speech to 
the discipline of “the God found in Jesus Christ […] enables Christians to see the world 
as it is, and not as it appears […] if we get our theology wrong, we get our world 
wrong.”179  On such a reading, the ongoing relational training of being a Christian not 
only changes what a person sees in the world; it disciplines her faculty of sight.  
Reasoning incarnationally would at the very least, then, involve commitment to a 
community and its formative texts and practices.  That is because, as Hauerwas learned 
from Alasdair MacIntyre, my ethical action becomes legible as such only if others 
recognize it as carrying on a narrative that they share with me, and I learn how to carry 
on that narrative by participating in the social practices that sustain it.180 
In For the Time Being (1944), Simeon gives an account of the incarnation that 
adumbrates just such a communal, sacramental, tradition- and revelation-based approach 
to ethical deliberation.  According to Simeon, God’s self-revelation via enfleshment—
i.e., God’s self-disclosure to the world as one particular human being in the world—
entails a relational epistemology.  We acquire knowledge about God not through 
ratiocination but revelation, not through proofs (ontotheology) but encounters (Christ, 
eucharist, the church).  And these encounters mark the beginning of an intersubjective 
ethical story about grace—a story under way in lives formed (through corporate practices 
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180 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed (South Bend, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); and Stanley Hauerwas, Working with Words: On Learning to 
Speak Christian (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011), 202-213. 
 
 218 
like confession, forgiveness, the passing of the peace, and prayer) by the virtues (faith, 
hope, and love) constitutive of grace.  
According to Simeon, because the incarnation unites “Flesh” and “Word” with 
neither “a magical transformation” of the “Flesh” nor a “loss of perfection” of the 
“Word,” it has something to say about how imagination and reason ought to operate.  The 
incarnation redeems “Imagination […] from promiscuous fornication with her own 
images” (CP 389).  In light of the embodied God, every person and situation takes on 
spiritual significance, not just those featured in literature and history.  And the 
incarnation redeems “Reason […] from incestuous fixation on her own logic” (CP 389).  
It demands suppleness and creativity on the part of reason because it is a “coinherence of 
the One and the Many.”  It denies monism and pluralism, the one “indifferent” god of 
“the philosophers” and the many separate gods of the pagans. The word “coinherence,” 
which means something like “mystical interpenetration” (of, e.g., the three persons of the 
trinity), comes from the theology of Charles Williams, a lay Anglican writer of highbrow 
Christian thrillers whom Auden met in 1937 (see chapter two above).  A letter that Auden 
wrote to a priest in 1956 sheds light on the implications of “coinherence” in Simeon’s 
meditation:  “it does seem to me that the Doctrine of the Incarnation implies the co-
inherence of spirit and flesh in all creatures, and that materialism and manicheeism [sic] 
are mirror images of each other.”181  Spirit and flesh form a unity rather than a 
dichotomy, giving the lie to theologies that deny the spirit (materialism) or that posit an 
unending conflict between flesh and spirit (the Manichean tradition).   
Auden’s Simeon thus suggests a sacramental, relational, tradition- and revelation-
based approach to ethical deliberation in the following way.  If God’s taking on flesh 
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alters flesh in the way Simeon describes—and if first (a) the real presence of God in the 
Israelites and then (b) the supernatural event of the incarnation teach us to see that flesh 
and spirit co-inhere—then it follows that we cannot read “nature” or “creation” at face-
value.  Rather, story and sacrament, friendship and worship, have to direct our reading.  
Put differently, Simeon articulates a fundamentally responsive epistemology that shores 
up virtue ethics (as opposed to deontological, consequentialist, or pragmatic ethics).  Not 
“pursuit” but “surrender to” and “following” God determine what we know and how we 
act (CP 390).  Hence, as Simeon concludes his reflections on the implications of the 
incarnation for science and the arts, the chorus of For the Time Being proclaims that 
God’s love saves “[o]ur lost appearances” and forgives the “errors” of “our Vision” (CP 
390).  Simeon’s meditation thus speaks to the quest of the third wise man (the 
philosopher), who, having found reason and empiricism poor ethical guides, follows the 
star of the nativity “[t]o discover how to be loving now” (CP 369-370).  
Lest the narrative ethic of grace without nature that I have pulled from For the 
Time Being seem, because of its insistence on maintaining a relationship with the past, no 
less inimical to the construction of a queer theological ethics than Elshtain’s free-floating 
signifier “nature,” remember that, although the story begins with a divine encounter, it 
continues in lives formed by the virtues constitutive of grace.  More precisely, it 
continues through intersubjective recognition:  people learn how to carry on the narrative 
in an intelligible way.  And carrying on the narrative means engaging in an ongoing 
argument with a concrete history that began at a particular moment—not swallowing 
non-negotiable, abstract, static, universal truths.  Moreover, the community of storytellers 
 
 220 
clarifies the thrust of the story through conversations with other communities that tell 
rival stories about the world.   
Think, for example, of my discussion of “In Praise of Limestone” and “Ischia” 
(1948) in chapter one.  The Englishman on Ischia—prompted by the landscape’s 
similarity to his native Pennines—rereads his Anglicanism through the lens of the 
island’s “mad camp,” its homosocial culture of Catholic pageantry, hot springs, and 
transactional sex (SP 190, CP 542).  He fully inhabits the island’s decidedly un-British 
life:  it “correct[s]” his “eyes” that have been “injured” by the liberal ethos of the “soiled 
productive cities” from which he and his “dear friends” come (CP 541).  And, to put it in 
the language of “New Year Letter” (1941), the Englishman develops a creative 
“synthesis” of his Anglicanism with his experience on the island (DM 17).  Gnosticism is 
the Englishman’s besetting sin:  his “greatest comfort is music / Which,” unlike sex, “can 
be made anywhere, is invisible, / And does not smell” (SP 191).  But The Book of 
Common Prayer in all its vivid incarnationality—where “bodies rise from the dead” and 
blessedness consists not in perfection but in shameless innocence (SP 191)—starts to 
come alive in a queer way for him as he superimposes the limestone statues of beautiful 
men on the creeds. 
Thus the process of intersubjective recognition by virtue of which a community 
carries on its story about the world works dialectically, via ethical improvisation.  Which 
is to say that, when mutual recognition breaks down and one member of the network of 
agape culpably fails to recognize another (e.g., when, as I mentioned in chapter two, Paul 
Dean phobically insists that Auden “ended in” spiritual “darkness”),182 the disrespected 
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person can (a) appeal to the trajectory implicit in the story itself to call into question the 
disrespector’s candidate continuation of it183 or (b) incite a new tradition that branches off 
of the old story if the appeal fails (thus we see that traditions always already proceed by 
adaptation and innovation).184  The dialectical ethical improvisation involved in carrying 
on a tradition (or starting a new rival tradition) becomes clearer when we examine the 
parallel between Auden’s and Alasdair MacIntyre’s conceptions of tradition. 
David Toole offers an excellent account of MacIntyre’s notion of “dialectical 
reason” in Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo (1998), one that helps explain the dialogic and 
dynamic quality of communal, sacramental, tradition- and revelation-based approaches to 
ethical deliberation:  
Dialectical reason makes no claims to be an ahistorical foundation that 
grounds the universality of truth and goodness.  Rather dialectical reason 
always commences at some particular historical juncture and is contingent 
upon a host of historical particularities:  a set of authoritative texts, a 
particular geographical location, neighboring communities with rival 
interpretations of the world, and so forth.  Here reason emerges not as an 
abstract universal but as a dialectic enterprise always already underway—
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These Markan myths became constitutive of early Christian reality, just as myth is 
constitutive of the reality of every major religious tradition.  Such traditions are not fixed 
and static but externally porous, internally plastic, multiple, and continuously 
renegotiated clusters of texts, symbols, and practices.  By replacing ancient Greek myths 
with his own, Mark was doing what he was supposed to do:  adapting cultural 
monuments to address new realities.  Religious transformation is in large part a 
competition of myths. (190) 
 
People continue a tradition through adaptation—arguing with prior texts and practices, revising them for 
new contexts, rewriting them in light of insights from interlocutors outside the tradition.   
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as individuals and communities engage with one another, with texts, and 
with the world.  Dialectical reason emerges concretely, in the midst of 
historically contingent events, and is from the beginning not a blanket 
assertion of universal truth but an argument.  As this argument is extended 
in time it becomes what MacIntyre calls a tradition, and the reason it 
embodies is thus tradition-constitutive and tradition-constituted:  no 
tradition existed before the argument began, nor was there reason, until 
parts of the argument were settled.185 
	  
“Dialectical reason” describes Auden’s and MacIntyre’s conceptions of tradition.  A 
tradition begins as a conversation with others—an argument.  It emerges out of a concrete 
situation.  No tradition can claim universality.  Moreover, every tradition develops “as an 
endless engagement with difference, as a truth that, by definition, exposes itself to the 
critique of ceaseless argument, gesturing always to other traditions and the world.”186  
The continuation of a tradition depends on the continuation of challenges to it.  When 
challengers stop dialoguing with a tradition, the tradition dies (irrelevancy).  And when a 
tradition stops its dialogue with challengers, it becomes unreasonable (fascism). 
 Through the concepts of “skepticism in belief,” “double focus,” and “co-
inherence” that (as we saw in chapter two) drive the cosmopolitan project of The Double 
Man (1941) and various essays of the early 1940s, Auden articulates a theological ethics 
strikingly similar to MacIntyre’s notion of “dialectical reason.”  Consider the overlap 
between the following two passages about adjudicating among rival traditions, the first 
from Auden’s “A Note on Order” (1941): 
In a civilized society, that is, one in which a common faith is combined 
with a skepticism about its finality, and which agrees with Pascal that 
“Nier, croire, et doubter bien sont à l’homme ce que le courir est au 
cheval,” orthodoxy can only be secured by a cooperation of which free 
controversy is an essential part. 
                                                
185 David Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo:  Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, 
and Apocalypse (Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1998), 10. 
186 Toole, 10. 
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 For what at the time appears to be a heresy never arises without a 
cause.  Either it is a real advance on the old orthodoxy (for example, the 
Copernican cosmogony was an advance on the Ptolemaic) or it is an 
unsatisfactory reaction to a real abuse (for example, Manicheeism [sic] 
was an intellectual heresy caused by the moral corruption of the relatively 
orthodox church). (Prose ii 103)187 
 
And the second from MacIntyre: 
A necessary first step would be for [the members of one] tradition to come 
to understand what it is to think in the terms prescribed by [a] particular 
rival tradition, to learn how to think as if one were a convinced adherent of 
that rival tradition.  To do this requires the exercise of a capacity for 
philosophical imagination that is often lacking.  A second step is to 
identify, from the standpoint of the adherents of that rival tradition, its 
crucially important unresolved issues and unsolved problems—unresolved 
and unsolved by the standards of that tradition—which now confront those 
adherents and to enquire how progress might be made in moving towards 
their resolution and solution.188   
 
MacIntyre goes on to suggest the third step of asking (a) whether the tradition lacks the 
resources to solve its own impasse and if so (b) whether some other tradition can supply 
resources for overcoming the tradition’s predicament:  in other words, cooperative 
controversy.  Thus MacIntyre and Auden alike position themselves against the 
excarnational Enlightenment conception of rationality as an exercise of pure reason 
unmediated by historical contingencies and disengaged from bodily particularities.  Note 
how dialectical reason / cooperative controversy—which involves learning how to reason 
the way a rival tradition does, excavating its presuppositions, and so on—differs from 
Elshtain’s facile cherry-picking of appearances of the word “nature” in writers from rival 
traditions.  Note also the conceptual compatibility of MacIntyre’s and Auden’s analysis 
of tradition with Foucault’s sense of gayness not as a psychological state but as a genre, a 
                                                
187 The Pascal translates, “To deny, to believe, and to doubt are to a person what running is to a 
horse.” 
188 MacIntyre, xiii. 
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socially and culturally transformative practice that a person takes up and has to work 
at.189 
The similarity between Auden and MacIntyre is no coincidence:  they share the 
same key influence, namely, the British philosopher R. G. Collingwood, who in An Essay 
on Metaphysics (1940) defines philosophy as the study of absolute presuppositions 
embedded in social practices.  MacIntyre writes that he “owes” his “greatest debt” to 
Collingwood for teaching him “the situatedness of all enquiry, the extent to which what 
are taken to be the standards of truth and rational justification in the contexts of practice 
vary from one time and place to another.”190  Auden lists Collingwood’s Metaphysics as 
one of the “Modern Sources” to “New Year Letter” (DM 162), quoting it generously in 
the “Notes” to the poem—to the effect that any metaphysical tradition exhibits the muddy 
complexity of legal or constitutional history, not the timeless clarity of math (DM 112). 
In addition, Auden’s lectures and reviews of the early 1940s frequently cite Collingwood 
to defend a political version of the theological ethics of cooperative controversy that For 
the Time Being suggests (Prose ii 67, 79, 100, 198, 529-530).191 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
                                                
189 Foucault, Ethics, 136, 139-140, 148, 163. 
190 MacIntyre, xii. 
191 Auden argues in one of the notes to “New Year Letter” that, unlike in closed (i.e., organicist or 
totalitarian) societies, in open (i.e., democratic) societies, it is “necessary to live by Faith” (DM 122-123).  
The aforementioned note alluding to Collingwood defines “faith” as “an absolute presupposition” (DM 
113).  The essay “A Note On Order” (February 1941) borrows the vocabulary of “New Year Letter,” 
arguing that “[t]he cohesion of a differentiated and open society” requires, first, “a common agreement 
upon a small number of carefully defined general presuppositions, from which each individual can deduce 
the right behavior in a particular instance,” and, second, “[a] recognition […] that these presuppositions are 
not knowledge” but “faith” (Prose ii 102). 
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In the concluding chapter I will argue for the urgency of gesturing toward a queer 
theological ethics, indicating how queer theory and literary studies could benefit from 
reflecting seriously on current discussions in academic theology.  But I want to end the 
body of this study by returning to Lee Edelman and Heather Love, and reading George, 
the gay soldier in For the Time Being, through and against them.  George clarifies the 
difference between queer theory’s antisocial turn and Auden’s queer ethic of 
responsibility. 
Robert Caserio offers a brilliant reading of George.  As Auden tells the story, the 
soldier “cruised” his way back into Herod’s army “[j]ust in tidy time to massacre the 
Innocents,” which makes him, traditionally speaking, the most repugnant character in 
Auden’s retelling of the nativity story after Herod (CP 295).  With George the queeny 
murderer-for-hire as its lone queer figure, For the Time Being (1944) stands in marked 
contrast to Auden’s queering of the holy family in the epistolary prose poem that he gave 
Chester Kallman on Christmas Day in 1941.  (Auden told a friend that he intended 
Joseph’s barroom anxieties about Mary’s faithfulness in For the Time Being as a coded 
account of the demise of his romance with Kallman, a reading that has become available 
to the general public by virtue of archives and posthumous biographies.)192  Caserio 
smoothes out the conflict by noting that George’s “public villainy reaches its apex” when 
he returns to the army after considerable “wandering, and enrolls himself as a solid 
citizen.”193  By contrast, Joseph and Mary feel at “home” only in exile and “insecurity” 
(CP 398).  The takeaway?  A solid citizen makes for a callous queer. 
                                                
192 Auden identified “The Temptation of St. Joseph” as one of his works depicting “the Crisis” in 
“l’affaire C,” ALS to Alan Ansen, 27 August 1947, Berg. 
193 Robert L. Caserio, “Auden’s New Citizenship,” Raritan 17. 2 (Fall 1997): 101. 
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To Caserio’s marvelous reading I will add that, in Auden’s modernized account of 
the Christmas story, enrolling as a citizen and serving Herod specifically identifies 
George as a good liberal.  In the biblical version, Jesus poses a threat to Herod’s power 
(Matt 2:1-20).  In Auden’s version, Jesus poses a threat to Herod’s values of rationalism, 
impeccable hygiene, progress, and capital.  The self-styled “liberal” king predicts that 
once people start worshipping the “absurd” idea of a “finite” god-man in the form of a 
“wretched infant” (CP 394), the occult darkness that he worked so diligently to drive 
away will engulf his empire (CP 391-393).  To put the takeaway more precisely than 
Caserio, then, liberal assimilation turns queers into villains.  Better to stay in the 
wilderness and prophesy against nationalism and imperialism.194 
Thus the queer theo-ethic of responsibility that characterizes Auden’s post-
emigration, post-conversion poetry rejects the liberal ideal of the hyperrational sovereign 
subject.  And it shares Edelman’s and Love’s suspicion of liberalism’s secular theology 
of progress and positive feelings.  But Edelman and Love resemble “the either-ors” 
whom “New Year Letter” (1941) decries:  either negativity or assimilation, either 
abjection or transfiguration (DM 42).  Auden, on the other hand, describes concrete ways 
of life whereby marginal queers redefine the future for themselves, calling into question 
the assumptions of “the Great Powers”:  Ischia’s “mad camp,” a shamelessly 
eschatological practice that betokens a green world, a great good place (SP 190-191). 
                                                
194 Or better to participate in a post-war bombing survey of Germany than fight as a soldier for 
America.  Auden made a point of not hiding his homosexuality in his interview with the draft board in 
1942; as a result, the army rejected him.  After the war, however, he joined the United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey as a uniformed civilian.  See Humphrey Carpenter, 324, 334; and Mendelson, Later 
Auden, 207, 285. 
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“A chaste fidelity to the Divine Miss K?  Miss God, I know, says that, but I haven’t the 
strength, and I don’t think you, sweetie, have the authority to contradict me.”  
—W. H. Auden1 
 
I will now argue for the urgency of gesturing toward a queer theological ethics, 
indicating why queer theory and literary studies ought to reflect seriously on current 
discussions in academic theology.  In addition to the obvious fact that such reflection 
facilitates more sophisticated engagement with deeply theological writers like Auden, I 
am interested in how theology—particularly Auden’s own Anglican tradition—might 
answer David Halperin’s call to find alternatives to the scientistic, pathologizing, 
disciplinary language of psychology and psychoanalysis for thinking about and 
describing gay subjectivity.  Though I here take inspiration from Halperin’s remarks 
about the role of Catholic kitsch in gay men’s creative resistance to social trauma, it will 
soon become clear that I am talking about something different:  not “an outmoded, 
fairytale brand of religiosity,” but earnest religious practice.2  As evidenced by the camp 
spiritual style that Auden cultivates in poems like his Christmas Day letter to Chester 
                                                
1 Quoted in Dorothy J. Farnan, Auden in Love (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 158.  “The 
Divine Miss K” refers to Chester Kallman.  As his correspondence with friends reveals, Auden frequently 
referred to God as “Miss God.” 
2 Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want?, 38. 
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Kallman (to which I will briefly turn in a moment), Christianity can, I submit, serve as 
the basis for a non-psychological queer language of love.3 
Early in his career, Auden took a serious interest in psychoanalysis.  In the late 
nineteen twenties, for example, Auden embellished the psychological theories of his 
friend John Layard to explain homosexuality as a psychosomatic disorder.4  He even 
went so far as to seek a cure for his “disorder” of homosexuality from a psychoanalyst at 
a Belgian spa in 1928.5  But, as I have hinted throughout the preceding chapters, Auden 
began to reject psychoanalysis as an explanatory framework for sexual desire—and for 
subjectivity in general—after he converted to Christianity.   
In one way or another, many of the poems we have discussed throughout 
Queering the City of God indicate Auden’s rejection of psychoanalysis as an explanatory 
framework for desire.  “In Sickness and in Health” (1940) pokes fun at the notion of 
sublimation, calling it a “sin of the high-minded” (SP 122).  The annotations to “New 
Year Letter” (1941) include a dismissive squib that likens psychoanalysis to Puritanism:  
“Why, like the old Puritan, / Do you separate in man / Pleasure from reality?” the squib 
asks the “dear psychoanalyst” (DM 95).  “In Praise of Limestone” (1948) replaces 
Auden’s early, earnest Layardian search for a cure to homosexuality with a lighthearted 
camp Freudian gesture, relishing rather than pathologizing the gay cultural trope of 
mother-love.6  For the Time Being (1944) asserts that science can yield no answers about 
“how to be human now,” because the fall damaged our epistemic faculties; and the poem 
                                                
3 David M. Halperin, What Do Gay Men Want? An Essay on Sex, Risk, and Subjectivity (Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2007), 104. 
4 Humphrey Carpenter, W.H. Auden:  A Biography (London:  George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 91. 
5 Humphrey Carpenter, 82-84. 
6 See Richard Bozorth, Auden’s Games of Knowledge: Poetry and the Meanings of Homosexuality 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 2001), 245-246. 
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calls into question the idea of a natural law, or any construction of nature as revelatory of 
ethical principles.  For the Time Being thus challenges the ethical norms implicit in the 
pseudo-science of psychoanalysis.  And in The Age of Anxiety (1947), Malin argues that 
inasmuch as we (a) privilege the episteme of the present, and (b) remove God from the 
center of our epistemology, we remain “quite in the dark” about loving and living well 
(Age 104-106).  That is because we ourselves “have no mean,” which is to say that our 
“mirrors”—our main conceptual tools and ethical frameworks of psychoanalysis, the 
market, and the police (Age 104)—“distort” (Age 7).  Malin’s arguments suggest that to 
talk about subjectivity, we need theology.7 
It would therefore seem that Auden’s later oeuvre merely trades one disciplinary 
regime for another—the medical language of aberration for the theological language of 
sin.  It is certainly true that Auden’s later poetry frequently insists on the belief that we 
are all sinners under judgment.  But Auden’s appeals to the Kierkegaardian notion that 
before God “we are always in the wrong” (SP 121) have mostly to do with a kind of 
Niebuhrian pragmatic political gesture, e.g., Auden’s critique of pacifism on the grounds 
that it of necessity involves a spurious moral high ground.  Thus Auden’s Kierkegaardian 
pronouncements about sin do not represent an attempt, say, to democratize the sinfulness 
of sexual desire, so that straight people and gay people alike can castigate their own loves 
and longings. 
Moreover, I submit, it is a mistake to read the treatment of Christianity in Auden’s 
later poetry merely as a replacement disciplinary regime, for even if Christian theology 
(particularly in its scholastically inclined Anglo- and Roman Catholic varieties) includes, 
                                                
7 A point that reveals Auden’s influence by the twentieth-century Lutheran existential theologian 
Paul Tillich. 
 230 
among its many riches, a substantial lexicon of sin, the fact remains that Auden’s later 
poetry uses Christian theology as a means of creatively resisting the aforementioned 
disciplinary regimes of the market, the police, and psychoanalysis.  The syncretic 
ecclesiology that underpins the apology for friendship in “New Year Letter” (1941), for 
example, provides a means to resist the neoliberal “Verbürgerlichung of / All joy and 
suffering and love” that turns everyone into “Empiric Economic Man” (DM 57, 55).  The 
Christian account of art in The Sea and the Mirror (1944) treats art as a means to pursue 
queer self-fashioning safely in a world that polices queer desire.  And The Age of Anxiety 
(1947) shows ordinary people resisting the false mirrors of the market and the police 
through religiously inflected artifice (Age 87).  One last look at For the Time Being 
(1944) will show how Auden’s later poetry provides a means of creatively resisting the 
pathologizing regime of psychoanalysis. 
The Christian epistemology of For the Time Being, as I argued in chapter five, 
gestures towards a narrative ethic of grace without nature.  In other words, it articulates a 
responsive epistemology—we respond to God and to the network of agape that carries on 
the story of God—that shores up a virtue ethics—i.e., the network of agape, rooted in the 
story of the incarnation of God.  According to this responsive epistemology, we cannot 
read “nature” or “creation” at face-value.  Rather, story and sacrament, friendship and 
worship, have to direct our reading.  (The poem makes this argument primarily through 
Simeon and the three wise men.)  In chapter five I described this epistemological 
emphasis on narrative, sacrament, and friendship as a process of intersubjective 
recognition, through which a story about the world unfolds in conversation with rival 
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stories about the world, and sometimes changes or splits off into newer rival stories 
through prophetic critique.   
The narrative virtue ethics of grace without nature that For the Time Being 
articulates gestures towards a means of creatively resisting the pathologizing regime of 
psychoanalysis, then, because it propounds a Christian epistemology based on communal 
self-fashioning rather than constructions of the natural.  Norms arrive, not through 
unquestionable pseudo-scientific pronouncements, but through embodied relational 
practices.  Looking at Auden’s reliance on the British philosopher R. G. Collingwood, 
chapter five established the link between the relational Christian epistemology of For the 
Time Being and the contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s definintion of a 
tradition as a historically contingent ongoing argument with the past.  To defend the 
claim with which I began this paragraph, then, I submit that there is a crucial similarity 
between gay epistemology and Christian epistemology (as Auden and MacIntyre and 
Charles Taylor present it) and that, as it looks for new models of subjectivity, queer 
theory ought to explore this similarity.  In his late essays, Michel Foucault describes 
gayness in terms that look quite like MacIntyre’s account of tradition.  Gayness is not a 
psychological essence but an ethical practice.  And just like the sacramental network of 
agape, gay culture requires initiation and ongoing relational training.  It is a way of life. 
Expanding on the work of a poet like Auden, and putting his insights in 
conversation with MacIntyre and Foucault, enables us to see that contemporary Christian 
theology and practice—not just outmoded gothic fairytale kitsch—could have a 
constructive place in the ongoing story of queer ethics.  Certainly we can see from 
Auden’s own spirituality—as evidenced by the epigraph to this conclusion, and from my 
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reading of Auden’s Christmas Day letter to Kallman in the introduction—how the very 
serious camp erotics of wooing Miss God marks one alternative way of thinking about 
gay male subjectivity.  In addition, by (a) refusing to privilege the episteme of the 
present, (b) reaching back to discourses of apophaticism and askesis that predate the 
social sciences, and (c) its emphasis on following Christ as an aesthetic as well as ascetic 
craft, Auden’s Christian poetry indicates how queers might riff on Foucault’s insights 
about the epistemology of gay sociality in a distinctively and intelligibly Christian way, 
inventing new relational forms in the process.  It is certainly a project that current 
theological work in Auden’s own Anglican tradition could enrich,8 and one that I hope to 
take up in a future study. 
                                                
8 See Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy, and Gender (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002); Susannah Cornwall, Sex and Uncertainty in the Body of Christ: Intersex Conditions and 
Christian Theology (London: Equinox, 2010); Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., Sexuality and the Christian Body: 
Their Way into the Triune God (Oxford, Blackwell: 1999); and Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
